


1975

# Metro Toronto Under Review:

## WHAT ARE THE ISSUES?



A Joint Publication:



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SOCIAL  
PLANNING  
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*Metro Toronto Under  
Review:*

**WHAT ARE THE  
ISSUES?**

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## INTRODUCTION

When the Provincial Government announced last September, 1974 that it had commissioned the Hon. John Robarts to undertake the third major review of Metro's government, a number of individuals felt themselves drawn together by a common concern. This group — less than a dozen in number — represented a variety of backgrounds and professional interests, including the Social Planning Council, the Bureau of Municipal Research and the University of Toronto. The concern we shared was that the real issues at stake in this examination would not surface. We were somewhat alarmed at the apparent superficiality of the public discussion of the matters to be dealt with by the Commission. We believed that unless these issues were clearly identified and defined, neither the public nor the staff of the Commission itself would be equipped to consider all of the options.

A few exploratory meetings were held in January and February to talk about how we should respond to the Commission. It became clear that we were all groping ourselves — groping for a framework in which we could place the problems which we saw with the existing system of local government. It also became clear that in spite of what might be described as a common sensitivity to the present urban political climate, there was no agreement on any one single alternative as "the answer".

The result of these meetings was the April 24th Conference: "Metro Toronto Under Review: What are the Issues?", jointly sponsored by the Bureau of Municipal Research and the Social Planning Council. The principal objective of this Conference was to provide a forum for discussion of the essential points at issue in the review, which underlay specific questions of structure and organization. In creating a climate of inquiry into the kind of local government that is relevant to contemporary human needs, we aimed

at encouraging citizens to challenge accepted notions about effectiveness and efficiency in service delivery and planning.

Invitations were extended to people who had more than a passing interest in the structure and operation of local government. We were successful in having representation from the following interests: agencies/professional, university, citizen groups, governmental (elected and appointed), business, labour and the media. Registration was somewhat limited to ensure an appropriate cross-section, with the maximum number set at 150.

The programme of the Conference was designed around three main themes.<sup>1</sup> The first session dealt with the purpose of local government in the contemporary metropolitan context. Session II focused on the form of Metro's government and consisted of oral presentations based on the four background papers contained in this publication. The third and final session was devoted to the issue of municipal autonomy — the power and independence of local government in terms of both municipal finance and planning.

This publication consists of the Keynote Address and four background papers prepared for the BMR/SPC Conference, together with a brief summary of the themes that emerged.

We hope that the presentations which follow will help to highlight the central questions about the future form of government in the Metro Toronto area. We believe that the arguments put forward will contribute to:

- a healthy skepticism as to the validity of traditional arguments about the benefits of centralization
- a more informed understanding of the changing priorities for local government.
- and the development of sound criteria for evaluating the alternative solutions.

1. See Appendix A for Conference Programme

## ABSTRACTS OF THE FOUR BACKGROUND PAPERS

### PAPER #1 – The Form of Local Government: What Are the Options for Metro?

This paper examines several possible options for the structure of local government in the Metropolitan Toronto area. Three alternative approaches are considered - - *amalgamation, metropolitan federation, and the dissolution of Metro.*

Each option is examined in the light of several basic oft-cited goals. These goals express certain traditional values of local government in a democracy, values associated with the concepts of participation, efficiency and individual liberty. The five goals that we selected as our criteria for judging each scheme can be abbreviated as follows (not listed in any order of priority):

- (a) participation;
- (b) sense of community;
- (c) efficiency;
- (d) effective planning;
- (e) sufficient local autonomy.

The paper illustrates the challenge involved in designing a structure conducive to the integration of the two principal sets of objectives that local government serves: namely, the delivery of essential hard and soft services and the political function of providing for local democracy. The task of structuring government for our metropolitan region in order to meet the criteria as fully as possible is a formidable one.

### PAPER #2 – Efficiency in Urban Government: Economies and Diseconomies of Scale.

This paper examines the concept of economies (and diseconomies) of scale as applied to municipal services. The subject was suggested since the justification for amalgamating specific municipal services in Metro Toronto is often the economies of scale argument.

In attempting to respond to the question, the paper discusses the notion of efficiency – in both its narrow ‘cost-saving’ and broad ‘quality of life’ terms. In addressing the diseconomies of scale, the paper deals with the blind faith in the use of common standards, management by objectives, as well as the over-specialization and co-ordination problems of bureaucracy. It is pointed out, too, that there are decision-making implications to changes in scale, to be considered beyond the efficiency questions.

The paper concludes that while there is nothing definitive about economies of scale, some services (especially “hard” services) appear to benefit in some respects from economies of scale, where others (especially “soft” services) appear to have few, if any, economies of scale. The paper’s summary conclusion is that there are certain shibboleths in the argument for economies of scale that should not be accepted automatically.

### PAPER #3 – Human Services – Co-ordinated Planning and Integrated Delivery

The growth and development of human services in the municipal sector has received relatively little attention. This paper attempts to situate the extent of this growth, how its present shape is affected by the process of historical evolution, and what some of the current problems are.

The concept of human services is an attempt to interrelate the examination of municipal service areas which hitherto have been seen as separate and distinct. The need for inter-related planning and delivery is cited, with an analysis provided which suggests that this is an appropriate area for municipal leadership.

The concepts of both effectiveness and efficiency as goals of urban government are examined in relation to why we need the integrated development of human services, and to which municipal level this responsibility should be assigned.

This paper does not deal with the larger issue of what options exist for Metro – federation, amalgamation, dissolution. It does however affirm an important role for area municipalities in the human services, which by implication rules out amalgamation as an absolute preference.

### PAPER #4 – Planning Responsibilities in Metro: A Search for the New Consensus

Metropolitan government in Toronto was originally conceived as an administrative device to expedite the provision of basic services to rapidly growing suburbs by tapping the financial strength of the city’s commercial core. The geographic centrality of this core became

translated into conceptual plans that called for radially oriented road and transit facilities along with the expansion of residential areas in concentric rings of more-or-less constant population densities. Consistent with this Metro idea was the aggressively pursued interest in territorial expansion into what have now become the new Regional Municipalities of Durham, York and Peel. More deliberate structural planning of the region was avoided because Metro officials believed that their planning powers were inadequately defined in legislation.

With Metropolitan Toronto now almost completely covered by first-generation development and related land uses, with the planning area confined since January 1st, 1974 to the six metropolitan local governments, with a greater emphasis on social planning and with legislative changes that have conferred increased planning responsibilities on the Metro level of government, the stage is fully set for a new consensus that will re-define the role of regional and local governments in Toronto.

Properly devised, a continuation of two-tier government can be made to serve the people of Toronto. Two principles for the assignment of planning responsibilities are proposed: 1) retain as much flexibility in the style and type of services available for delivery at the local level as possible; and 2) concentrate at Metro on the internal organization of government, on the creation of organizational forms adequate to deliver the intelligence needed for an understanding of the relationships among urban activities. In keeping with these pri-

nicples, an extension of shared Metro-local responsibilities into such fields as public transit and police is proposed. At the Metro level, the usefulness of the "official plan" as a policy instrument is questioned and its replacement by policy by-laws is suggested. The creation of a Metro Policy and Planning Unit and a re-definition of the role of the present Planning Department are called for.

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## METROPOLITAN TORONTO UNDER REVIEW, 1975

Keynote Address to the Conference  
of the Bureau of Municipal Research  
and the Social Planning Council  
Toronto, April 24, 1975

by

Senator H. Carl Goldenberg, Q.C.

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It is almost exactly ten years since I presented my report as Royal Commissioner on Metropolitan Toronto to the Hon. John Robarts, Prime Minister of Ontario, whose Government had appointed me. He announced in due course that there would be another review of Metro ten years later but I am certain that he did not then foresee himself as the next Commissioner. I am pleased that he is because he is highly qualified by knowledge and experience.

Comparing the terms of reference of the Robarts Commission with mine, I find that, with a few exceptions, they are basically the same. Accordingly, even though conditions change and Royal Commission findings do not constitute precedents, I think it appropriate to take a look at some history. It does not necessarily repeat itself but we can always learn from it.

The Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto was the first experiment in metropolitan government on a federated basis in North America. It was created in 1953 to meet the post-war problems of exploding growth in an area of 240 square miles linked by geographic, economic and social ties but divided into thirteen municipalities varying widely in size, population and resources.

The development of the Toronto metropolitan area has, in general, been similar to that of most metropolitan areas on the continent: the population of the suburbs mushroomed while that of the central city remained stationary or even declined. Caught in the post-war "population explosion", the area, by 1950, was faced with economic, financial and social crises and problems of political organization. The rapidly expanding suburbs urgently required increased services of all kinds, and, more particularly, water, sewage disposal, roads and, above all, schools, but few were in a position to finance them. As dormitory municipalities, the suburbs with the highest rates of growth were very largely dependent on residential assessment for tax revenues and mill rates rose steeply. With each municipality seeking capital funds on its own credit, borrowing became more and more difficult as interest rates rose. By about 1950 it was apparent that major reforms were necessary to ensure further growth of the region on an orderly basis.

In 1953 the Government of Ontario took bold measures. Acting on a report of the Ontario Municipal Board (the Cumming Report), it submitted to the Legislature a plan for the creation of a metropolitan government based on a

federation of the thirteen municipalities. Six weeks from the date of the report, which was the product of a lengthy inquiry, legislation creating the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto received Royal Assent. The new metropolitan Toronto government ("Metro") commenced operations on January 1, 1954.

Under the federated system, Metro assumed the responsibility for such matters of area-wide concern as assessment of real property, debenture borrowing, the wholesale supply and purification of water, major trunk and sanitary sewers and the control of water pollution, public transportation, the major road network, regional planning, regional parks, and the co-ordination of educational facilities and assistance in financing the basic costs of education. On January 1, 1957 the police forces were unified under Metro, which also assumed the responsibility for licensing. Matters of local concern remained the responsibility of the thirteen area municipalities, which retained their local autonomy. Accordingly, Metro was not designed to produce a uniform tax rate for the area. It was only in respect of area-wide services that a uniform levy was to apply.

The constitution of the Metropolitan Council presented some special features: the members were not to be elected directly but became Metropolitan Councillors by virtue of their election to office in an area municipality; the Chairman could be elected either from among the members or from outside; the City and the suburbs, as a group, were to have equal representation; each city ward and the voters of the City at large would be represented; and each suburb, regardless of size or population, was entitled to one representative. These features, linking the area municipalities to Metro, made for wider acceptability of the new form of government and helped to solidify its political base.

In June 1963, I was appointed a Royal Commissioner to inquire into Metro's operations during its first decade and to recommend such changes in its organization and functions as past experience and probable future development showed to be necessary. I presented my report to the Provincial Government two years later, in June 1965. Metro was then approaching its twelfth birthday. I found that in these twelve years of rapid growth and development, water and sewage problems of crises proportions were overcome; transportation facilities for both city and suburban residents were immensely improved by expressway and rapid transit construction; and urgently needed new school accommodation was provided for the greatly expanded school population, particularly in the outer suburbs. The financing of the vast projects was made possible by a high credit rating.

While I found that Metro had realized its objectives in substantial measure, I also found areas where expectations had not been fulfilled. I summarized these findings as follows:

*Notwithstanding these accomplishments (of Metro) this report has shown that some of the problems described in the Cumming Report of 1953 persist and have grown. They flow from continuing "illogical and inequitable but extremely rigid divisions of political jurisdiction and available taxable resources." The area is divided into thirteen municipalities ranging from less than one square mile to seventy square miles in size, from 9,000 to 650,000 in population, and from \$22 million to \$2 billion in taxable assessment. As a result, in an area which is a social and economic unit, there are undue inequalities in the burden of financing essential services and in the range and standards of some of the basic services provided.*

*While the equalizing influence of Metro has prevented far greater inequalities from developing, the spread between the lowest and highest taxed municipalities has tended to widen. Moreover, with population growth concentrated in the outer suburbs, inequalities in representation on the Metropolitan Council have grown to the point that reform is imperative. A system which gives equal representation to Swansea, with 9,300 people, and North York, with 340,000 can no longer be maintained.*

These wide disparities in resources and in representation established the need for some further reorganization of the structure of government in the area. This was recognized in most of the 75 briefs submitted to me in the course of public hearings, which extended over a period of three months. There was widespread agreement on Metro's accomplishments and no brief suggested a return to the pre-Metro divisions of political jurisdiction. Most of the smaller municipalities, while recognizing that some changes were necessary, urged that they be made within a continuing metropolitan federation of thirteen municipalities. The larger suburbs also favoured continuation of the metropolitan system but with the area municipalities consolidated into a small number of "boroughs". The City of Toronto recommended amalgamation of the whole area into one city.

