

CIVIC AFFAIRS

A BULLETIN ISSUED BY THE BUREAU OF MUNICIPAL RESEARCH, 32 ISABELLA STREET, TORONTO 5

November 3, 1958

METROPOLITAN DEBT STORY

Since January 1, 1954, when Metro began operations, the debenture debt load of the area has been rising sharply. It will shortly have more than doubled. The deadweight portion of debt has increased more rapidly than the debt to be serviced from revenue-earning enterprises. The debt is unevenly spread among the constituent area municipalities and, what is more, the distortion is growing. The Bureau recommends an improved ten year capital budget presentation which would help us to discern the future debt position and keep it under control.

The Recent Trend	Page 1
The Overall Position in Review	2
Per Capita and Assessment Comparisons	3
How the Burden is Divided Between the Two Levels	4
Local Area Debt Load	4
We Must See Where We Are Heading	5
Debt Tables	6-8

* * * * * * * * *

At the opening of the year, Metropolitan Toronto's net debenture debt obligations totalled 434 million dollars. If the load were spread evenly over all the people--which it is not--every man, woman and child would have a capital obligation amounting to \$314, and interest charges to pay in addition. Measured against the value of property, the indicated burden upon the owner of a home assessed at \$10,000--and worth perhaps \$25,000--was \$1,429 plus interest. The fact that the load is not spread evenly in either of these ways means that the obligations upon many of our citizens are much heavier than these indicated averages.

The Recent Trend

Since January 1, 1954, when Metro began actual operations, the local government debt load has grown considerably every year. The present capital works programme envisages new debt creation in 1958 amounting to \$96 million. Against this figure, however, must be offset the debt which is being redeemed. The average annual increase over the past four years has been a little under \$49 million. Throughout the same period, the percentage increase in the total net debenture liability has been 81.4%. Two months hence, when Metro concludes its fifth year its people will find that their municipal debt load has more than doubled over the period. Plainly, this trend cannot continue for very much longer.

- 2 -

One theory on battling economic recessions is that governments should spend heavily on public undertakings when times are slack and employ the check rein when economic conditions improve. Municipal governments are not in a position to engage in such manoeuvres because, for one reason, they are forbidden by law from going into deficit financing on current account. The province imposes this restriction, quite properly, in recognition of most municipalities' limited capacity and all municipalities' heavy reliance upon the real property tax for current financing.

Instead of reducing debt in prosperous times, local governments tend to increase it thereby entailing heavier annual debt charges (payment of interest and repayment of principal installments) whose full effect may not be felt until after an obvious recession has set in.

Faced with a backlog accumulation of necessary public works and a remarkable rate of population growth and community expansion, the Metropolitan Municipality and its constituent area municipalities have been adding greatly to debt in good times and seem prepared to go on doing so in spite of the recent downturn in economic activity.

Early in 1957, backed by the Bureau and other organizations interested in good government, the Council of Metropolitan Toronto voted to put two mills on the tax rate for the specific purpose of curbing new debt while pushing ahead with capital projects. For 1957, it meant that \$6,366,000 which would otherwise have been borrowed was paid from current taxes. Even so, the total debt responsibility of the Metropolitan Corporation and its member municipalities combined was higher by some \$66 million at the end of 1957 compared with the year previous. The increase was approximately eighteen per cent. When full allowance is made for debt incurred for public utilities and similar enterprises which are expected to be self-supporting, total combined dead weight debt increased by some \$45 million, representing a rise of some twenty-one per cent.

Between the 1957 and 1958 levies the Metro assessment for general purposes increased by only some five per cent. Thus debt was being increased more than the expanded tax base warranted and the heavier load was destined to push taxes up in future years unless ways are found to effect economies sufficient to offset the increased annual debt charges.

The Overall Position in Review x at any particular time, the assess-

Table I appended to this bulletin indicates how the Net Debenture Debts of Metropolitan Toronto and the thirteen area municipalities have grown since December 31st, 1953, the eve of Metro's birth as an operating municipality. Included in these figures are all outstanding debt issued by both the area municipalities now forming part of Metro and by the Metropolitan Corporation since its inception. The total takes in the debt undertakings on behalf of all the associated "local boards" including the Metropolitan Separate School Board.

