




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COMMENT



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SHOULD THE METRO CHAIRMAN BE DIRECTLY ELECTED?

INTRODUCTION

The Province of Ontario is now undertaking a comprehensive two-year study of the entire Metro system of government. Headed by the former Ontario premier, John Robarts, the Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto has extensive terms of reference that cover all matters related to Metro Toronto's government.¹ This will be the third major review of the Metro government structure since it was created in 1953² and it will likely lead to important modifications in the Metro system.

One of the issues to be studied - and an issue which has attracted a good deal of press attention - is how the Metro Chairman should be selected. According to the present method he is indirectly elected by Metro Council. Recently, editorial writers and political pundits have seized upon this question as one of special significance for democracy, arguing that the appointment process is inconsistent with democratic principles.

The main purpose of this Comment is to examine the merits and drawbacks of direct election of the Metro Chairman. The method of the Chairman's selection cannot be separated from two more basic issues: the role of the Chairman in the Metropolitan system of government and the balance of power between Metro and the area municipalities. This report first discusses the Metro Chairman's responsibilities and powers, both as originally defined and as they have evolved. It then briefly considers the implications of the expansion of Metro's responsibilities for the local municipal governments. Against this background, the pros and cons of directly electing the Metro Chairman are summarized.

As part of the research for this study, the BMR staff conducted interviews with several regional Chairmen across Ontario. We wished to learn, for one thing, whether this question of direct vs. indirect election was a concern facing other regional governments. This Comment concludes with a brief discussion of the issue from a province-wide perspective.

1. These include political representation, boundaries of area municipalities, inter-governmental relationships and financing.
2. The first review was a Commission of Inquiry in 1957-58 and the second was the one-man Goldenberg Royal Commission of 1963-5.

A. THE ROLE OF THE METRO CHAIRMAN

The Metro Chairman is often referred to as the Province of Ontario's most powerful municipal leader. Yet his responsibilities and powers as formally stated give no indication of this. According to the Municipal Act, the Metro Chairman has four main duties:

- he presides over Metro Council and Metro Executive meetings,
- he votes on Metro Executive Committee and on other standing committees,
- he casts the tie-breaking vote in Metro Council,
- and he serves as the "chief executive officer" of the Metropolitan Corporation.

It is this last duty - to act as the chief executive officer - which allows the latitude for the Chairman's very great informal power, power which seems to go well beyond what is implied by his assigned tasks.

The informal powers of the Metro Chairman can be grouped under three general areas of activity:

- first, the Chairman handles the administration of his Department. His office maintains an ongoing liaison service with the heads of the various Metro departments, members of Metro Council, the appointed and elected officials of the City and the boroughs, and the community at large. As head of the administrative arm of Metro, the Chairman's duties and obligations are immense. He sits on all six standing committees of Metro Council ^{1.} as well as numerous boards and commissions.^{2.} He therefore receives all reports referred to the committees and to Council by department heads (indeed, there is often prior consultation on an informal basis) and generally supervises the administrative details of running the corporation. This kind of day-to-day involvement in all areas of administration carries with it an obvious potential for control.
- second, he provides the political leadership in Council needed to develop priorities and make policy decisions. In the last two years the Metro Chairman's office has developed into the primary source of

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1. The six standing committees of Metro Council are: Social Services and Housing, Parks and Recreation, Works, Transportation, Legislation and Licensing, and Planning. (Planning just became a Department in January, 1975, replacing the Metro Planning Board).
 2. The present Chairman, for example, sits on the Toronto Transit Commission, the Metropolitan Board of Commissioners of Police, the Zoological Society, the Canadian National Exhibition Association's Board of Directors and its Executive and Finance committee.

all policy-shaping recommendations for Metro Council.^{1.}

- third, the Chairman is Metro's chief representative in its dealings with all other levels of government - federal, provincial and area municipal. Because of the scope of Metro's responsibilities, which has continued to expand since Metro was created in 1953, the Chairman now deals with more provincial ministries and more intergovernmental agencies than do the local mayors.^{2.}

By reason of these three general functions the Metro Chairman possesses an extensive sphere of influence. Power has naturally gravitated to the one individual who is providing the essential continuity and direction at the regional level and who is, after all, the only political representative looking after Metro business on a full-time basis.