Looking at the diverse metropolitan areas on the continent, it was clear to me that there is no "one way" for solving the problems of metropolitan areas. For example, what may be the appropriate size of constituent units of one area will not necessarily be appropriate to another with different characteristics derived from its own history, geography, population composition and economic development. The "metropolitan problem" is general,

but it must be dealt with on the basis of the facts of each particular situation. I therefore based my conclusions on the facts of the situation in the Toronto area as I saw them. Among these facts was the continuing rapid growth of the area. In my opinion, this pointed to the need for a structure which is relatively flexible and can be adapted to changed conditions and to the realities of situations as they develop. Finally, I sought to base my recommendations on the needs of the larger Metro community rather than on the special interests of particular sections within that community.

Having regard to these considerations, I rejected the maintenance of the status quo even with an extension of metropolitan responsibilities. While I recommended such an extension, particularly in the financing of education, I also recommended that important functions be left to the area municipalities, provided that these were regrouped into larger units which would make a fuller range of basic local services more widely and more equally available than was possible under the existing system. The alternative was to transfer responsibility for an increasing number of services to Metro. I believed that if this process were carried much further, it would be difficult to justify the continued existence of the individual municipalities; they would be left with little administrative significance.

I also rejected the case for total amalgamation. It appeared to me at that time that an amalgamated city would by its very size create a rigidity which would make it difficult, if not impossible, to effect periodic adjustments in boundaries in response to further urban growth and development. To this end I preferred a more flexible structure. Moreover, while total amalgamation would mean centralized

administration, it would require necessary decentralization of important local services through the establishment of divisional offices responsible to the central office. I felt that the requirements of both democracy and administrative efficiency would be better satisfied if the administration of such local services, as distinct from area-wide services, were, as far as possible, in the hands of local officials responsible to local elected representatives in municipalities properly constituted to meet the needs of their people. Accordingly, I recommended the continuation of a metropolitan federation with a consolidation of the thirteen area municipalities in four cities — Toronto, North York, Scarborough and Etobicoke.

In respect of the constitution of the Metropolitan Council, I found that Metro's success has been due in no small part to the fact that members of the Council were also members of the councils of the area municipalities; Metro had not become a rival or alien government. However, in recommending that the liaison between the area councils and the Metropolitan Council should be maintained, I also recommended the direct election of councillors. While the system of indirect election had helped to secure Metro's political base, it appeared to me that councillors who have decision-making authority in major matters of area-wide interest and are responsible for a large part of the tax levy in the area should be elected directly. My recommendation was that the representation of each of the four cities on Metro Council should be composed of the Mayor and of Metropolitan Councillors elected directly by each ward or by a combination of wards, the councillors to serve on both Metro

Council and the respective city councils. I also recommended a three-year term of office for members of city councils and of the Metropolitan Council.

A number of briefs submitted that the Chairman of Metro Council should be elected at large by the citizens of Metro. Alternatively, it was suggested that, if he is to be elected by the Council, he should be chosen only from among its members. I found merit in the latter suggestion but recommended no change in the existing provisions of the legislation. Among the reasons set out in the report are the following (p.194):

*The chairman is in law and in fact not only the head of Council but also the chief executive officer of the Metropolitan Corporation. He is the only member of Council who is required to devote his full time to Metro. As the head of the government of a federation of municipalities, he must be impartial, He must also be sufficiently independent in relation to local politics to be able to face pressures and to fight on issues where the area-wide interest may conflict with a local interest. There is no doubt that the independence of the chairman has contributed in large measure to the successful operation of metropolitan government in Toronto. I doubt that he could retain his independence if he were required to be elected at large; an election in an area of 240 square miles, with a population of 1,750,000, would have to be financed by large business enterprises or by a political party.*

The municipal structure recommended in my report differed from the structure I proposed for public school education. Here I proposed both centralization and decentralization. There would be an

elected central board, to be called the Metropolitan Toronto Board of Education, with overall responsibility for school finance and for the development of an acceptable and uniformly high metropolitan standard of education. The administrative responsibilities of this board would be limited to matters of area-wide policies, to coordination of mutual services, and to the provision of services which can best be provided on a metropolitan basis. The board would secure all tax revenue for educational purposes from the Metropolitan Council through a uniform levy. On the other hand, administration and management of the school programme would be decentralized and carried out by eleven local boards to be called District Education Councils. The boundaries of the districts would not be coterminous with municipal boundaries because they would be determined by criteria based on educational requirements.

My terms of reference also required me to consider "the boundaries of the metropolitan area . . . with due regard to probable future urban growth within or beyond the present metropolitan limits and future service requirements." While I found that, resulting from the pressure of metropolitan expansion, there was a continuous urban development far beyond the boundaries of Metro, east, west and north, I did not recommend that these boundaries be extended. I concluded that, in looking at the potential size of Metropolitan Toronto, consideration must be given to its place in the Province of Ontario. I saw that Metro and its urban fringe form part of an urban belt which extends eastward to Oshawa and westward to Hamilton. A dividing line might be drawn on the east, but the belt to the west is unbroken; it can be said that the Toronto metropolitan region runs

right up to the metropolitan area of Hamilton or that the latter is only a further extension of the Toronto region. It was clear to me that, for political and administrative reasons, Metro's boundaries could not be extended indefinitely to encompass the extension of urban development.

With respect to municipal functions and responsibilities, I recommended that:

- i) A Metropolitan official Plan be adopted without undue delay and that Metro's planning powers be strengthened by conferring upon it more explicit responsibility for the general direction of the physical development of the area, with powers to establish basic zoning standards, to participate in redevelopment and renewal, to enact a uniform building by-law and uniform engineering design standards, and to review and make recommendations on development applications and proposals.
- ii) While the Toronto Transit Commission should continue to be the authority for the provision of public transportation, with the Metro chairman as ex officio a full member, Metro should exercise a more formal coordination in overall transportation planning, assume appropriate major local arterial roads, establish an area-wide parking authority, and unify the traffic engineering services of the area.
- iii) Metro should establish an area-wide public emergency ambulance service and a Metropolitan Board of Health Officers, composed of the health officers of each of the area municipalities, to coordinate public health policies.
- iv) Metro should assume responsibility for all waste disposal and the Metropolitan area as a whole should share in financing the municipal costs of the necessary trunk sewer renewal programmes in the core area.



v.) Metro should exercise responsibility for the development of the waterfront for park and recreational purposes.

vi.) The Ontario Housing Corporation should act as a single agency on behalf of the federal and provincial governments in dealing with Metro on all further low rental housing developments, with Metro assuming the remaining municipal financial responsibility therefor.

vii.) Metro's budget should be increased to provide a properly staffed Metropolitan Juvenile and Family Court with court facilities in each of the proposed four cities, pending a review of the sharing of costs of the administration of justice between the Province and Metro.

viii.) The four cities should retain basic responsibilities for fire protection, with an effective mutual aid agreement, licensing of local businesses tied to a specific location as distinct from metropolitan-wide businesses, health, welfare and libraries whose operation should be coordinated by a Metropolitan Library Board.

In summary, this was my Report and these were my recommendations for Metropolitan Toronto as I saw it in 1965. On January 10, 1966, Mr. Robarts announced that, while the Government's position did not coincide with mine on all recommendations, it accepted and endorsed the main principles: "the continuation of the two-level federated system of metropolitan government; the consolidation of constituent municipalities rather than total amalgamation; an increase in the authority and responsibilities of the government of Metropolitan Toronto; a Metro-wide uniform school levy to provide a basic education programme for the Metropolitan area; and a reform of the system

of representation." The principal modifications were, first, in the consolidation of area municipalities: instead of the proposed four cities, the thirteen municipalities were consolidated to form six, the City of Toronto and five boroughs. Secondly, instead of eleven school boards, there would be six, coterminous with the six new municipalities. While the system of representation on Metro Council was made more equitable, indirect election was retained. In the matter of services, welfare was transferred to Metro. Bill 81, embodying the changes, took effect on January 1, 1967 and the New Metro came into being.

As there is no finality in governmental reorganization, the Robarts Commission faces some of the same issues which confronted me ten years ago. For example: should the metropolitan area continue to be governed as a federation with a two-tier system, with or without a further consolidation of area municipalities, or should the whole area be amalgamated to form one city? If the two-tier system is retained, should the Metro Chairman and the Metro councillors be elected directly? With the City of Toronto continuing as the core area and the five boroughs as satellite communities, should not the system of representation be modified to allow the City to play its proper role?

The Robarts Commission will, of course, have to consider the issues in the current context. There has been considerable change in the ten years since my report. The Metropolitan Area has continued to experience rapid growth and development. Population has risen by about one-third with the increase occurring mainly in the boroughs. It is of interest to note that the proposed Metropolitan Official Plan which was submitted to me showed that in 1963, 47 percent of the area

of Scarborough, 33 percent of North York and 32 percent of Etobicoke was agricultural or vacant land. The changes which have since occurred necessarily affect municipal finances and the requirements for municipal services. They also affect the relationship between the boroughs and the central city. While Toronto's proportion of the total population and the total assessment of the area has declined relatively, it remains the core of the metropolis. I suggest that consideration be given to protecting its position so that its needs are not subordinated to the various local interests in the area. It must be remembered that without the City of Toronto there would be no Metro.

The Robarts Commission is operating in a climate of rising expectations and changing values in which social, economic and political issues, such as housing, urban renewal and the impact of growth on the quality of life, have attained a greater significance than they had ten years ago. Citizens' groups, no longer ratepayers' associations concerned solely with taxes, have multiplied and take militant positions on the issues. They seek some participation in the formulation of policies. The increase in the number of these groups reflects a feeling of alienation on the part of citizens in the face of bigness in government and points to the importance of responsive decision-making by municipal governments. Moreover, the issues which are of concern are now often matters of more than municipal interest in that their solution calls for provincial and perhaps federal involvement. With this growing interdependence, combined with the natural limitations on municipal revenue sources, we may have to modify our traditional thinking on "municipal autonomy."

The problems of Metropolitan Toronto are not unique. They are shared by metropolitan areas in all countries and there is no perfect or final solution. It is my view that in a time of rapid growth and changing values it would be wise to retain some flexibility in whatever solutions we adopt.

## THE FORM OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT: WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS FOR METRO?

Background Paper #1

by

Dr. Anne Golden

Research Coordinator, Bureau of Municipal Research

The purpose of this paper is to examine the possible options for the structure of local government in the Metropolitan Toronto area. While the question of form is only one of the many issues to be studied by the Robarts Commission, it is the overall structural solution that will provide the framework for all of the suggestions for changes in the present system.

### I. THREE OPTIONS

This paper will consider the following alternative approaches:

(A) *Amalgamation* – the “one big city” approach; this would involve the merger of the six municipalities into a unitary form of government.

(B) *Metropolitan federation* – variations of the present two-tier form of government; within the context of the two level framework, the choices are:

- to maintain the present balance in terms of the allocation of powers
- to continue the trend of centralizing power and responsibility at the Metro level
- to increase the powers of the area municipalities.

These choices are relevant whether the number of municipalities within the federation remains the same or they are further consolidated into four approximately equal units, as has been suggested.<sup>1</sup> The prospect for increasing the number of local units, given Metro’s present boundaries, seems most unlikely.

Another possible variation of the present scheme would be to expand Metro’s boundaries; again, this seems politically improbable in view of the Province’s strategy of restricting the growth of Metro and surrounding it with other regional governments.

(C) *Dissolution of Metro* – a ‘federal’ system of provincial/municipal relations. This option calls for the return of responsibility for most local services to the individual area municipal governments (e.g. including social services, housing, parks and recreation).<sup>2</sup> In order to coordinate certain specialized services and above all in order to cope with growth pressures, a joint intergovernmental authority could be set up. Its territorial jurisdiction would coincide with the overall urbanized area around Toronto,<sup>3</sup> and it would be responsible

for such major district-wide services as water supply, waste disposal, mass transit, capital borrowing and construction for area-wide projects. Representatives selected from each municipal council would sit with appointed provincial representatives on this body.

The new district-wide authority would not be a second tier of government but a coordinating mechanism between the province and the local units. A precedent for this kind of ongoing provincial-municipal coordination can be seen in the Provincial Municipal Liaison Committee. In this case, however, the territorial scope would be limited to the designated urbanized area. In addition, it would have certain planning and administrative functions for that area. Implementation of decisions would be carried out by the appropriate body - the province, the city or in more cases, special purpose bodies such as a police commission, a mass transit authority or a conservation authority.

If this approach were adopted, it would mean that the Toronto area would have a different relationship to the province than other Ontario municipalities.

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In discussing these alternative possibilities for the structure of local government in Toronto, we shall try to answer one very basic question:

*What kind of government best provides people in our urban municipality with local services necessary for healthy human environments?*<sup>1</sup>

The obvious difficulty with this apparently straightforward question lies with the word *best* – for there is no single agreed-upon definition of what the primary values and objectives of local government should be, let alone how they can most readily be fulfilled.

During recent years, in reaction to what is commonly known as “the urban crisis”, increasing attention has been focussed on the need for local governmental reform. Over the past three decades a spate of books and articles has poured forth searching for the causes and solutions to the problems of city governments and particularly to the apparent structural weaknesses of municipal government. The diagnoses have concentrated on the problem of metropolitan *fragmentation* – the division of metropolitan areas into too many independent local governmental units. The consensus was that this multiplicity was the primary obstacle to improving local government: what was needed was a broader municipal system in which service delivery and planning could be rationalized and coordinated. It was argued, moreover, that the creation of area-wide governments with greater powers, more skilled administrators etc., would be more effective in responding to the concerns of the local citizens.