Since 1953 total debenture debt in Metro has increased from \$239 millions to \$434 millions, a rise of 81.4 per cent. Were this increase in debt mainly for revenue-earning enterprises the picture might not look too bad, but such debt increased only 67 per cent while the remaining dead weight debt which must be serviced directly by property taxes, increased by 92.8 per cent. Of the dead weight debt, the amounts entered into for general municipal purposes other than schools increased by 77 per cent, noticeably more than the 67 per cent rise for revenue-earning enterprises.

The largest increase among the components of Metro debt was in school debt, which jumped 115.8 per cent between 1953 and 1957. Because of the form in which capital assistance is provided by the province for school expenditures, the local position appears worse than it is. On other undertakings, such as roads, the province pays out a lump sum which other undertakings, such as roads, the province pays out a lump sum which other undertakings, such as roads, the province undertakes to ion, the municipality borrows the entire sum and the province undertakes to ion, the municipality borrows the entire sum and the province undertakes to pay an agreed share of the annual debt charges as they fall due. The pay an agreed share of the annual debt charges as they fall due. The province is committed to help service some \$86 millions Metro portion of the \$117 million of metropolitan school debt. Yet changes in construction costs and in the grant policy from year to year alter the percentage of approved costs which the province will accept as its share. In 1954, the province absorbed 27 per cent of the approved Metro total for the year whereas by 1957 the figure had shrunk to 17 per cent.

In terms of annual increases, the rise in school debt between 1956 and 1957 was the largest percentage increase of any of the components in any of the years covered in Table I. An unqualified comparison, however, is misleading. For instance, from its inception until the end of 1957, is misleading. For instance, from its inception until the end of 1957, is misleading took on a capital commitment of over \$29 million for roads, and Metro alone took on a capital commitment of over \$29 million for roads, and yet was able to keep the debenture load to a figure of some \$14 million. The remainder was financed beforehand in two ways-by direct grants from the Province of Ontario and from the special two mill capital levy in 1957.

If there can be criticism of the two mill capital levy it is of the way in which it is allocated. In 1957 over \$3.9 million of the \$6.4 million capital expenditure out of revenue went for roads. Thus examination of capital expenditure appreciation of how certain capital expenditures are financed can lead to unwarranted anxiety over the rise in tures are financed can lead to unwarranted anxiety over the rise in education debt. On the other hand, would diversion of the two mill levy to education debt. On the other hand, would diversion of the two mill levy to subway financing lead to a corresponding increase in total borrowing?

To help gauge the significance of debt figures, it is common to express them in amounts per capita and amounts per \$10,000 of assessment. Both comparisons can be useful if properly understood.

For the dead weight portion of debt, the basis of repayment is largely taxation on all assessed property, and subject to recognition of the level of assessed values which exists at any particular time, the assessment comparison is helpful. Part of this debt, of course, will be local ment comparison is helpful. Part of abutting properties on the streets improvement debt payable by owners of abutting properties on the streets where the improvements are made. For revenue-earning debt, repayment is expected to come from the people using the service and the per capital expected to come from the people using the service and the per capital expected to come from the people using the market. Taxpayers, however, become liable for repayment of revenue-earning debt if the income of ever, become liable for repayment of revenue-earning debt if the income of the enterprise is insufficient. An example is the so-called "grant" of \$2,300,000 to the T.T.C. during the transition period. The taxpayers of Metropolitan Toronto footed the bill.

In Metro financing, the per capita and assessment comparisons require further qualification. First of all, the debt is split between metropolitan obligations which are spread over the whole area and individual obligations of each area municipality. Within the former category are dual obligations of each area municipality. Within the former category are included separate school debts where the tax responsibility falls solely on included separate school supporters. In the latter category the weight of debt separate school supporters to municipality.

How the Debt Burden is Divided Between the Two Levels

Table II shows how the overall debt load is divided between the metropolitan and the local area municipalities. We see, for example, that only sixty per cent of the total debt is apportioned evenly throughout the broader area. The remaining forty per cent has been assumed by the various area municipalities in widely varying proportions. The percentage of debt held by the area municipalities is such that one area municipality can be in serious difficulties while another maintains quite a safe position.