This magnetic pull exerted by the Chairman is reinforced by the weakness of the Executive Committee. In theory, the Executive Committee (composed of the Chairman, the Mayor and three Executive Aldermen from the City, and the Mayors and four Controllers from the Boroughs^{3.}) is the chief executive body of Metro. It is supposed to handle all of the essential executive duties - including preparation of the budget, the tendering and awarding of contracts and personnel matters. However, in practice the local mayors and executive aldermen are so pre-occupied with their own municipalities that they tend to rely on the Chairman to provide leadership on Metro issues. Too busy to be concerned with the details of Metro administrative and governmental problems, the members of Metro Executive have not offered consistent effective direction so that more and more power has come to rest with the Chairman. The expansion of the Executive Committee to 14 members after January 1,

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1. The only comparable period of political leadership and policy initiation by the Metro Chairman was in the first years of Metro's operation under Mr. Frederick Gardiner's chairmanship (1953-1961).

A list of some of the major policy initiatives which have been put forward by the present Chairman (not all have been implemented) attests to this energetically positive approach:

- the establishment of a Metro housing policy
- the reorganization of the representation system of Metro Council and Executive
- the hiring of a grants officer and the creation of a Metro arts policy
- the servicing by Metro of the lands to the North of Metro (in Vaughan and Markham townships)
- the establishment of a North York recycling plant
- the building of a new sports stadium
- the establishment of area-wide bargaining with civic employees
- the integration of the Toronto Transit Commission as a Metro department (this was the only major proposal by the Chairman that has been rejected)

2. For example, he is a member of the Provincial-Municipal Liaison Committee, the Toronto Centre Coordinating Committee and the Toronto Area Transportation Operating Authority (TATOA).
3. After January 1, 1975 - prior to that, the 11-member Metro Executive Committee was made up of the Mayor and 4 Executive Aldermen from the City, the Mayors of the Boroughs and the Chairman. The four Controllers include 2 from North York, 1 from Scarborough and 1 from Etobicoke.

1975 can be expected to further diffuse authority and responsibility and lead to an even greater focusing of power on the Chairman.

This is all the more significant when one considers how the decision-making process actually works. While the ultimate legislative power rests with Metro Council, where decisions are made by a simple majority vote, to a considerable extent policy decisions are settled upon by the Executive Committee. Composed of Metro's most influential local politicians, the Executive generally controls the situation and few issues that have its approval are overturned in Council. (In certain financial and contract matters, where Council wishes to spend more money than the Executive has authorized, a two-thirds vote in Council is needed to overturn an Executive Committee recommendation.)

Within the Council, the standing committees handle the bulk of the work involved in supervising the administration with the main operating departments reporting to Council through them. These standing committees are composed of members of Council and are intended to provide the democratic control in the process. This is where the political input is supposed to be made.

However, two factors hinder these standing committees in performing their democratic role. First, certain decisions - namely, those dealing with budget, personnel and contracts - go directly to the Executive Committee and are not considered by the standing committees at all. Second, in some instances, the Commissioner is able to dominate the standing committee by virtue of his expertise and knowledge of the programs and problems of his Department. Hence, the standing committee's recommendations to the Executive Committee often endorse the Commissioner's views as a matter of course.

This means that the Executive Committee's role as a potential check on the Chairman's power is vital. And the apparent passivity of that body is more significant from the standpoint of democratic principles.

The Chairman's position has been augmented in a second way - by the increase in his personal influence over his department heads. Under the first two Metro Chairmen, the Commissioners operated with considerable independence, generally unhampered by interference from the Chairman or the Executive Committee. However, this appears to be changing and the present Chairman has been plainly assertive in directing the operations of the Metro Corporation.