Since fragmentation was seen as the crucial weakness, the creation of Metro in 1953 as a pioneer attempt at Metropolitan federation was naturally hailed as a major step forward. To this day,

1. We are using “services” in its broadest sense, including land use regulation and planning.

1. *The Goldenberg Report* (1965), which made many of the recommendations for the 1967 reorganization of Metro Toronto, had proposed a four-city plan for the Toronto area.  
2. The current distribution gives local municipalities the control over such services as property taxation, zoning, garbage collection, fire protection, public health.  
3. There is no consensus as to the exact extent of this urbanized area but on the basis of commuting and servicing patterns it could extend roughly from Oakville to Oshawa.

the Metro Toronto experience is widely regarded as representing an ideal pattern of development of metropolitan government, both because of its impressive accomplishments<sup>1</sup> and because of its evolutionary approach toward integration.<sup>2</sup> It is no exaggeration to predict, therefore, that this third major review can have far-reaching consequences for patterns of local government around the world.

Now, however, perspectives are changing. To many, the problems of fragmentation and parochialism seem less significant than problems arising out of feelings of citizen apathy and alienation, the lack of accountability in public service delivery or the inefficiencies and unresponsiveness of excessive centralization.

As a result, to return to the initial question posed above, one's choice for the "best" form for local government in Metropolitan Toronto is necessarily tied to the values and goals which one attaches to local government.

With this in mind, we propose to explain and evaluate possible alternative structures by examining each option in the light of several basic oft-cited goals. These goals express certain traditional values of local government in a demo-

cracy, values associated with the concepts of participation, efficiency and individual liberty.<sup>3</sup>

## II FIVE GOALS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

### (a) Participation

The idea that local government has both a unique capacity and obligation to realize the potential of public participation is basic to our democratic political tradition. The essential justification for local government is that it is the level of government closest to the people and therefore offers the maximum opportunity for access to and involvement in decision-making. According to de Tocqueville, the most famous classic political theorist on the subject, local government was indispensable to a nation's democratic system, for, within his own "township" the citizen

*"takes part in every occurrence in the place; he practices the art of government in the small sphere within his reach; he accustoms himself to those forms without which liberty can only advance by revolutions."*<sup>4</sup>

But the value of participation is not limited to its role as a "school for democracy" in the abstract sense. In modern metropolitan settings, it is participation that humanizes the system and ensures

that governmental bureaucracy responds to the growing and disparate needs of its citizens. The sheer scale of metropolitan areas in both population and physical size makes the goal of encouraging active participation in public affairs seem more urgent than ever.

Regardless of how one defines "participation"<sup>1</sup> — whether as an "information-consultation" situation on the one hand, or as "citizen control" on the other — viable, effective participation implies at the very least:

- opportunity for access and information
- adequate political representation
- accountability in service delivery
- an easily understandable system.

### (b) Sense of Community

Closely related to the need to provide for local democracy and participation is the goal of promoting cohesive social communities. Public indifference and ignorance is usually associated with large governmental units — units that are too big and too remote to stimulate civic interest and commitment.<sup>2</sup> It is generally accepted that active participation can best be achieved within the framework of small units of government — units that are

capable of engendering a sense of community among its inhabitants. And this in turn is basic to preserving and enhancing the diversity of our communities and the lifestyles they offer. This is not necessarily an argument against amalgamation in a metropolitan area but it could be a justification for combining total integration with smaller sub-units. In defining what constitutes the "cohesive social community" many factors are relevant, including geographic factors, demographic, cultural and economic conditions, historical aspects — all of the conditions which contribute a sense of common interest.

### (c) Efficiency

A primary goal of local government is the efficient delivery of municipal services, including basic physical facilities, protection services and, to an increasing extent, welfare services. Local government was traditionally considered conducive to efficiency because it was assumed that local authorities would have both a greater personal stake than would remote administrators in the efficient discharge of public tasks as well as the necessary information and local "feedback" for making sound decisions.<sup>3</sup>

1. Among Metro's most significant achievements are: the securing of public and political support for the metropolitan government scheme, the resolving of structural crises — the construction of schools, increased capacities for sewage disposal and water supply, and the provision of the capital financing needed to accommodate the vast physical growth throughout metropolitan Toronto. See Frank Smallwood, *Metro Toronto: A Decade Later* (Toronto: Bureau of Municipal Research, 1963).

2. In the beginning Metro was composed of the original thirteen municipalities and was given exclusive jurisdiction over only a limited number of services. For example, police protection was not shifted to Metro until 1956. The restructuring of the federation in 1967 consolidated the thirteen units into six larger units, gave greater representation to the suburban communities and expanded the powers of Metro Council, most notably in the areas of education and welfare.

3. Professor J. Stefan Dupre discusses these key values with reference to the classic writings of three major political theorists — Montesquieu, de Tocqueville and J. S. Mill. See "Intergovernmental Relations and the Metropolitan Area", paper prepared for the *Centennial Study and Training Program on Metropolitan Problems* (Toronto: Bureau of Municipal Research, 1967).

4. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, I, Ch. 5.

1. The range of possible definitions is discussed in a recent BMR *Civic Affairs* entitled, "Citizen Participation in Metro Toronto: Climate for Cooperation?" (Toronto: Bureau of Municipal Research, January, 1975).

2. This assumption that the capacity of government to promote participation and access is in large part an "inverse function" of municipal size has not gone without challenge. See the Bureau of Municipal Research, "Regional Government — The Key to Genuine Local Autonomy", *Civic Affairs* (Toronto: May, 1968).

3. As John Stuart Mill states in his treatise, *On Liberty and Representative Government*, "It is but a small portion of the public business of a country which can be well done, or safely attempted, by the central authorities . . . even if the local authorities and public are inferior to the central ones in knowledge of the principles of administration, they have the compensating advantage of a far more direct interest in the result . . . (I) t is the local public alone which . . . calls the attention of the government to the points in which they may require correction . . . In the details of management, therefore, the local bodies will generally have the advantage". Cited in J. Stefan Dupre, "Intergovernmental Relations and the Metropolitan Area", *op. cit.*, p. 12.

The importance of efficiency as a key consideration in determining the structure of local government scarcely needs to be restated. The difficulty is how to apply it as a guideline. A prominent theme in many studies of local government is the notion that, while participation values call for small municipal units, efficiency demands bigness. But what size is sufficient?

One rule of thumb that has been proposed is that efficiency can be achieved by assigning each "public good" to a level of government whose territorial jurisdiction matches the area "over which the spillovers from the good are internalized".<sup>1</sup> Using this formula it should be possible to determine what is commonly referred to as the optimal "catchment area".<sup>2</sup> The responsibility for a given public service would fall to the level of government whose jurisdiction was appropriate in terms of its ability to contain the external impact or spill-over effects of that service. Thus for example, the externalities of playgrounds or garbage collection are neighbourhoodwide in scope and capable of being handled by the lowest level of government; however, the spill-over effects of police functions or refuse disposal or transportation are clearly not able to be internalized on a small scale and therefore should be assigned to a higher level of government. This is essentially the approach that has been used in the allocation of responsibilities in the Metro Toronto scheme.

Unfortunately this approach is far from clear-cut. For one thing, the optimal

catchment area differs from service to service so that there would have to be far too many government levels if maximum efficiency was to be sought for each public good. Moreover, opinions may differ as to the scale needed to internalize a public good, particularly in the case of a service like education or public health which can be broken down into different component functions each with different catchment areas.

In addition to the "optimal catchment area", a second criterion is used to test efficiency - - the concept of "economies of scale". As this issue is being explored in depth in another paper in this series,<sup>3</sup> it is sufficient at this juncture to simply indicate that, though they can reinforce each other, the two criteria are not the same.

Moreover, the dictates of other goals like participation may be at odds with the apparent dictates of efficiency defined in terms of optimal catchment areas or economies of scale.

#### (d) *Effective Planning*

The concept of effective planning as a goal of local government is, for many, an extension of efficiency. In view of the emphasis currently being placed on the importance of integrated planning for the entire metropolitan region, it is helpful to recognize planning as a separate objective.

This stress on planning has generally led to a plea for larger units of local government. The goal of defining overall planning strategies that will promote the well-being of the city-at-large

points up the crucial dilemma of metropolitan government: how to create a structural framework capable both of developing area-wide programs to meet common needs and at the same time of permitting the exercise of local power over matters which affect the lives of local citizens.

Because, until recently, planning was thought of mainly in terms of projection of land use or development patterns, "comprehensive planning" was often idealized as the cure to the maladies of large cities. The old style planning approach was really a "top down" process and local communities were expected to submit to overall goals. Today, however, our understanding of planning is changing. Moreover, doubts about comprehensive planning are growing, as the ineffectiveness of efforts like the Toronto Centred Region Plan become more apparent.<sup>1</sup> It is now being recognized that planning must, above all, provide for the reconciliation of conflicting interests. Local interests and minority claims on the environment need to be protected by a planning process that provides for flexibility and diversity. This suggests that the form of local government should be capable of relating to local or neighbourhood planning processes.

#### (e) *Sufficient Local Autonomy*

Any discussion of the relations between local governments and higher authorities inevitably raises the issue of local autonomy which is increasingly being viewed as vital to municipal reform.

There is a long tradition, particularly in the United States and Europe, that local government means self-government - a right that is jealously guarded

in many instances. Local autonomy was a primary goal of local government and was connected to the quest for individual liberty; local autonomy was viewed as a way to protect the individual against the danger of excessive control or interference by the central government. It is also frequently linked to the democratic values of participation, for without autonomy, local units can not hope to preserve their individual character and the sense of community that inspires involvement; and without more than nominal power, it is difficult to raise the level of civic interest. The assumption is that public interest will not gravitate to a level of government unless it has some autonomy, some power to make significant priority decisions.

In Canada, where local government is (from a constitutional standpoint) relegated to a position of inferiority, the idea that municipalities should play a meaningful role in regulating their own affairs seems to be gaining in importance.<sup>2</sup> Local autonomy implies that the municipality has both the authority and the fiscal resources needed to make priority decisions about public activities of local impact.

Significantly, the goal of local autonomy has been used in the arguments of both proponents and opponents of larger municipal units: advocates of amalgamation and regional government claim that consolidation will strengthen the position of local government vis-a-vis the provincial and federal governments; opponents, on the other hand, insist that a move toward amalgamation would make local government more remote from citizen influence, thereby compromising true local autonomy.

1. This theory is discussed by J. Stefan Dupre, "Intergovernmental Relations and the Metropolitan Area", *op. cit.*, chapter 3.

2. The catchment area may be defined as the area for which a given service is provided.

3. Peter F. E. Lyman, "Efficiency in Urban Government: Economies and Diseconomies of Scale", paper no. 2 for BMR/SPC Conference.

1. See Graham Fraser et al, *The Tail of the Elephant* (Toronto: Pollution Probe, 1974).

2. This was the theme of the address given by Vancouver's Mayor Art Phillips, for the Bureau of Municipal Research Annual Meeting, May 1, 1975.

In the case of Toronto, pure autonomy is of course impossible in the present system, even if it were desirable, as provincial organs such as TEIGA and the OMB maintain a close supervision of local affairs. In our view, the fifth goal of local government for the Metropolitan Toronto area is that the local unit(s) have enough strength to deal with provincial and federal authorities in a valid partnership.

To this end, the structure should assist in clarifying the federal and provincial roles in municipal public affairs and rendering their priority-setting power over municipalities more visible and accountable. This would certainly aid participation, for example, since citizens would be better able to see where they might best apply their energies on a given issue.

### III THE IMPLICATIONS OF THESE GOALS FOR EACH OPTION

Please note that we have not given "equal space" to each evaluation, as many of the principal arguments are explained under option (A).

#### (A) Amalgamation

Despite the fact that amalgamation has frequently been proposed as the most rational solution for governing large urban municipalities, it has not proved to be easy to achieve. Amalgamation often arouses widespread and deepseated resistance. While this

opposition may, in part, reflect the self-interest of elected officials and bureaucrats, inconvenience to citizens or the natural inclination of people to avoid major change, many of the reasons for resistance are related to the fear of negative consequences to local autonomy, the special character and interests of the smaller communities and the potential for participation.<sup>1</sup>

#### Participation

These fears are, of course, based on the reality that total amalgamation would require the abolition of existing local units. Since it is virtually an article of faith that the opportunity for participation is greater in a decentralized system with government "close to the people", the amalgamation of Metropolitan Toronto would seem to have obvious disadvantages in terms of the goal of maximizing participation. It is generally accepted that expansion of local government units will increase the distance between the citizen and his local government, diminishing his influence and control.