Turning to dead weight debt, it can be seen that the area municipalities are directly liable for an even higher percentage of the combined total-434 per cent.

Not so the school debt portion. Area municipalities are responsible for only 27 per cent of the total. But the surprising fact is not that their share of school debt is so small, rather that it is so large. When their share of school debt is so small, rather that it is so large. When their share of school debt is school debt and it has continued to Metro began it took over all existing school debt and it has continued to finance what might be called the essential minimum new capital outlays, with the help of provincial grants. The area school debts of over \$31 with the help of provincial grants. The area school debts of over \$31 million are all new since January 1, 1954, and no part of the repayment of such debt is met by provincial funds.

The area school debts illustrate dramatically that local authorities are not prepared to confine school construction to what the province describes as essential classroom and administrative facilities. Does the entire difference represent unbridled extravagance? The answer would seem to be no, especially since the greatest increases in area school debts are to be no, especially since the greatest increases in area school debts are in those suburban municipalities faced with the greatest necessity to limit capital expenditures.

For the total school capital undertakings, apart from local approvals, there is the necessity to obtain authorization from the Metropolitan School Board and the Metropolitan Council. At the provincial level there are the approvals required of the Department of Education and the Ontario are the approvals required of the school construction programme warrants Municipal Board. Nevertheless, the school construction programme warrants continued scrutiny with total debt so heavy and new school debt of the area municipalities mounting so fast.

The Local Area Debt Load

The area portion of the combined debt is further separated, according to municipality responsible, in Table III. For each debt classification, each area municipality's position is stated as a proportion of the total for all the area municipalities. The percentages obtained can be compared both with the per cent of Metro's population in each municipality and with the percent of the Metro assessment in that municipality for general purposes as used for the 1958 tax levy. In combination, this presentation indicates how the burden of area debt is spread among the municipalities, and also the relative ability of the different municipalities to carry the load.

Toronto has over 47 per cent of Metro's population, nearly 44 per cent of the total area debt, and over 52 per cent of Metro assessment to support that debt. As a contrast, Scarborough with eleven per cent of the population has nearly fifteen per cent of the total direct debt of the area municipalities and only 8.6 per cent of the Metro assessment.

Scarborough and Etobicoke prove to be worst off relative to their assessments, while Leaside and New Toronto, with their high ratio of industrial and commercial assessments, find the burden least onerous on all their properties. In spite of a high revenue-earning debt, Scarborough still has the unwelcome distinction of having the worst ratio of dead weight debt and assessment, although it is not much worse off than Weston, Etobicoke and Long Branch. Mimico, by keeping its dead weight debt low, managed to earn the most favourable position. Leaside and New Toronto were next best off.

For school debts the table shows how the "Big Three" suburban townships, with 32.23% of the population have 62.87 per cent of the area school debts. These are the areas of greatest growth since Metro and hence of greatest need for new schools; under Metro they are carrying an increasing burden for school capital costs while those municipalities whose main period of expenditure was prior to Metro have all of Metro's resources to assist in the payment of debt charges on their older school plant.

We Must See Where We Are Heading

Among the various parts of Metro, there is a growing distortion in the debt load, as Table III plainly shows. The situation threatens more than the well-being of particular area municipalities, it strikes a blow at the credit standing and the solidarity of Metro itself. The debt position points up in yet another forceful way the fact that the creation of Metro has not wiped out the problems which accompany the expansion of a single big metropolis and which are most acute for the suburban municipalities where growth is most rapid. On the contrary, it is perpetuating problems which by now would have produced outright amalgamation, had Metro not been established when it was.

As for area wide debt the picture is also cloudy. The Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto now maintains a ten year capital works programme which effects a certain amount of control over proposed capital expenditures. But there are no figures showing the effect on outstanding debt totals as and if the programme is implemented. Does this capital works "budget" tell us enough about the direction in which we are heading? The Bureau suggests it does not, and urges that a complete plan for capital spending be developed: 803,85 224,60 245,84 271,19 314,28 (1) 1,169 1,245 1,598 1,429

- (a) Covering Metropolitan Toronto and each area municipality; and
- (b) Disclosing the annual debt charge burden to which taxpayers of each local municipality will be committed for the ten year period ahead.