This expansion of the Chairman's role is reflected in the changes that have taken place in the office organization and staffing.¹ Under the first two Chairmen the staff was very small, consisting of one administrative assistant and three secretaries. The position of Executive Director was only created during Mr. Albert (Ab) Campbell's term. The positions of Research Assistant and Executive Assistant, created towards the close of Mr. Campbell's administration, were not filled until the present Chairman took office. The present staff is composed of an Executive Director, a Research Assistant, an Executive Assistant, an Administrative Assistant, three secretaries and a clerk. One result of this increase in the

1. This staff increase is not solely the result of the Chairman's growing power. It also is indicative of the changing political climate and the increased demands that citizen participation have put upon the office.

Chairman's personal staff has been to confirm the Executive's reliance on the Chairman; there is a general feeling of confidence that the Chairman, with the help of an able staff, has done his "homework". More important, the additional staff has provided the resources that enable the Chairman to develop new programs and policies to bring to Council.

The Issue

As a result of these factors the Metro Chairman's power has grown markedly. It is the apparent discrepancy between the power wielded by the Chairman and the indirect basis of his election that bothers many people. The thrust of current thinking, in the press at least, is that indirect election of the Metro Chairman constitutes a violation of democratic principles.

Before examining this argument and the assumptions underlying it, it is helpful to remind ourselves of the system upon which Metro is based. When Metro was created in 1953 the primary model was the provincial county council system.¹ The basic framework of this system is its two-tier structure with two levels of councils. The first level is the local council, which serves townships, villages and towns, and is directly elected. The second level is the indirectly elected county council, composed of councillors who sit on it by virtue of their election to their local council. The head of this indirectly elected county council is appointed by the members of that body.

The clear premise of this county council system is that the directly elected local municipal council was intended to be the primary unit of local government. The indirectly elected second-tier council was to handle only those matters concerning the county as a whole. This was the concept underlying the design of Metro. When Metro was reorganized by the Ontario government in 1966, the scope of Metro's responsibilities was broadened² - but Metro Council was kept as an indirectly elected second-tier council with an indirectly chosen head.

However, since 1966 Metro's powers and responsibilities have continued to expand (one clear example being the recent strengthening of Metro's planning powers), and so have the Metro Chairman's. This increased role for Metro lies at the heart of the case now being made for direct election of both the Chairman and Metro councillors. Therefore, the problem of how the Chairman should be chosen raises a more fundamental and unavoidable issue: namely, Metro's proper role in our local government system. Perhaps the real question is whether the county council two-tier model is still appropriate or desirable for local government in a large metropolis. We recognize that any evaluation of the "pros" and "cons" of direct election of the Chairman (and of the Council as well) cannot be separated from this general problem of Metro's relationship to its local municipal governments. We are assuming here that some form of a two-tier system of municipal government will be maintained for Toronto.

1. The provincial county council system encompasses all Ontario municipalities under 100,000 in population.
2. Of the new powers and responsibilities which were transferred to Metro, the most important relate to social services and schools. Other new responsibilities include waste disposal, the C.N.E., public ambulance service.

B. THE PROS AND CONS OF DIRECT ELECTION

Pros

The essential rationale for direct election of the Metro Chairman was summed up in a recent Toronto Star editorial:¹.

Direct election of the Metro Chairman by the people. This should be a question of when, not whether, since it is obviously undemocratic to go on denying the people the choice of their most powerful municipal leader.

The first and most basic advantage of direct election is that it appears to be more consistent with democratic traditions. Our concept of democracy assumes that citizens have the right to choose the officials whom they want to exercise control over policy and administration. Direct election would make the Chairman responsible to a specific public constituency, require him to campaign on relevant Metro issues and allow him to be defeated at the polls if his platform or past performance were not acceptable to the majority. While the present method of indirect election cannot be said to violate the broad political principle,² direct election would afford the public more direct control.