For instance, amalgamation can lead to a representation system in which the ratio of elected representatives to citizens is reduced. To ensure a favourable ratio of democratic representation — say, one elected representative for 20,000 people.<sup>2</sup> — the new area-wide council would have to be very big (i.e. 125 councillors) — probably too big for the council to

function effectively! A result of this might be the introduction of formal party politics at the local level, which in turn could have undesirable effects for participation. For one thing, party politics could reduce the opportunity for the ordinary citizen to seek election; without party ties, candidates would have difficulty getting elected.

Recently, large-scale amalgamation proposals have taken these problems into account. As in the Winnipeg experience<sup>1</sup>, amalgamation could be combined with bureaucratic decentralization so as to overcome the apparent barriers to participation. If amalgamation in Metro were accompanied by the introduction of smaller local units, perhaps coinciding in some instances, with the original municipalities, not as separate local units of government, but as "machinery for the expression of community opinion or consultation"<sup>2</sup>, then perhaps some of the disadvantages could be overcome. However, this deconcentration might undercut some of the efficiency arguments made on behalf of amalgamation.

On the positive side, the argument that amalgamation would contribute to participation in that it would be a more readily comprehensible system with improved accountability is an important point. Further, because of its scale and because it would be a more powerful entity with its power clearly visible, it would be more likely to attract and

hold the interest of its citizenry.

#### *Sense of Community*

The apprehension that democratic values would suffer under amalgamation is heard particularly with regard to the impact on local communities. This apprehension was clearly summed up by Professor W. A. Robson, a leading authority on forms of metropolitan government throughout the world:

"... the stark fact remains that amalgamation usually results in the absorbed unit ceasing to be a separate entity, and thereby losing its local government institutions. Instead of having its own elected council, mayor, chairman or city manager, it becomes an insignificant fraction of a vast city governed from a remote centre with which it has little contact. Is it surprising that, faced with such a prospect, (smaller units) should resist what appear to them to be the lethal encroachments of an advancing tide? From their point of view, it is a fight for life."<sup>3</sup>

In the case of Metro, because of the extensive integration that has already occurred, total amalgamation might not appear to be such a dramatic threat to the survival of small communities; yet, to the extent that these communities feel that the existing municipal set-up allows them to preserve their sense of identity, and pays at least some heed to their interests, Professor Robson's explanation is significant. Resistance to

1. See A. F. Leemans, *Changing Patterns of Local Government* (The Hague: International Union of Local Authorities, 1970). Chapter 5, for an analysis of "the disadvantages of, and resistance to amalgamation".

2. For a discussion of this issue, see "Political Representation on Metropolitan Toronto Council", (Toronto: Bureau of Municipal Research Comment, February, 1974).

1. The City of Winnipeg's Unicity system came into existence in July, 1971. The most interesting elements of the new government are the Community Committees. It was hoped that the Community Committee concept would restore community cohesiveness and provide the citizen with ready access to the system. They are comprised of from three to six wards, over an area approximating the old municipalities. The councillors sit both on the central Council and on their Community Committee. Attached to each Community Committee is a Resident Advisory Group (RAG).

2. Leemans, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

3. W. A. Robson and D. E. Regan, *Great Cities of the World: Their Government, Politics and Planning*, 3rd Edition (London: Allen & Unwin, 1972), I, p.74.

amalgamation would serve as an important indicator that amalgamation would be perceived as destructive of political community life.<sup>1</sup> And to dismiss these fears as springing from selfish motives that disregard the wider public interest is to ignore the significance of local community identity for political democracy and cultural diversity.

Again, however, amalgamation accompanied with decentralization, could conceivably mitigate this resistance. *Efficiency*

A common justification given for amalgamation, at least in our daily newspapers, is that amalgamation would be more logical and more efficient. But how valid is this assumption?

In considering the goal of efficiency it is instructive to note the findings of the *Royal Commission on Local Government in England, 1966-1969*. With regard to the provision of services with maximum efficiency (taking into account the ability to command the needed resources and skilled manpower), the Commission concluded that *a local authority with a population of over 1 million would have serious difficulties of management and also of maintaining democratic local government. The Commission recommended that this should be the upper limit of size for unitary authorities and that larger metropolitan areas should have a two-tier structure.*<sup>2</sup>

If we apply the formula of "overspill" (explained in part II of this paper) so that each government has a territorial jurisdiction that succeeds in internalizing the public goods assigned to it, it is clear

that under amalgamation there would be many inefficiencies; for under a single one-tier system it would not be possible to take advantage of the varying "optimal catchment areas": functions which, according to the spill-over idea, could be handled most efficiently by local governmental units, would be performed by the central authorities.

The disadvantages of amalgamation for efficiency can be most clearly understood if we think about the "diseconomies or disadvantages of scale". While another background paper for this Conference examines this subject in depth, it is vital to remind ourselves that as an organization grows, at a certain point the efficiencies that can be achieved through large-scale administration of service delivery disappear; instead there are diseconomies of scale.<sup>3</sup>

An interesting illustration is the service of fire protection.<sup>4</sup> Amalgamation of municipal services frequently leads to pressures for service standardization. Although this may not be the *logical* conclusion, citizens tend to expect a standardization of service. The focus would be on equalizing the number of stations per square mile, and the amount of men and equipment per population. In the extreme, standardization for Metro's fire stations could mean almost 100 new stations to bring the boroughs up to the City's ratio of stations per square mile. But in the case of fire protection, there are demographic and structural differences between each of the area municipalities (e.g. density of population, types of structures -

residential/commercial, age of structures).<sup>1</sup> The particular needs of each area seem to require a tailored protection service which may or may not be best provided by an integrated system. Although there is evidence that the boroughs' standards do need to be upgraded, whether this would require amalgamation remains to be proved. Oft-claimed economies of scale re: purchasing advantages need to be closely examined in view of the fact that 90% of fire department budgets are taken up with salaries, benefits and compensations. In short, the question to be asked is, would amalgamation lead to unwarranted expenditures with minimal increased effectiveness?

#### *Effective Planning*

The essential case for amalgamation is based on planning considerations. Metro was originally created because of the need to provide services (e.g. sewage, water supply, education, trans-

portation) over an area more consistent with expanding service needs. One overwhelming advantage of amalgamation is that it would facilitate comprehensive planning for the Metro area. Proponents of amalgamation emphasize that the vital flaw in the present system is parochialism - the narrow vision of politicians who are looking only to satisfy the constituents of their wards and boroughs.

But if planning requires the reconciliation of conflicting interests to be effective, then this "narrow vision" might be needed so that public officials can utilize the local concerns as an essential resource in the planning process. It can be argued that amalgamation with its insistence on the "wider view" might impede effective planning.<sup>2</sup>

#### *Sufficient Local Autonomy*

As pointed out in section II of this paper, proponents of amalgamation insist that by creating one big city with a

1.

City/Borough	Density per sq. mi. in 1000's approx.	% of Buildings		% Buildings Built*	
		Residential	Commercial	Before 1946	After 1960
Toronto	19.1	44%	56%	80.0%	20.0%
York	16.2	69%	31%	78.5%	21.5%
East York	12.8	72%	28%	59.2%	40.8%
Etobicoke	5.8	56%	44%	28.1%	71.9%
North York	7.3	66%	34%	9.9%	90.1%
Scarborough	4.7	?	?	16.0%	84.0%

\* Percentages are based on the number of residences built before 1946 and after 1960. Those built between '46 and '60 are not accounted for. The numbers also represent one-third of the population polled in the '71 Census.

2. For example, consider the Toronto island issue. One reason that the islanders have been able to put up such a vigorous fight to protect what they see as their interests is that the present two-tier structure provides a local level of government which can play an advocacy role on their behalf. Regardless of the merits or demerits of their case, a two-tier system makes the planning process in this case more responsive to their claims for the future of the land in question. Under amalgamation the island takeover would have been smoother but would have provided less for the expression of local opposition.

1. It might be argued that this so-called "political community life" has at best token viability under the present provincially-dominated system.
2. See A. F. Leemans, *op. cit.*, Appendix III, pp.212-213.
3. Peter F. E. Lyman, *op. cit.*
4. The Bureau of Municipal Research is currently studying the advantages and disadvantages of integration of fire protection services in Metro Toronto. We anticipate the publication of the results of our research this July, 1975.

council and a mayor elected at large by some two and one-half million people, the power of Toronto would be immeasurably strengthened in its dealings with higher authorities. Undoubtedly, amalgamation would clarify the role of the province and the federal government in both its exercise of power over and interference in local affairs. Thus, for example, the real causes of municipal financial problems would be more apparent to the people, who would no longer be confused by Metro/local financial arrangements.

But if we define local autonomy in the traditional sense of local *community* power within its own sphere of influence, then amalgamation will be seen as harmful to this goal.

#### (B) Two-tier Federation

To many, it might seem that a two-tier system of local government offers the best of both worlds: the many advantages that result from establishing a major authority for the planning, coordination and administration of large-scale functions together with the benefits (for citizen participation, communal identity and efficiency) of leaving all the purely local services to a lower tier of government. According to Professor Robson, the arguments for a two-tier system in a great metropolitan area are "overwhelming":

*"Only by this means, moreover, can*

*we hope to find a solution to the problem of providing the metropolitan area with a democratic system of local government while also giving the citizen a smaller and more easily comprehensible unit of community life in whose government he can participate. It is perfectly feasible and logical to aim simultaneously at both larger and smaller units of local government in metropolitan areas; and to evoke in the citizens a sense of civic interest in both the larger community and the smaller."*<sup>1</sup>

Without doubt, the virtually universal esteem in which the Metro Toronto plan is held throughout North America by those interested in municipal reform is due to its combination of centralization and decentralization. However, as citizens of Metro know, all is not sweetness and light. Many of Toronto's "achievements" owe less to enlightened forethought than to fortuitous inertia and happenstance.<sup>2</sup> While the establishment of Metro led to outstanding accomplishments in the public works field, it has not proved so successful in such areas as welfare, housing and recreation.<sup>3</sup> Given the stage that Metro has now reached in its development — the challenges of physical growth have largely been met and the more difficult problems like welfare, public housing urban renewal and public transit services are still with us — there is no room for complacency about the existing federation

1. W. A. Robson and D. E. Regan, *Great Cities of the World*, op. cit., I, p. 75.

2. Thus, indecision in building all of the expressways that were called for back in the 1960's, is now seen as a positive move. Moreover, as Harold Kaplan emphasizes in his essay, "Metro Toronto: Forming a Policy Formation Process", the federal form of government was a necessary factor but not a sufficient cause of Metro's achievements. "Any explanation of these policy achievements must include a statement on the structure and culture of politics in the Toronto area, along with some recognition of the important role played by particular personalities" (e.g. Frederick Gardiner); in Edward Banfield, *Urban Government, A Reader in Politics and Administration* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961).

3. For example, Frank Smallwood, *Metro Toronto: A Decade Later*, op. cit., p. 35 emphasizes the lack of assertiveness that has characterized the field of public housing as an illustration of the indecisiveness caused by parochial tensions in the Metro scheme.

scheme.

#### Participation

The advantages of a two-tier system for participation, very simply, are those afforded by the decentralized component of the structure. These include: the opportunity for access and information, the possibility of a favourable ratio of democratic representation<sup>1</sup> and accountability and responsiveness in service delivery.

The chief disadvantages relate to the complexity of the system. It is a widely held assumption that two-tier metropolitan government impedes participation in that the complexity of the form makes it more difficult to attract and hold the interest of its citizens. It is more difficult to fix responsibility in the two-level system, a factor which undermines accountability. Perhaps most importantly, when the second tier of government is indirectly elected, as is the present situation in Metro, democratic principles are to an extent infringed.<sup>2</sup>

#### Sense of Community

With respect to the goal of promoting cohesive social communities, it is generally acknowledged that a major advantage of a two-tier federation over amalgamation is that it is better suited to the retention of community identity and local diversity.

#### Efficiency

Similarly, from the point of view of efficiency, a two-tier federation is highly favoured as a structural solution because it gains the benefits of both

centralization and decentralization. By permitting some functions to be assigned exclusively to the central council, others to the local councils, with many responsibilities being shared, overspill can be minimized; economies of scale can be utilized where applicable.

On the other hand, however, there are weaknesses in the Metro plan that compromise its efficiency. In an analysis of Metro's achievements and difficulties published twelve years ago, Frank Smallwood identified what he saw as the crucial problems, and it is interesting to note the relevance of his observations today. One of the major defects, in his view, was the failure to achieve a cohesive spirit of metropolitan unity among the members; the persistence of parochial strains tended to inhibit the Council's program and its ability to act decisively on key issues.<sup>3</sup> Above all, the two-level structure was creating inefficiencies due to overlapping governmental jurisdictions.<sup>4</sup>

#### Effective Planning

As mentioned above, the two-tier federation model is recommended by most of the "textbooks" as the best way to overcome fragmentation and parochialism in a large metropolis and facilitate effective planning. And in theory, the system does create a governmental institution with power to deal with regional problems.