In 1957 nearly \$35 million were paid out for principal and interest on municipal debt by Metro and the area municipalities. The estimated debt charges for 1958 amount to over \$412 million. Let us find out where Toronto is heading in its accumulation of debt before irretrievable damage is done. 01 Debt 40,35 48,75 57,88 67,00 85,00

BUREAU OF MUNICIPAL RESEARCH

A. H. LEMMON ERIC HARDY

amounted in 1952 to \$1,671,981,609. The figure is not comparable

President

Director

NET DEBENTURE DEBT

METROPOLITAN TORONTO AND THE THIRTEEN AREA MUNICIPALITIES

As at December 31st - In Thousands of Dollars

1. Total Debt	1953 \$ 239,118	1954 \$ 280,723	1955 \$ 320,333	1956 \$ 367,727	1957 \$ 433,709	% Increase 1957 over 1953 81.4
Less						
2. Debt of Revenue-Earning Enterprises	106,135	122,297	144,918	156,259	177,290	67.0
Equals						
3. Dead Weight Debt Composed of	132,983	158,426	175,415	211,468	256,419	92.8
(a) General Muni- cipal Debt	78,616	97,428	100,002	120,619	139,118	77.0
and (b) School Debt	54,366	60,997	75,413	90,849	117,301	115.8
Population	1,172,556	1,250,773	1,302,758	1,356,468	1,380,000	17.7
Total Taxable Assessment	(1)	2,361,304	2,573,865	2,832,682	3,034,496	(1)

		Inc	dicated	Per Car	ita Det		\$10,000 Assessment				
1.	Total Debt	1953 \$ 203.85	1954 \$ 224,40	1955 \$ 245.84	1956 \$ 271.19	1957 \$ 314.28	1953 \$ (1)	\$	1955 \$ 1,245	1956 \$ 1,298	1957 \$ 1,429
2.	Debt of Revenue-Earning Enterprises	90.48	97.76	111,22	115.24	128.47	(1)	518	563	552	584
3.	Dead Weight Debt (a) General Municipal Debt	67.02	126.64 77.88			185.81	(1)	671	389	747	845 458
	(b) School Debt						(1)	258		321	387

⁽¹⁾ The combined total assessments of the City and the twelve suburbs amounted in 1953 to \$1,671,981,609. The figure is not comparable with those of later years when a uniform assessment was in effect throughout the whole area.

NET DEBENTURE DEBT

METROPOLITAN TORONTO AND THE THIRTEEN AREA MUNICIPALITIES

As at December 31st - In Thousands of Dollars

						Increase 1957 over
	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1953
Marca 1 Dobt	\$	280,\$23	\$ 3	\$ 727	433,709	81.4
1. Total Debt	239,118	280,723	320,333	367,727	400,100	
Less						
2. Debt of						
Revenue-Earning	106 125	122,297	144,918	156,259	177,290	67.0
Enterprises	106,135	120,001	Metro	Ares		
Equals					Spinio	00.0
3. Dead Weight Debt	132,983	158,426	175,415	211,468	256,419	92.8
Composed of						
(a) General Muni- cipal Debt	78,616	97,428	100,002	120,619	139,118	77.0
and (b) School Debt	54,366	60,997	75,413	90,849	117,301	115.8
Population	1,172,556	1,250,773	1,302,758	1,356,468	1,380,000	17.7
Total Taxable Assessment	(1)	2,361,304	2,573,865	2,832,682	3,034,496	(1)

	Ind	licated	Per Car		ot	Indicated Debt per \$10,000 Assessment							
1. Total Debt	1953	1954 \$ 224.40	1955	1956	1957	1953 \$ (1)	1954 \$ 1,189	1955 \$ 1,245	1956 \$ 1,298	1957 \$ 1,429			
2. Debt of Revenue-Earning Enterprises	90.48	97.76	111,22	115.24	128.47	(1)	518	563	552	584			
3. Dead Weight Debt	113.37	126.64	134.62	155.95	185.81	(1)	671	682	747	845			
Municipal Debt	67.02	77.88	76.75	88.95	100,81	(1)							
(b) School Debt	46.35	48.76	57.88	67.00	85.00	(1)	258	293	321	387			

⁽¹⁾ The combined total assessments of the City and the twelve suburbs amounted in 1953 to \$1,671,981,609. The figure is not comparable with those of later years when a uniform assessment was in effect throughout the whole area.