A second benefit - for those who approve of the shift in political power from the local councils to Metro Council - is that direct election would increase the Chairman's stature and the prestige of the Metro government. The overall effect would be to reaffirm the trend to amalgamate local responsibilities under Metro. Again, this would reduce the apparent discrepancy between the Metro Chairman's regional responsibilities and his political mandate.

Cons

The drawbacks of directly electing the Metro Chairman are, in our view, far more significant. As shall be shown, while the idea of direct election may seem more democratic in principle, there are serious dangers.

First and foremost, direct election would create a position of potentially immense power. It would give the Chairman the largest popular mandate of any elected official in Canada with a constituency of some two and one-half million

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1. "Reforming Metro Government", Toronto Star (June 27, 1974).
 2. Since the Chairman is presently chosen by the elected representatives of the people, the essential democratic principle that the people have the right to choose their leaders is respected. The specific precedent for this is the British system of local government under which the presiding officer of a local Council is elected by the councillors. Interpreting democratic principles has always involved balancing different and competing values. For example, Canadians appoint the judges who enforce the law, while in the U.S., the election of judges is justified as an extension of the democratic principle - both governmental systems are considered democratic.

people. This would undercut the authority of Metro Council, the governing body of the corporation in which power is legally vested, and of the Executive Committee. Given the Chairman's already commanding role in his relationship with the Executive and Council, direct election would serve to accentuate this imbalance and make him all the more dominant.

This is closely tied to what we perceive as a second objection: direct election would reinforce the current trend to centralization of local government power at the Metro level. The clear danger of this trend to amalgamation is the potential loss of the responsiveness of Toronto's local governments to its citizens. All the officials with whom we spoke agreed that such a change would contribute to this centralization by giving the Chairman a mass power base and by promoting the visibility and hence the apparent pre-eminence of the regional government. The status and influence of the local mayors, for example, would inevitably be reduced.

A third objection arises out of the very practical question of cost. To wage an election over an area of 240 square miles with a population of two and one-half million people would take a staggering sum of money.¹ The cost would be virtually prohibitive for most people and therefore discriminatory, unless it were subsidized out of public funds. The prospect of candidates becoming overdependent on certain special interests seems unavoidable.

Finally, the Chairman's position ideally requires someone with special managerial skills. While the present Chairman has taken on a strong role as policy initiator and intergovernmental spokesman, the job of Chairman is largely one of administration and coordination. Because he presides over a federation, one of his responsibilities is to facilitate cooperation between the constituent local municipalities. The process of direct election is not as apt to deliver the person who possesses the necessary skills and who would be best qualified to be the chief executive officer as the indirect method.

Possible Solutions

How can the apparent inconsistency between the Chairman's powerful role and the indirect basis of his election best be solved?

Within the context of a two-tier system, two alternative routes are possible.² One approach would be to reinforce the development of the Chairman's office into that of a regional "super-mayor" by insisting that he be directly elected.³ The other is to clarify the Chairman's role and prevent an undemocratic concentration of power.

1. The estimate given by our present Chairman is \$250,000. See "Godfrey Says Job to Cost \$250,000", Toronto Star (Sept. 12, 1974).
2. A third reform alternative is the adoption of a parliamentary system at the regional level. This would involve the election of a Chairman who would campaign as the head of a political party with a specific program; he would stand for election as a regional councillor and become Chairman if his party won a majority of the seats. While this reform possibility does not, by definition, depend on amalgamation, it is difficult to envisage how such a system could work in a two-tier scheme.
3. If, as has been recently suggested, the Chairman's administrative and coordinating functions were transferred to a Chief Administrative Officer so that he became less of a "chairman" and more of an intergovernmental spokesman and policy developer, then the case for direct election would be more compelling.

As outlined above, there are serious problems inherent in direct election which, in our view, quickly dispell the notion that such a reform would be more Democratic.