But as the current pattern of Metro politics indicates, a federated scheme in which planning powers are necessarily shared<sup>5</sup> does not always lead to effective

1. Although we now have a two-tier structure, our system of political representation is far from ideal.

2. The Bureau argued for indirect election of the Metro Chairman in a recent *BMR Comment*, "Should the Metro Chairman Be Directly Elected?" (January 1975) but there were several other factors to be considered.

3. *Metro Toronto: A Decade Later*, op. cit.

4. The example cited by Smallwood was the Toronto public housing program.

5. At present, zoning powers over densities, heights and locations of buildings are the prerogative of the area municipal governments. The responsibility for the overall distribution of population, employment and transportation rests with Metro.

planning: Metro's inability to implement planning decisions with regard to transportation and public housing on a region-wide basis are the most obvious examples.

There are two other qualifications to the notion that a two-level metropolitan form is the best framework for effective planning. First, in the case of Metro Toronto, Metro's jurisdiction no longer coincides with the urbanized area.<sup>1</sup> Second, effective planning no longer is synonymous with comprehensive planning; rather it takes in the goal of reconciling conflicting needs and aspirations with regard to land use and development, which adds to the justification for a strong area municipal voice in planning.

#### Sufficient Local Autonomy

Under a two-tier system, power is shared. While there are some advantages for participation and efficiency, this sharing can obscure accountability. At times Metro serves as a buffer between the provincial reality and local aspirations. A good case in point is the debate over public health boards: because the City of Toronto has refused to integrate its public health board under one District Health Board, it is being blamed for intransigence and for the fact that the City and the boroughs are not receiving more financial aid from the Province for public health care. If they amalgamated, 75% of Metro's public health costs would be funded by the province, instead of the 25% grant that each local board presently receives. In line with their campaign for amalgamation, the newspapers have been vigorous in their denunciation of Toronto as selfish and parochial. But the real

conflict should not be between Toronto and the rest of Metro on this issue. Should the province be interfering with local decision-making by the use of such "funding carrots"? Both the first and the third options would be more conducive to a clarification of the power relationships between all three levels of government.

In section I of this paper, we mentioned the three available choices within the context of the two-tier framework. Without reiterating all of the implications of the identified goals of local government for these choices, it is evident that the decision to move in the direction of more or less centralization should strive to incorporate different and possibly conflicting priorities. It is essential that local governmental services be evaluated in light of the specific objectives the service is supposed to achieve as well as the overall "political" functions which we want our local government to serve.<sup>2</sup>

#### **(C) Dissolution of Metro**

The implications of the five identified goals of local government for the third alternative approach can be briefly summarized:

#### Participation and sense of Community

Because it is a decentralized approach, option (C) would theoretically maximize the conditions and opportunities for active participation at the local level. The simple one-tier system would promote access and accountability; there would be sufficient power at the local level to attract and hold public involvement; the conditions for promoting a sense of community purpose would be enhanced.

But the essential dilemma of this option is this: if the larger "intergovernmental authority" is to play a significant role in planning, it must have some power as a separate entity to make and implement policy; and, if it does, how can the values of participation be realized, since it is not an elected organ of government but a coordinating agency?

#### Efficiency

Some experts on local government argue that the overall aim of a system should be to ensure that all functions are exercised at the lower level consistent with efficiency and economy. Given this objective, the dissolution of Metro combined with the establishment of a provincial-municipal coordinating body with jurisdiction over the larger urbanized district could be an acceptable option. Now that Metro is almost completely developed physically and is faced increasingly with problems in the area of so-called "soft" or "human" services, it can be argued that it would be more efficient to return power to the area municipal governments for most services.<sup>1</sup> The coordinating intergovernmental body would be responsible for those designated functions clearly beyond the scope of the local unit (e.g. large scale land use, transportation, major physical services).

#### Effective Planning

Because the logical planning area exceeds Metro's jurisdiction, it makes sense to have an expanded coordinating authority. The creation of TATO<sup>2</sup> reflects the need for this and suggests that Option (C) would be most consistent with the goal of effective planning for the entire urbanized Toronto area.

Within this hypothetical structure there would be two planning processes: one would occur from the "bottom-up" with the hope that overall goals would largely be an integration of local goals; at the same time, in dealing with district-wide growth problems, the joint authority would bring together provincial planning and municipal planning for the urbanized area from Oshawa to Oakville. This could make the comprehensive planning process more visible to the public, and therefore, more accountable than the present system. The prevailing experience permits provincial planning to be carried on in isolation and then presented to the public as a "fait accompli" – clearly at variance with participation and local autonomy goals.

#### Sufficient Local Autonomy

As in the case of the other two options, this alternative could have mixed blessings with respect to local autonomy. On the one hand, a one-tier system would tend to strengthen the hands of the municipalities in dealing with the higher levels of government; on the other, due to the financial limitations of smaller governments, without reforming the structure of municipal finance it might simultaneously tend towards less independence and more centralization at the provincial level.

The main advantage of this option is that it maintains local autonomy. In certain instances, cities would have the right to "opt out" and not participate in an integrated program. However, in the event of a conflict between the cities that could not be settled by the withdrawal of the unconsenting party,

1. This inconsistency could in part be resolved if Metro's boundaries were expanded.  
2. This point is stressed in a recent BMR *Comment*, "Metro Toronto Under Review: What Are The Issues?" (Toronto: March, 1975).

1. Paper no. 3 of this Conference by Marvyn Novick, entitled "Human Services: Coordinated Planning and Integrated Delivery", deals with this subject in depth.  
2. Toronto Area Transit Operating Authority was created in August, 1973, in order to coordinate and integrate transit operations within the Toronto-Centered Services Area (which includes the regions of Peel, York, Durham, and Metro).



the province acting as arbiter would have the power to step in and impose a solution. The Canadian political system offers a precedent for this in the example of the federal-provincial relations. Presumably under this option, the province would feel increased pressure to accommodate each city in its efforts to resolve the conflict.

While some might view this kind of plan as tending toward anarchy on the one hand or excessive provincial control on the other, it should be pointed out that for the past several years this has been the prevailing pattern under the two-tier system. The province has ended up having to make decisions (witness transportation matters) on issues which were not resolved at the Metro level.

#### CONCLUSION

This paper has attempted to sketch in broad strokes some of the critical factors to be considered in designing the future form of local government for the Metro Toronto area. It is an overview — and as an overview it runs certain risks. But it does enable us to see the obvious pros and cons of the alternative options.

The following “conclusions” are tentative and we trust that they will stimulate some useful discussion:

1. The future form of government for the Metropolitan Toronto area should aim at achieving five basic goals. In abbreviated form, these are: (a) participation, (b) sense of community, (c) efficiency, (d) effective planning, and (e) sufficient local autonomy.
2. No single option fully satisfies all of these criteria. In choosing Metro's future structure, the consequences of goals that remain unachieved or undermined must be faced and dealt with.

3. Changing attitudes about the importance and scope of participation have important implications for structure. They confirm the importance of local units that are small enough to offer access in its broadest sense and to preserve community identity and local diversity.
4. Traditional assumptions about the dictates of the various criteria need to be tested. For example, the notion that integration and centralization are more efficient is open to challenge on a number of points.
5. The ever-increasing emphasis on human or “soft” services as opposed to “hard” services reinforces the need for a form of government capable of responding to disparate local needs.
6. The criteria for judging structural proposals must also take account of new perceptions of traditional functions. Thus planning which used to be seen mainly as a “top down” land use projection process is now viewed as having an essential political role. The form of government chosen must therefore be capable of relating to neighbourhood planning processes. At the same time it must facilitate planning on a large-scale basis to cope with all of the many problems related to growth.
7. Because the present Metro government seems to be both too big (i.e. for participation and local planning objectives) and too small (i.e. for effective large-scale planning), option (C) is appealing. However, the complexities of this alternative have not been spelled out in this paper. In our view, the dissolution of Metro and the concomitant reduction from six to four cities combined with a formal innovation in provincial-municipal relations is an approach that deserves further study.

## EFFICIENCY IN URBAN GOVERNMENT: ECONOMIES AND DISECONOMIES OF SCALE

Background Paper #2

by

Peter Lyman

Peat, Marwick and Partners

#### INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to examine the concept of economies and diseconomies of scale in municipal services, and to discuss its significance for the future structure of government in Metro Toronto.

The question of economies/diseconomies of scale is pertinent, since alternative Metro structures will affect the scale of operations of municipal services. Some of Metro's options include:

- further integration of borough and city responsibilities for some services
- expansion of the jurisdiction of Metro departments beyond existing Metro boundaries
- assignment of certain Metro responsibilities to the boroughs and city.

To the extent that there are economies or diseconomies of scale in municipal services, the future will affect the efficiency of local government.

#### CONCEPT OF ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND EFFICIENCY

Economies of scale in terms of city government are the perceived efficiencies achieved through the organization of service delivery for larger numbers of people, over a larger geographical area, and sometimes the grouping of more services into a single organization. Diseconomies are the perceived inefficiencies in service delivery brought about as a result of such an expanded organizational scope.

In theory, at some point in the

growth of an organization, economies of scale disappear and give way to diseconomies. This relationship is shown on Exhibit A, where efficiency is measured by reduced cost per capita or per unit of service delivered.


The concept of economies of scale is derived from private industry experience, wherever the manufactured output can be standardized. However, in the municipal field the “output” of municipal services is constantly changing and is seldom standardized. Therefore, efficiency is difficult to measure, and this means economies of scale are difficult to determine.

The first problem is to designate acceptable criteria to measure efficiency. The common notion of efficiency in urban government includes a mix of the following:

1. *Operating Efficiency*  
A municipal service is more efficient if it makes greater use of financial resources to achieve a standard output (e.g. per ton cost of garbage collected).
2. *Quality of Services*  
A municipal service is more efficient if it improves the quality of service by making use of specialized equipment and specialist skills (e.g. reduction in response time for emergency service calls, operation of special social programs).
3. *Total Cost of Local Government*  
A municipal service is also more efficient if the total per capita cost of the service to the community is kept down.

## EXHIBIT A

### STANDARD VIEW OF ECONOMIES/DISECONOMIES OF SCALE



Efficiency in urban government, then, means more service for the dollar, "better" services, and relatively moderate overall cost. It is still a problem to measure economies of scale according to these efficiency criteria, but the main point is to begin with a concept of economies of scale that is enlarged beyond the narrow, cost-cutting image.

#### ATTEMPTS TO MEASURE ECONOMIES OF SCALE

The efficiency of municipal services has often been considered as "U" shaped (as shown in Exhibit A) — economies turn to diseconomies of scale at a certain city size.<sup>1</sup> Empirical studies have failed to demonstrate whether this is so, primarily because of the problems in measuring efficiency. Some examples are:

- a massive study of the potential restructuring of St. Louis, using a complex service-quality index to account for service level differences, could not draw conclusions about economies or diseconomies of scale<sup>2</sup>
- in a more recent review of Ontario local governments, there seemed to be economies of scale for water supply and public works, but no real evidence for fire, police, sanitation and other non-education programs<sup>3</sup>

— there is some evidence that school board size does not necessarily correlate with economies of scale, although measurement of the quality of education is almost impossible<sup>4</sup>

The Ministry of Treasury Economics and Intergovernmental Affairs is studying local government service levels, but is encountering the same measurement problems. An example quoted by a Ministry official compared smaller municipalities, which use only 1 staff person per 200 cases in social services, to larger ones, which were found to use up to 4.5 per 200 cases. However, the services rendered in larger cities were considered far more extensive than for smaller municipalities, and thus they are not comparable.

What can be measured are the *costs* per capita of municipal services. Some studies have shown that costs/capita exhibit a "U" — shaped pattern, indicating that large cities have *higher* costs/capita than medium-sized ones. In actual fact, Metro Toronto's municipal service cost per capita is \$404, compared to Hamilton \$341; Windsor, \$310; Kitchener-Waterloo, \$270; Mississauga \$273.<sup>5</sup>

Why Metro Toronto spends more per capita is difficult to say. Expenditures per capita seem to correlate more with per capita incomes or property value assessments than populations. This means

1. See Isard, Walter, *Location and Space-Economy*, MIT Press, 1956; Mera, Koichi, "On the Urban Agglomeration and Economic Efficiency", *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 1973.
2. Bollens, John C. *Exploring the Metro Community*, University of California Press, 1961.
3. Bodkin, R. G. and D. W. Conklin, "Scale and Other Determinates of Municipal Government Expenditures in Ontario: A Quantitative Analysis", *International Economic Review*, Vol. 12 No. 3, October, 1971.
4. See studies quoted in Lind, L. J., *The Learning Machine*, House of Anansi, 1974, pg. 208.
5. Peat, Marwick and Partners and the I.B.I. Group "Mississauga Urban Development and Transportation Study", 1975 Services included in the study were: general administration, police protection, fire, public works, sanitation-waste, health, social and family, recreation, planning, financial, education, county levy.

that often larger cities, with higher per capita incomes, can afford to spend more on local services.

Another way of explaining the high per capita expenditure phenomenon in large cities is that the demand for services is greater. The demand for services in larger municipalities could be attributed to the desire to have high levels of service (i.e. through the use of more specialized equipment and staff) standardized throughout the city area. (Of course, the demands for better services may be partly the result of the "push" for them by the highly trained professional staff, as well as the "pull" by city residents.)