TABLE II

APPORTIONMENT OF NET DEBT BETWEEN METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY AND LOCAL AREA MUNICIPALITIES

As at December 31, 1957 - In Thousands of Dollars
Area

Total Portion Portion \$ 1. Total Debt 433,709 260,115 173,594	Area Portion as % of Total 40.03
Less 2. Debt of Revenue- Earning Enterprises 177,290 114,589 62,701	35.37
Equals 3. Dead Weight Debt 256,419 145,525 110,894	43.25
Composed of (a) General Municipal Debt 139,118 59,614 79,504	57.15
and (b) School Debt 117,301 85,912 31,389	9 26.76

TABLE III

			% of Total	Area	1	32,33	21.01	22.46	0000	75°67	3.24	.11	2710	118	90"	2) .36	19.			7.	1111		100.	
				School	Depr	10,147	6,595	7.051		6,088	1,017	36		N11	19	118(2)	1900[2]		(2)62	48	NAL		31,389	
			% of	Area	Dept	40.58	11.74	10.83		13,50	9.83	96-9		2.37	1.39	.35	6.1	40.	86.	1.28	19.		100.	
	Dollars			General Municipal	Debt	32,265	9,330	813 0	0,000	10,736	7,816	0 749	72.162	1,881	1,103	282	100	480	782	1,019	450		79,50%	
	MUNICIPANDS of		% of	Total	Debt	38.25	14.36	24 22	14:10	15.17	7.97		TC * 27	1.70	1.01			19*	.78	96*	11		100.	
	THE THIRTEEN AREA MUNICIPALITIES IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS			Dead	Debt	42,412	15,925		15,664	16,825	8,833		4,779	1,881	1.122	7007	204	676	861	1,067	150	NOW Y	110,894 100.	
	HE THIRT		% of	Total	Debt	53.74	16 77		16.10	12,36	1111		1.19	.04	90		07.	H11	.02	.41		.17	100.	
	BY		Debt of Revenue-	Earning Thistor	prises	\$ 22 ED	17120000	9,889	10,092	7.752	114.1	7711	744	2%	40 7	- 1	6.76	M11	10,8	258		107	62,701	
1	RNE DIR	29	00	Total	Debt	10000	43°C4	14.87	14.84	14.16	000	60.0	3.18	1.10			•29	.39	.50			.32	1000.	
	NET DEBENTURE DEBT BORNE DIRECTLY	As at December 31, 1957	9		Total Jebt]	69=	76,106 43,84	25,813	25,755	OA 577	110,27	8,855	5.523	1 905	2006	1,155	497	676	872	1 205	1,060	557	173,594 100.	
	DEBENTUR	t Decemb	9	% of	Aggasa-		52,13	13.23	8.61	200	23.6	5.88	3.21	1 70	Toto	1,84	.72	1,10	19		10.	.61	100.	
		As a	,	% of Metro	Popu-	TER TOTAL	47.67	13,25	11.00		66. 4	8.51	R 02	2000	1°40	1.19	1,00	-84	36	0.	•68	.63	100. 100.	
	- DINGTO DOLITAN TORONTO -	The state of the s				and Population	Toronto - 658,250	North York - 182,942	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	Scarborougn - 151,000	Etobicoke - 110,306	York - 117,503	100000	East fork - 69,341	Forest Hill - 20,107	Leaside - 16,418	Mimico - 13.838	m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m	COC-TT - ON UNION MAN	Long Franch - 10,552	Weston - 9,404	Swansca - 8,710	All Area Municipalities Combined - 1,280,775	

55

(1) Includes C.N.E. and Housing and Parking Authorities. (2) Attributed share of Lakeshore Board of Education Debt of \$386,972.