Adoption of the second approach could permit the Chairman to offer the kind of leadership and coordination which a metropolitan system evidently requires without endowing him with excessive power. Following this second approach, we shall discuss three suggestions for reform:

(1) require that the Chairman be indirectly elected by members of Council from within their ranks. At present, Metro councillors can elect someone from their own number "or any other person".¹ By removing the provision "or any other person", the Chairman would have to be elected to Metro Council first in order to be eligible for appointment. In the present system this would mean that the Chairman would stand for election each term in his own area municipality; if selected to be the Chairman, he would resign and the local council would call a bi-election and would be responsible for filling the vacant Metro Council seat. The essential merit of this reform is that it would add a democratic check to the process.

However, there are two disadvantages that make this impractical. First, the people who had elected the individual chosen as Chairman would be deprived of their original choice for representative. True, this possibility exists now every time a new Chairman is chosen - but it need not occur every term. Second, the Chairman could find it difficult to get reelected in order to simply establish his eligibility for the Chairmanship. After vacating his local position the Chairman would be replaced by another representative who presumably would seek reelection. The constituents would thus be faced with a dilemma:

either they could vote for a potential Chairman who would, if successful, not serve as their representative, and simultaneously reject a good representative who may have served them well,

or they could vote against the person who would be a good Chairman and elect the person they wanted as their representative.

What if he (she) were permitted to retain his (her) constituency while serving as Chairman, so as to avoid these difficulties? The prime minister and provincial premiers are obvious precedents. However, the key difference between the federal and provincial example and the situation of a regional chairman is that the discipline of party politics and commitment to a party program are absent at the regional level. To a large extent, regional government business consists of overcoming local rivalries in order to get the member municipalities to work together solving problems and providing services for the region. As a result, the arrangements by which prime ministers and premiers can both head the government and represent their own constituencies does not seem suitable for the chairmen of municipal regions.

(2) strengthen the Executive Committee as an advisory and deliberating body. One proposal with this aim has been put forward by the present Metro Chairman. His plan calls for the creation of a sort of "cabinet", with executive members acting as municipal "ministers" and bearing the direct policy-making responsibility for the various departments. The necessary staff would be provided to enable the Executive

1. The Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Act (1970) Part I (no. 5[5])

Committee members to carry out their "ministerial" duties. This idea is said to have the advantages of relieving some of the pressure on the Chairman and confirming the Executive Committee as a countervailing power.

There are, however, difficulties with this idea. As executive members are not chosen by the Chairman but serve by virtue of their position at the local level, he is not free to select the people whom he considers most suitable in terms of their capabilities and interests. In fact, the description of this idea as a "cabinet" proposal is a misnomer. The proposal really involves the assignment of responsibility for a designated operating department to one or two executive committee members. The quality of their work will undoubtedly depend on the interest and time available of the individual member. It is worthwhile to note that this idea was tentatively but unsuccessfully tried out in Ottawa-Carleton in the early 1970's. Nevertheless it might be worthwhile to experiment with this idea in Metro on an ad hoc basis.

A more feasible way to bolster the Executive Committee would be to create a special subcommittee to work with the Chairman in carrying out his supervisory and decision-making tasks. Steps have, in fact, been taken in this direction. During the 1972-4 term two sub-committees were set up within the Executive Committee, one dealing with the budget (the Budget Sub-Committee) and the other dealing with personnel (the Personnel-Policy Advisory Committee or PPAC).¹ It would be logical to continue this approach and formalize the concept of an inner working Executive within the large 14-member Executive Committee. The chairman of this inner executive should be someone other than the Metro Chairman, so as to help further counteract the trend towards centralization of policy-making power under the Metro Chairman.