Exhibit B shows an example — in transit operations — of how cost per capita tends to rise. Costs go up in quantum jumps for additions to transit fleet (and subways in Metro), new garages, specialized equipment, and planning/design support staff. In addition, as shown in the second graph of the exhibit, the costs for every increase in level of service tend to be high, which is reflected in the overall rise in cost/capita as service demands increase.<sup>1</sup> It is cautioned that these relationships are the judgement of transit planners, and not based on empirical study.

There are those who would further argue that as cities grow they become more inefficient in terms of local service delivery.<sup>2</sup> Two causes proposed to explain inefficiency of larger cities are density and "neglect". The implication of density is that social interactions increase geometrically (population increases only arithmetically), and it is a number of interactions that determine some service needs (e.g. police, transportation). The implication

of neglect is that, faced with deteriorating social conditions requiring increased operating expenditures, cities put off replacing capital facilities that are thus neglected year by year. Both reasons would imply that very large cities cost a great deal to operate on a per capita basis whether or not service delivery is centralized or decentralized.

In summary, then, no one really knows whether, in general, there are economies of scale for municipal services, partly because the services seem to get more sophisticated and expensive in larger cities. This additional cost per capita does not by itself mean less efficiency, since there is a higher demand for services in larger cities; the examination of scale economies must proceed at the micro level, bearing in mind the service delivery problems of specific local government services.

#### EFFICIENCY AND SPECIFIC SERVICES

Two of the three aspects of efficiency mentioned above are now examined with reference to specific services. These are: (a) "operating" efficiencies, or cost reductions per unit of service, and (b) higher levels of service, or "better" service.

##### Operating Efficiencies

First, let us examine efficiency in terms of the narrow "more for less" perspective. Some of the reasons given for consolidating responsibilities into larger organizations are:


- vehicles and crews can be utilized more productively
- supplies and equipment can be ordered in larger quantities and thus possibly cut unit costs

1. Another example of this is the increasingly high cost per minute improvement in emergency services response time.  
2. Increased urbanization is supposed to lead to greater efficiency in overall economic terms, according to urban agglomeration theory.


### EXHIBIT B

#### ILLUSTRATION OF COST RELATIONSHIPS IN INCREASES IN SCALE IN TRANSIT OPERATIONS

1. Quantum jumps in cost bring only temporary scale economies.



2. Each increase in level of service costs relatively more.



- facilities, equipment, and specialists can be more efficiently allocated and utilized
- fewer supervisory people are required, thereby cutting administrative overhead and duplication.

These reasons can be quite valid, but only up to a certain population level. The minimum city size is difficult to determine, and few analysts have attempted to speculate on numbers. One exception is the Province which proposed the figure of 100,000 to 150,000 "and beyond" for local health services organization.<sup>1</sup> Metro's population is so large in comparison with other municipalities that it generally is an aberration to provincial norms.

Examination of specific services indicates that potential cost savings from most Metro-wide unification are marginal. Crew, vehicle, equipment, facilities, and specialist utilization efficiencies are more apt to be achieved on a sub-metro scale. The Metro Police Commission is decentralized into precincts, the TTC into four operating divisions, Metro Social Services into field offices, and fire protection is still an area municipality responsibility.<sup>2</sup> Library, school and to some extent medical facilities are of course dispersed throughout Metro. Thus from an operating efficiency perspective, one could argue that there are few economies of scale from Metro-wide organization.

The reduction in supervisory staff and lower supply/equipment prices through common purchasing are often advanced as cost saving arguments. For example, it was calculated that the

complete amalgamation of emergency services would produce staff savings equivalent to about 8 to 9% of the total budget.<sup>3</sup> In practice such cost savings appear to be largely theoretical. In terms of staff, enough reasons are usually advanced to maintain existing staff size and thus wipe out any potential cost savings.

In terms of common purchasing, the opportunities are not as large as they might seem. For example, the TTC has no special discount on a GMC bus relative to a much smaller municipality.

While larger-scale operations do not produce huge cost savings, it does not mean that there are no potential cost savings from greater efficiencies *within* organizations. The Human Resources Agency in New York city is supposed to be saving over \$100 million annually as a result of improvements in management procedures and data processing facilities. Most Metro departments have room for cost reduction possibilities — if at a less dramatic scale.

There are also potential operating efficiencies from integration of *part* of the activities of area municipalities. There are substantial savings from closer integration of city and borough computer facilities, for example. In fact, this is under current study by Metro. Such operating efficiencies suggest there are economies of scale in some aspects of municipal government operations, but not enough to warrant Metro-wide unification of whole departments.

#### Quality Criteria

The more important potential

efficiency benefits are in the area of improvement in the quality of the service. Organizing services on a larger scale can raise the *level* of services and provide common *standards* throughout the area served. Such improvements include the following:

- more integrated planning can raise the level of services through more co-ordinated delivery; e.g. water, hydro, sewage disposal and transportation services
- larger units can afford or justify the development of specialized skills and equipment: e.g. communications equipment, experimental programs, specialists
- larger organizations help achieve Metro-wide uniformity in service standards: e.g. income maintenance is distributed on a common basis; e.g. emergency services have relatively standardized response times (as opposed to widely diverging standards for borough fire departments).

Potential quality efficiencies should not be assumed to prevail for every municipal function. First, some municipal services avail themselves to standardization and specialization more than others. Those services dealing with physical services — i.e. the "man-to-machine" service — are more susceptible to improvements than the services requiring attention to personal problems.

Second, when there is a rapid chain of command required, as in fire, police and emergency services, there are benefits to be gained from *unification*, achieved through organization on a large scale. The same is true when services have to be planned on a Metro-wide basis, as in all linear physical

service systems. Clearly, then, a service-by-service review would be required to identify the benefits of scale for each case.

#### Diseconomies of Scale<sup>1</sup>

Since there has been an easy acceptance in municipal organizational review of the benefits of larger-scale operation, it is appropriate to raise questions about the service level improvements actually achieved. They might be phrased as follows:

1. Are common standards always appropriate?
2. Does the bureaucracy of larger organizations tend to put additional constraints on the desirable organizational objectives of:
  - (a) adaptability to change
  - (b) field staff communication to management
  - (c) reduction of the barriers among specialists
  - (d) co-ordination among departments.
3. What about more "management by objectives"?

These issues are discussed in turn.

#### Problems of Common Standards

Common standards in Metro are supposedly "efficiency" benefits of scale for the individual. Residents throughout Metro obtain the same level of service wherever they live or happen to be when the service is required. However, it is possible that this drive for common standards compromises responding to actual requirements at the individual level.

The problem is that standards are usually defined in *output* terms — e.g. garbage collection twice/week, income maintenance payments of so much, response time of police under 'x' minutes,

1. See 1965 Task Force on Local Health Services  
 2. It is presumed that even if fire responsibilities were merged into a Metro-wide organization, there would still be a fairly decentralized operation.  
 3. See "Unified Operational Control of Metro's Ambulances", Ontario Ministry of Health, 1974.

1. Some of this analysis is based on the teaching of Dr. Michel Chevalier, Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University.

transit service within two blocks of all residents, etc. There is a kind of faith in these standards, partly because they are measurable and thus can be maintained. But are they appropriate in all or most cases?

In social, medical, education and other people-oriented services, flexibility and attention to particular need are very important. For example, the standard health services in schools of, say, X nurses per Y number of schoolchildren, is not related to the quite different needs of suburban vs. inner city schoolchildren. While a common standard of "good health" is quite valid, common standards for the delivery of a service (i.e. the service output) is not.

The evident need for local adaptability for some services suggests that common standards for service delivery are not necessarily a benefit of scale. Overall objectives for service should perhaps be similar, but standardizing the manner in which service is delivered does not automatically follow.

#### *Problem of Bureaucracy*

The nature of many municipal services is the high level of *discretionary* service administered by the policeman, social worker, and other field level staff. The number of people police do *not* arrest is perhaps as important as the number they do, for example.

The need for local flexibility and personal service is recognized by many municipal agencies. Metro and area municipality administrators try to accommodate the local variations in need through administrative decentralization. For example, the Metro Social Services Department is establish-

ing local multi-service centres. At the same time in some school boards more authority is being delegated to school principals.

However, it is always difficult to decentralize authority in a large organization. There is pressure for the central decision-makers to retain a considerable degree of control over operations. This pressure is partly because they have to be wary about expensive precedents being set in one part of their jurisdiction. In addition, there remains a remoteness at the top administrative and political level. Inevitably, there is additional buffer that develops between the senior administrators and field staff in larger organizations. Elected officials also become more remote when they are called upon to make judgements in areas of Metro with which they are unfamiliar. While certainly not impossible, such remoteness tends to make an appreciation of local need more difficult.

There are two other major bureaucratic problems of larger organizations. First, there is the phenomenon of "*overspecialization*", particularly in areas of complexity requiring input from a number of specialists. Problems are perceived as the purview of specific disciplines, whose members assume that only they are qualified to cope with these problems. Thus, barriers are built up among specializations attempting to deal with the same problems and same people.

*Co-ordination* among agencies and among specializations is a second problem compounded by scale. The federal and Ontario provincial governments have expended an enormous amount of effort in achieving inter-departmental program co-ordination and integration. At larger scales of government operation more policy advisors, secretariats, task forces, and inter-departmental committees are required.

One potential solution is to create super-departments to achieve a more effective co-ordination. This approach was tried in New York City but seems to have been beset by more problems by the extra management level that was added to the service structure.<sup>1</sup> This step increased the remoteness of field staff without improving co-ordination at the middle management or field levels. Consequently, some of the super-agencies, including the most people oriented (the Human Resources Agency) are being dismantled.

The truth is that we have not yet succeeded in learning how to develop suitable mechanisms for co-ordination. Co-ordination of services is still perhaps best achieved through informal and personal channels rather than formal structures. Even at the federal and provincial government levels, much inter-departmental progress is the result of variations of "old boy" and other informal networks. At the local level, this kind of informal communication structure is possibly easier to maintain at lower scales of organization.

Some services appear to need co-ordination on cross-specialization or cross-departmental lines more than others. The broad social area which requires co-ordination among a variety of departmental and other institutional groups, would seem to suffer more than physical services from this aspect of diseconomies of scale.

Therefore, in strict organizational terms there can be diseconomies of scale in the efficiency of service delivery, particularly the less well defined "people" needs.

#### *Management by Objectives*

Linked to the earlier discussion about standards of service is the question of what the services are supposed to accom-

plish. What is a higher level of service: To answer this brings to mind the increasingly popular notion that the service must be defined in terms of program objectives. Performance can only be evaluated if there is a set of standards or objectives for the service.

The need for establishing objectives for department programs has been the main force in upgrading public service management over the last several years. At the municipal level, departments and elected officials are paying more attention to the objectives of municipal services.

The main problem with this objective setting activity is that departments define objectives in terms of their own scope of operations. This process is satisfactory for some departments which have fairly straight forward tasks that require little co-ordination with other departments. Again, the routinized, primarily physical services respond better to this kind of management approach.

The inter-relationships among services, i.e. inter-departmental concerns, are not so easily managed by this objective setting approach. Performance is more difficult to measure when co-ordinated action is required. In the increasing need for interaction between policeman, health inspector, social worker, planner and others, it is difficult for each department to establish objectives to respond to this need requiring inter-departmental action.

The discussion of management by objectives is another way of raising the basic question of scale. The ever optimistic public administrator puts value in rational approaches and believes that if only co-ordination can be achieved and the proper system implemented, the larger organization can marshal its specialist resources to solve complex problems. It is suggested here that one

1. Yates, Douglas, *Neighbourhood Democracy*, Lesington Books, 1973.

approach to be examined is the return to a smaller scale operation.

#### *Decision-making Implications*

In many cases arguments are made on behalf of amalgamation or integration of services on the basis of economies of scale. Often not part of the discussion are the decision-making implications of more centralized services. Economies of scale, while primarily advanced on the basis of efficiency, seem to have a substantial impact on decisions concerning the distribution of (a) services, and (b) tax burden among population segments and political jurisdictions within Metro.

#### *Distribution of Services*

Centralized decision-making has two potentially important effects on the distribution of services. First, there could be an adverse effect on the participation by interest groups in government decision-making regarding service delivery. Second, under the guise of "common standards" a more centralized jurisdiction can quite substantially alter the distribution of services among area municipalities.

#### *Change in Participation*

Centralized planning of the distribution of services affects local participation in planning and decision-making. It does not necessarily reduce participation, but it can alter the spectrum of community participants. With their ability to gain access to the decision-maker, the strong organized interests exert greater influence than weaker interests (which are often local) following service amalgamation.

It was proposed earlier that effective people-oriented services must be responsible to very local and individual

needs. Such needs might possibly be less well represented if local groups and individuals have less influence under a more centralized system.

#### *Change Among Area Municipalities*

The second aspect of decision-making concerns the distribution of services among area municipalities. A greater standardization of services from larger scale centralized operations tends to support the service deprived area municipalities. Overemphasis of one type of service, which could favour one geographic area, could then result in an imbalance in the overall distribution of services in Metro.

Standards, as discussed above, that have been set in the past have usually been in areas where finite output can be measured, primarily in the physical services areas. If increased centralization leads to common standards, it is possible that the common standards will not take into account the more difficult, cross-departmental objectives that are required to improve the social and economic conditions of communities.

There is obviously a political dimension to this argument, often expressed in city versus suburbs service distribution. Albert Rose has argued that common standards favoured the boroughs following the creation of Metro, since services were distributed to support the physical infrastructure in the fringe areas of Metro.<sup>1</sup> Arguments can probably be made on both sides of the city/suburbs issue; however, it is important to examine both the "who gets what" implications as well as the economies of scale arguments in evaluating service centralization vs. decentralization.

#### *Distribution of Tax Burden*

The distribution of the tax burden is also an important consideration in the argument for and against centralization of services. In fact, the tax burden is often the more immediate cause of a desire to centralize or decentralize services. For example, the direct cause of the amalgamation of social services in Metro has been attributed to the tax inequality perceived by the City of Toronto. The tax burden issue has recently been subject to much discussion with respect to the future of the Metro School Board, and the creation of a health district encompassing all of Metro.

Questions of taxation will continue to influence the decisions whether to centralize or decentralize municipal services. The distribution of the tax burden, like the distribution of services, should be considered along with the question of economies and diseconomies of scale inherent in the organization of the service in question.

#### CONCLUSIONS

The major conclusion that can be drawn is as follows: there is nothing definitive about economies of scale and it is thus not a strong argument for amalgamation of services. At the same time, there are important implications to scale that should be examined on an individual service basis. Questions that could be asked about each service which would have a bearing on the potential economies of scale are as follows:

1. Is an integration of services essential, useful, or is only some form of co-ordination required on a Metro-wide basis?
2. Is the service restricted to the defined geographic area? Is the service administered partly on a cross-boundary

basis? Does service typically cover large geographic areas irrespective of political jurisdiction?

3. Does the service require a rapid communications and chain of command throughout the Metro area?
4. Is there a great deal of inter-departmental co-ordination required?
5. Is the service highly personal with a considerable degree of discretion called for the field worker? Is the service demand responsible in the sense that it should answer to the particular needs of community members?
6. To what extent can vehicles, equipment, and new technology be utilized? Does the service have standardized, repetitive activities?
7. How important or how easily defined are Metro-wide standards for the service?

These kinds of questions should sort out whether there are economies of scale according to the efficiency criteria of (a) operating efficiency, (b) quality of services, and (c) total costs. These questions should also clearly demonstrate that the economies of scale issue is complex.

The second conclusion is that arguments on behalf of economies of scale do not encompass all the implications of larger scale. The notion of common standards should be looked at more closely, rather than just accepted as a desirable feature. The inefficiencies inherent in larger organizations, especially in the co-ordination of services delivery, should also be taken into consideration.

The third conclusion is that many of the economies of scale benefits can be achieved through integration of certain parts of the departments and their services, without amalgamating the whole service.

1. Rose, Albert, *Governing Metropolitan Toronto*, University of California Press, 1972.

The fourth conclusion is that in considering economies of scale the political ramifications of the distribution of the services and the distribution of the tax burden should not be neglected.

In summary, there appear to be certain shibboleths in the argument for economies of scale that should not be accepted automatically.

## HUMAN SERVICES – COORDINATED PLANNING AND INTEGRATED DELIVERY

Background Paper #3

by

Marvyn Novick

Chairman, Social Development Group, Social Planning Council

### I – HUMAN SERVICES – A GENERAL DEFINITION

In employing the term "human services" we refer to those service sectors of our society which are directed to the personal and social growth of people.<sup>1</sup> These services seek to enhance learning, cure and prevent illness, promote emotional stability, facilitate adaptation to new environments, compensate for the liabilities of age or family dismemberment, enable access to basic material necessities of life. Human services include such areas as education and health (both defined in their broadest possible sense), social and community services, recreation, cultural enrichment including library services, corrections, manpower programs, and extensive elements of police work.

If this were a more detailed examination of the concept, it would be necessary to identify the fine line between goods-related services (travel, food, entertainment) and what are being called human services. For purposes of this report, however, we will confine ourselves to the general definition. Most of the services which we have included tend to be organized on a non-profit basis, whether through public or charity dollars. They are assumed to be legitimate subject for tests of community accountability in their function and practise, as

are other public or quasi-public programs.

The use of the term "human services" is fairly recent in describing the social resources referred to above. Other terms in current use which attempt to classify similar ranges of programs include "social development" (employed by Ontario), "personal social services" (arising from the Seebom report of 1968 in Great Britain), "community services" (the term used by the City of Toronto in its current neighbourhood services study), and "soft services" (to contrast with physical services such as sewers, roads, and refuse collection.)

The common aim of all these terms is to denote an integrated concept of service need, development, delivery and use. Its more general sense is to convey that elusive phenomenon, currently referred to quite frequently as "quality of life."

### II – THE PRESENT CONTEXT

Since this is an area which has usually not received extensive public discussion in the municipal sector (in contrast with physical growth, housing, and transportation concerns) it might be useful to quickly trace the evolution of human services to their present state.

#### 1) *The Private Origin of Human Services*

Historically the provision of human services was based on certain assumptions

1. Alan Gartner, Frank Riessman, *The Service Society and the Consumer Vanguard*, Harper & Row, New York 1974, Chapter 1, p. 16-42.

which come to characterize their organization and delivery.

Firstly, human services were viewed as residual. This meant that people in their normal state of being were presumed to be self-sufficient; human services became necessary because minorities of people were victims (illness, disability), unable to compete effectively in the mainstream (the poor), or of unstable character and behaviour (child protection, corrections services). The majority of people were recognized to require certain forms of service at important transition points in life – the need of the young for instruction, and the financial inability of the majority to provide such resources through private purchasing power resulted in our public schooling system. Similarly, age comes to us all, reducing the capacity for self-maintenance – hence support for special services such as homes for the aged.

Secondly, and this is an assumption which will later be examined in relation to the issue of urban structure, was the idea that service provision was more than an impersonal exchange of commodities and information between provider and receiver. Virtually all of our human services developed initially under private auspices.<sup>1</sup> Implicit in these efforts was the strong belief that effective service provision involved a personal and relational element. For a service to be meaningful the service provider had to somehow reach, discover, and work with the whole person.

The role of volunteer or friendly visitor became recognized as a critical element in the individualization of the service relationship – whether in a hospital, prison, settlement house, or home for unwed mothers. Because the

role of volunteer was by definition unpaid work there was minimal concern about controlling numbers. It was implicitly understood that the more volunteers there were – that is, people involved in personal and relational work with service consumers – the better the service would be.

A third assumption, reflected in the structures of private service financing, planning, and delivery, was the recognition that various forms of human services were inter-related in objective and content, and that their cumulative functioning in the community was an item of common concern. The Charity Societies of the late 19th century, and the Community Organization Movements of the early twentieth century were designed to co-ordinate services city-wide, and to rationalize integrated delivery into local districts and neighbourhoods. The emergence of settlement houses, and the use of schools during World War I for community services, were attempts to promote integrated neighbourhood service work.

This style of private service provision – commonly referred to as charity – has come to acquire a perjorative meaning for many people. Because charity was offered voluntarily, in both money and time, service entitlement was defined as a privilege not a social right.

Charity leadership, with its emphasis on excess disposable income, was vested in narrow socio-economic sectors of the community. The notion of assistance came to acquire an element of paternalism – those well off helping out the less fortunate. The model assumed absolute destitution and deprivation to constitute legitimate need (hence the concentration of services in poor neighbourhoods),

provided for no significant consumer participation and accountability over services, and because of the notion that “the poor will always be with us” possessed few concepts of prevention.

Having noted these shortfalls, it is important to acknowledge original features of the private system which were generally lost when human services began to move into the public sector. Notably – the personal and relational elements of service, and the integrated financing, planning, and delivery of services.

## 2) *The Public-Private System*

The private human service system has historically been unable to respond in periods when commonly recognized needs increased rapidly.

The first erosion of the private sector occurred during the depression. Because of the scope of support required, financial assistance, through income maintenance programs, became entrenched in the public sector. The private sector assumed responsibility for direct services exclusive of income support.

This arrangement persisted well through the forties and the fifties, with minor variations in selective areas. When the two tier structure emerged, Metro was responsible for homes for the aged, maintenance of Children's Aid Wards, post-sanatorium care for tuberculosis patients, the hospitalization of indigent patients.<sup>1</sup> The area municipalities were concerned with public health, unemployment relief, maintenance of non-wards, limited social work services (basically by the city alone), and of course schools.

In a report prepared for the Ontario Economic Council in January 1974 “The Service State Emerges in Ontario”, Vernon

Lang identifies the scope of the public role in human services through three decades. The forties saw the public sector primarily involved in the regulation of private services, the fifties was the period of capital development for essential physical infrastructures such as schools and hospitals, and it is only in the sixties that government emerges as a major provider for a wide range of services.<sup>2</sup>

The expanded role of government in the sixties can be linked to a number of factors: firstly, the immense population growth in Ontario and Metro, with a corresponding demand on existing service sectors. Once more a rapid increase in demand on the private sector necessitated an expanded public role. Thus, for example, the funding of Children's Aid Societies, became a total public responsibility.

Then there was the rediscovery of poverty in the sixties which identified whole areas of inadequate service provision, and which necessitated vastly increased public funding of services – day care, visiting homemakers, residential centers for treatment and rehabilitation, vocational and manpower training programs, to name but a few.

Converging on this period was the growth of citizen participation activity, largely developed in the context of discovering common residential concerns. People re-affirmed the value of neighbourhood and a local sense of community, as alternative centers of intimacy and personal expression. This, in the face of raw growth which characterized urban development, particularly in Metro.

1. Albert Rose, *Governing Metropolitan Toronto*, University of California Press, Berkeley 1972, p. 25-26.

2. Vernon Lang, *The Service State Emerges in Ontario*, Ontario Economic Council, January 1974, p. 55.

1. Sidney Dillick, *Community Organization For Neighbourhood Development: Past and Present*, Wm. Morrow & Co., New York 1953, p. 25-63.



Community development services — featuring self-help, social action, and a notion of citizen accountability — became widely included in the human services spectrum.

The rapid introduction of public financing and provision of human services in the sixties was situational and reactive. Wherever new problems were identified, or the capacity of the private sector was exhausted, government was persuaded to respond. Inter-governmental roles were never clearly pursued. The concept of a "direct response" to a specific problem was easier to get into a political system of negotiation and compromise than a general reshaping of programs or the rationalization of inter-governmental and public/private roles.<sup>1</sup>

Thus at the end of the sixties and into the early seventies, we emerge with a human services system whose parts are scattered within four levels of government (federal, provincial, metro and area municipal), with a decreasing proportion in the private sector.

It is a system whose cumulative logic very often defies ordinary understanding. With one set of federal dollars (i.e. L.I.P.) a parent can receive fully subsidized day care, or an elderly person can be provided with fully subsidized home support services. The same agency, upon receipt of another set of federal dollars (through the Canada Assistance Plan), must institute a full or partial recovery fee in order to continue the same service to the same person. One arm of government (Ontario Housing Corporation) does not recognize the means test of another arm of the same government (Day Nurseries Branch), which in turn does not recognize the means test of

another branch of the same ministry (Family Benefits — Community and Social Services) in determining program eligibility.

An information service is a social service when offered on a regional basis, and therefore eligible for Metro support, but ceases to be a social service and thereby loses its funding eligibility when offered on a neighbourhood basis. Subsidies to residential centers for treatment and rehabilitation can vary from \$11 dollars a day per person to \$60 dollars a day per person — because the former service is designated a social service, and the latter a mental health service.

To quote Vernon Lang in assessing the present state of the public (and one could add private) human service system:

*"The citizen today pays taxes to three or four different levels of government and to a variety of special funds, but a complex network of inter-governmental transfers effectively obscures any relationship between what goes in, what comes out, and who is responsible."*<sup>2</sup>

The result is a loss of public accountability for the adequacy and quality of human service provision.<sup>3</sup>

### 3) Consolidation and Coordination — Themes for the 70's

Recognition exists that some measure of rationality is urgently required. Senior government initiatives have been undertaken, but these have tended to be limited and hesitant. The federal government, as part of its social security review with the provinces, has a working party looking at services. The time frame for reporting, public discussion, and legislative change is unclear.

The provincial government instituted a social development policy secretariat

in 1973, which formally acknowledged the inter-related policy interests of various human service ministries — health, education, community and social services, and now culture and recreation. Various efforts at ministry decentralization have been attempted, one or two multi-service center programs funded, a select committee examined the relationship of schools, human services, and local communities, green papers have been issued on selective themes. This does not, however, add up to anything approaching a serious strategy — similar to efforts in Quebec and British Columbia.