The advantage of strengthening and formalizing the PPAC-Budget sub-committee system is that it would help to check the continuing concentration of power in the hands of the Chairman. The responsibility of this inner executive would be formally and publicly acknowledged. Staff resources could be assigned and be responsible to the group, not the Chairman.² More political leaders would therefore be involved in defining Metro policies and their involvement would begin at an earlier stage in the decision-making process.³

In connection with this, it might be advisable to increase the Executive Committee's supervision of the budget process. Again, some steps are being taken to improve the system. Metro has recently hired a budget officer to work within the Treasury Department. His job will be to evaluate and review the budget proposals of the various departments. As well, an Executive sub-committee was established to permit closer supervision. But there is no comprehensive analysis of the proposed departmental budgets (which are compiled by the Finance Commissioner) and hence no sufficient basis upon which Executive Committee members can evaluate or challenge the various programs. Perhaps one member of the inner executive should be put in charge of the budget, as is done in the City of Toronto. The need for staff support to permit a complete and thorough analysis should be examined.

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1. The composition of both committees was identical except for one person. The budget sub-committee was made up of Chairman Godfrey, Mayors Flynn, Blair and Cosgrove and Alderman Eggleton. On PPAC, Alderman Jaffery replaced Art Eggleton.
 2. At present the members of the Executive Committee must depend on their own local municipal staff, or turn to the Chairman's staff.
 3. See bottom of page 10.

(3) directly elect the members of Metro Council. This could be done according to any one of a number of schemes. Two common proposals are:

* direct election of councillors from special Metro wards which have been superimposed on existing local ward structures. (The ward boundaries would not overlap local area municipal boundaries.)

* direct election at large within each municipality according to proportional representation. This would avoid the problems inherent in creating different and competing constituencies, in terms of which representative actually had the mandate of the people.¹ To prevent the disfranchisement of certain sectors of the electorate, each voter would be permitted to vote for a specified percentage of the total number to be elected at large in the borough or City.

The focus and length of this Comment precludes a full discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of direct election of Metro Council or the various schemes. Because of our deep concern about the implications of this for the continued vitality of the local governments, we are reluctant to recommend such a move at

3. (Continued from preceding page)

Shortly after this study was completed, a report, prepared by John Kruger, executive director in the Metro Chairman's office, was released. It made recommendations based on a recent private meeting held December 12, 1974, of the mayors and the Chairman at a Toronto hotel. The report's key recommendations listed below are designed to 1) give more power to the Metro executive committee, 2) to tighten the administrative management of Metro government operations, and 3) to free the Metro Chairman to spend more time and energy as intergovernmental spokesman. They are:

- a) Appointment of a management committee composed of the six Metro mayors that would take over from the executive committee the task of hearing public deputations and receiving reports from administrative departments.
- b) Appointment of executive committee members to each of the six standing committees of council to coordinate the policy of each committee.
- c) Appointment of a chief administrative officer with a department responsible for the management performance of the Metro clerk's, treasury, computer, personnel and property departments.
- d) Appointment of a director of economic and policy research attached to the CAO's department.
- e) Reorganization of the Metro Chairman's office; creation of two or three new positions in the Chairman's office including a director of intergovernmental affairs and a special assistant(s) to the Chairman. The functions filled by the present executive director and special researcher would, in the new scheme, come under the CAO's department.

The first two proposed changes are consistent with our own recommendation that the executive committee be strengthened and we support their general thrust. (Whether or not the "management committee" should consist of the six mayors needs further examination.) However, the last three proposed changes - including the creation of a separate administration department headed by a CAO as well as other officials within the Chairman's office - cannot be either endorsed or rejected here by the Bureau without further study. Our instinctive reaction is one of hesitation at the idea of additional bureaucracy as a means of increasing administrative effectiveness or of curtailing the Chairman's power.

1. The situation is easily envisaged in which the local council representative(s) and the Metro Council representative conflict on one or many issues.

this point. Our submission to the Robarts Commission to be published later this year will spell out the conditions under which direct election of Metro councillors might be acceptable. From the standpoint of the issue being examined here, the chief advantage of directly electing Metro councillors whose interest and energy would be fully devoted to Metro issues is that it would further counter-balance the Chairman's power.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- I. That the Chairman continue to be indirectly elected by members of Metro Council according to the present system.
- II. That the role of the Executive Committee be strengthened by such measures as:
 - the creation of an inner working executive to work with the Chairman in providing political and administrative leadership
 - the assigning of specific responsibilities to individual Executive Committee members: for example, appointing one member as budget chief and giving him the necessary staff support to permit critical evaluation of the budget.

C. FROM A PROVINCE-WIDE PERSPECTIVE

Toronto's metropolitan system represents a form of regional government that is in the process of being instituted across Ontario. In 1968 the provincial government created the Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton, patterned after the apparently successful Toronto plan. Since then ten more regional governments have been set up out of a total of 29 that were originally proposed.¹

Although the regional municipalities differ in size, population, composition and urban density, all have been modelled on the original two-tier Toronto scheme. Each regional government has left some local affairs in the hands of the local units and transferred the responsibilities of apparently region-wide concern to the central council. Generally, the composition of the regional council is determined by a method of indirect election;² the head of the local council and a specified number of local councillors sit on the regional council. In every case the first Chairman of the regional council was appointed by the province, with succeeding Chairmen to be chosen by the council itself.

Because of the essential similarity in their systems, we were naturally interested in learning whether the matter of how the Chairman is chosen was an issue in the other regional municipalities across Ontario. After meeting with leading public officials in several regions we became more convinced of the merits of the indirect election process. The arguments against direct election, outlined above, are even more applicable to the regions examined:

1. Bureau of Municipal Research, Regional Government - The Key to Genuine Local Autonomy; Civic Affairs (Toronto: 1968), p.1
2. In Niagara, some of the area municipalities use direct election at large, according to proportional representation, to choose the councillors who will join the heads of each of the 12 municipalities on the regional council.

* The size of the regions underscores the danger of excessive centralization, which the Chairman's direct election would both symbolize and accentuate. The need to preserve local governments to ensure a responsiveness to citizens at the primary level seems more acute in the broader context of province-wide local government reorganization.

* The difficulty and cost of waging a region-wide election must again be considered as an argument against direct election in regions that encompass from 240 to 1100 square miles. No other Canadian politician is required to campaign over as large an area encompassing so many people. Such a change would almost certainly make it necessary for successful candidates to be very wealthy or to have access to substantial financial resources.

* The regional Chairmen whom we interviewed all felt strongly that the need to electioneer each term would have a negative impact on their effectiveness as the chief executive officer and "impartial" head of the federation.

* An additional consideration in many regional municipalities is that, unlike Metro Toronto, they embrace one or two major cities and several minor municipalities. Thus in any region-wide election, there would be a built-in advantage for candidates from the dominant municipality that would be unfair to and resented by the other member municipalities.

* Moreover, none of the other regional Chairmen appear to play a role comparable to that played by the Metro Toronto Chairman. Despite the structural similarities, Metro Toronto obviously differs from the recently established regional governments in the scope and complexity of the needs it must meet; the Metro Chairman's expanding role reflects this challenge. It is not surprising that the method of selecting the regional chairman does not seem to be a problem in the other regional municipalities.

* With regard to the suggestions for reform discussed above:

- the disadvantages of election of the chairman from amongst the ranks of the regional council are multiplied in the other regions
- with the exception of Ottawa-Carleton, the other regional governments do not have Executive Committees; recommendations to strengthen this committee are irrelevant in this context
- direct election of regional councillors is being considered in some regions. The chief concern seems to be how to ensure proper coordination between local and regional councils so that the regional council does not become both more powerful and also more remote from local needs and interests. This question of representation is one facing Metro Toronto as well and remains a major issue to be settled. The decision of the Roberts Commission for Metro Toronto will likely result either in the confirmation or abandonment of the present method of indirect election for the other regional governments in Ontario.

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