Because the experience of the rapid growth in human services is only recent, this is an area which previous reviews of local government in Metro have not examined seriously. It is an area, we would suggest, which warrants serious examination by the present commission — to assess the role and identify the scope of municipal government in consolidating and co-ordinating human services.

### III — THE MUNICIPAL SECTOR

Human services in the municipal sector are offered by metro, the city and boroughs (including special purpose boards), boards of education, and the United Way. (Most of the over 70 member agencies in the United Way receive varying levels of public funding, and can be considered quasi-public in character.)

The division of service provision is noted in Chart I (which is probably not exhaustive), with the scope of federal

and provincial service provision also identified. Service provision is defined to include direct operations of the government level itself, or transfer payments to quasi-public or special purpose structures. Cost-sharing arrangements are not specifically noted; we are more interested in determining the public level at which service is formally offered.

We also have attempted to determine the scope of human service expenditures by and within the municipal sectors — see Table I (a), (b) and (c). Human services represent the largest aggregate expenditure on local services by the municipal sector, including boards of education. When education is omitted, human services comprise 26% of remaining municipal expenditures. This corresponds to the proportion across Ontario municipalities, which grew from 18.4% in 1968 to 23.7% in 1973.<sup>1</sup>

In examining the proportion of expenditures between Metro and the area municipalities, we note in Table I (c), that when income maintenance payments are removed, the amount spent is roughly the same. The contracting scope of the private sector is evident; United Way expenditures represent 5.3% of the municipal total (also excluding education and income maintenance payments).

The public figures do not include direct federal and provincial expenditures on services in Metro, nor is the financial contribution of churches, corporations, service clubs, or foundations noted. If all of these preceding expenditure levels were available, however, the public ratio would be even higher.

1. Alvin Schorr, *The Future Structure of Community Services*, National Council of Social Welfare, May 1968, p. 5

2. Vernon Lang, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

3. *Municipal Tax Reform*, Office of the Metropolitan Chairman, February 1974, p. 31.

1. *Financing Development of Local Government in Ontario*, Municipal Finance Branch; Treasury, Economics, Intergovernmental Affairs; Government of Ontario, p. 8-11.

THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL/PRIVATE DIVISION OF HUMAN SERVICE PROVISION

Metro	City-Boroughs	Board of Education	United Way
- landlord/tenant serv.	- recreation programs	- child instruction & related programs	- family counselling
- day care	- information services	- psychiatric & special education services	- youth work
- homes for the aged	- libraries	- family counselling	- neighbourhood development & recreation services
- hostels	- public health	- continuing adult education	- information centers
- housing & services (elderly)	- cultural enrichment	- community recreation;	- immigrant orientation & settlement
- income maintenance	- community centers	- facilities & programs	- services to the elderly
- family and individual counselling	- neighbourhood parks	- interpreter services	- corrections;
- cultural enrichment	- housing rental services	- neighbourhood development;	- rehabilitation
- visiting homemakers	- neighbourhood planning	- facilities & liaison	- day care
- Children's Aid	- varied neighbourhood and community services		- mental health services
- information centers	- through grants		- community & denominational planning
- elderly persons centers			- vocational/occupational programs
- varied neighbourhood and established services through grants			- personal care services & friendly visiting
<b>Provincial</b>	<b>Federal</b>		- native people services
- hospitals & related health care centers	- job creation in the human service sector (LIP, OFY, LEAP) which has resulted in anywhere from 100-300 varied new services being initiated at any given time in Metro.		- distress centers
- income maintenance	- manpower & related services		- camping
- residential treatment/rehabilitation facilities	- immigrant orientation & settlement		- language classes
- public housing services (OHC)	- demonstration projects through Health & Welfare, Secretary of State, Manpower & Immigration		- cultural enrichment
- family court services	- corrections		- residential facilities; short term
- community colleges	- income maintenance & support		- visiting homemakers
- cultural enrichment	- cultural enrichment		
- vocational/occupational programs			
- legal aid			
- services to the retarded			
- community development			
- family counselling			
- immigrant reception			
- corrections			

TABLE I (a)

MUNICIPAL SECTOR EXPENDITURES ESTIMATES ON HUMAN SERVICES FOR THE YEAR 1974 IN DOLLARS & PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL SECTOR EXPENDITURE

Area Municipality	Parks, Recreation & Community Services	Conservation Of Health	Libraries	Total Human Service Expenditure	Total Overall Expenditure	Percentage
City of Toronto	\$ 12,765,711	\$ 6,453,822	\$ 5,396,850	\$ 24,616,383	\$ 140,804,595	17.5%
East York	1,845,204	819,163	843,869	3,508,236	14,453,115	24.3%
Etobicoke	4,815,240	2,195,377	2,400,610	9,411,227	39,174,484	24.0%
North York	9,974,882	3,955,822	5,364,931	19,295,635	57,462,217	33.6%
Scarborough	7,906,330	2,289,167	3,370,279	13,565,776	44,465,542	30.6%
York	2,972,958	1,374,052	651,000	4,998,010	17,457,394	28.6%
	<u>40,280,325</u>	<u>17,087,403</u>	<u>18,027,539</u>	<u>75,395,267</u>	<u>313,817,347</u>	<u>24.0%</u>
Metro Government	\$ 7,486,451	\$ *94,005,165	\$ 5,423,405	\$ 3,020,387	\$ 109,935,408**	27.7%
Education				495,290,724	495,290,724	100.0%
United Way				8,300,000***	8,300,000	100.0%

### NOTES ON TABLE I (a)

- \* Includes \$36,023,240 in projected social assistance payments.
- \*\* It has not been possible, nor was a functional budget analysis available, to identify the extent of human service activity in police work. Aside from visible units such as the Youth Bureau and Community Service Officers, observers have suggested that a considerable portion of mainstream police work is directed toward crisis intervention-mediation and short-term counselling, along with information and referral services.
- \*\*\* This represents United Way expenditures for local services in Metro. United Way revenue is also allocated to the Red Cross, national organizations, and for internal expenditures.

TABLE I (b)

TOTAL EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES ON HUMAN SERVICES BY ALL MUNICIPAL SECTORS DURING THE YEAR 1974 IN RELATION TO TOTAL MUNICIPAL SECTOR EXPENDITURES

Total Overall Expenditures spent by all governments in Metro Toronto	\$ 1,215,068,933
Total Expenditures on Human Services by all governments in Metro Toronto	\$ 688,921,399
Percentage of Overall Expenditures Spent on Human Services	56.7%

TABLE I (c)

TOTAL HUMAN SERVICE EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES BY ALL MUNICIPAL SECTORS IN RELATION TO INDIVIDUAL MUNICIPAL SECTOR EXPENDITURES FOR HUMAN SERVICES IN 1974.

Area Municipalities	Metro	Education	United Way	Total
\$ 75,395,627 10.9%	109,935,408 16%	495,290,724 71.9%	8,300,000 1.2%	688,921,399 100%
\$ 75,395,627 38.9%	109,935,408 56.8%	not included	8,300,000 4.3%	193,630,675 100%
\$ 75,395,627 47.8%	73,912,168* 46.9%	not included	8,300,000 5.3%	157,607,435 100%

\* excluding income maintenance payments

### 1) The Public Interest

The municipal sector is where the delivery of human services occurs — irrespective of how services are paid for or by whom they are provided. If services do not perform effectively, the problems arising therefrom will likely be experienced initially by municipal government. This can result in deviance which necessitates additional protective services (i.e. — youth crime), alienation which can intensify physical blight and thereby create a negative character to parts of a city (i.e. — slums), the absence of adequate employment programs leading to family dismemberment, which in turn can create additional stress on the school system, or insufficient orientation and integration programs for immigrants which may lead to inter-group community tension.

The absence of coordinated planning, financing, delivery, and evaluation of human services in the municipal sector is most evident.

Why, one might ask, should this be of public concern? Certainly, our trustees review education programs and budgets, and our aldermen keep tabs on social service and recreation expenditures. Don't we appoint competent citizens to direct public health and library services? The answer, of course, is yes. And in most instances the services themselves could be quite favourably evaluated.

The problem is that our human service system no longer serves people and communities, it deals with problems. Services are therefore organized according to the specialized skills viewed as solving the problem in question, most often in centralized operations

which disregard the environmental context of the consumer.

Individual services may come to acquire efficient procedures, defined in cost/output measurements, but this does not always result in service effectiveness, seen as the optimal realization of public dollar objectives.<sup>1</sup> For masking efficiency very often within individual services, is the practice of limited responsibility to the consumer. Thus an information service may efficiently inform consumers of services availability, but the effectiveness of the information service as a resource can be diminished if the consumer does not find satisfaction at the other end. A low-income mother requires day care in order to seek employment, but is informed that access to day care depends on her already having a job.

It is a fairly well-established fact that schools alone cannot be effective instruments for the socialization of children.<sup>2</sup> They depend on the effectiveness of resources directed toward the entire social environment of the child. There are no formal mechanisms relating the school to these resources, nor these resources to each other.

Let us examine the present delivery structure in the area of family support services. (See chart 2 next page.)

These service structures operate in their own spheres. Collaboration is generally informal and random. For local communities and neighbourhoods, bringing these resources together to develop an integrated family service strategy is quite difficult and time consuming, if at all possible. The overlap, and impact on cost effectiveness, can be significant.

1. Vernon Lang, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

2. Roland Warren, *The Community in America*, Rand McNally & Co., Chicago 1963, p. 176.

## CHART 2 – FAMILY SUPPORT SERVICES

Problem Response	Service Structure	Sector of Origin
learning	schools	area municipal
illness	hospitals & treatment centers	provincial
child protection	Children's Aid (three denominations)	metro
home management	Visiting Homemakers	private
health promotion	public health	area municipal
marital dysfunction	Family Service (three denominations)	private
neighbourhood socialization	Settlement Houses, Y's	private
accommodation adjustment	OHC/community relations	provincial
income maintenance	Dept. of Social Services	metro
	Family Benefits	provincial
physical security	police	metro
legal	Family Court	provincial
temporary shelter/ information	Y.W.C.A.,	private
cultural orientation	self-help groups: LIP	federal
	immigrant services	federal

The needs of people are inter-related, and they occur in the context of social relationships within a range of immediate environments. Not all problems require highly specialized skills of professionals. Some can be dealt with on an informal self-help basis by people with similar background and experience; but this is only possible if the appropriate social environments are present which enable these many forms of informal help to manifest themselves. This is not the case at present where uniform districting is virtually non-existent – local service areas are unrelated to each other, but serve only the administrative convenience of the parent central service structure. Each human service defines its own administrative neighbourhood or district. It is rare that groups of human services develop common working objectives and strategies in serving the same people of a given local area.

The absence of consumer involvement in service planning and delivery has resulted in the development of services that do not always correspond to perceived local need, nor to consumer understanding of what services offer and how they can be used. It also denies urban residents a level of citizen participation which is more than advisory to representative government – namely, involvement in self-management of their own community environment.<sup>1</sup>

Service interdependence, the importance of the local environment, the value of informal self-help, consumer accountability, and a movement toward prevention are themes which are beginning to be articulated around individual human service areas. We have come to recognize that a local school can also serve as a resource for neighbourhood integration, that a day care center can be one element of a prevention strategy related to family needs, that health promotion is related to

something more than hospital and doctors, that police work can have a community development component.

Individual services have attempted to modify their operations in relation to the above themes, either by becoming more firmly implanted into local areas, or by voluntarily collaborating with other service structures.

But these gestures lack cohesiveness and a sense of overall direction. The instruments for providing this leadership are simply not present. These directions cannot be achieved by citizen action, nor is it practical to assume that human services will coordinate themselves.

The problem is essentially political defined as the need to regulate competing interests toward new objectives for the common good. Given the heavy investment of the public sector in human services, it is at some level of government that leadership is required. If the municipal sector is to provide such leadership it requires a formal mandate, defined in terms of regulatory authority, an appropriately rational structure, and increased discretion over funding to human services.

In summary, with needs requiring human services expected to grow in the late seventies and early eighties, there is a strong public interest in moving beyond individual service efficiency standards to objectives related to service dollar effectiveness.

2) *The Case for Municipal Leadership*  
Rationality in the planning and delivery of human services necessitates some measure of simplification in the number of structures interacting within the urban environment. Part of the dilemma that exists now in negotiating the human service maze, is the absence of a coordinating center. This affects

both provider and consumer. A neighbourhood which seeks to improve itself by acquiring a decent set of community services is faced with the prospect of negotiating with at least seven public decision making authorities in the municipal arena, the provincial and federal levels along with their special purpose structures, in addition to anywhere from twenty or more quasi-public structures which may impinge on the service fabric of a given neighbourhood. Each of these decision-making centers, in pursuit of efficiency standards, can be expected to possess intricate administrative regulations governing service financing and provision, or access to selective facilities therein.

The administrative cost to individual services, viewed as paid time spent, can be significant in pursuit of minimal coordination levels, very often with limited success. The alienation experienced by citizens in similar pursuits is also costly.

The case for municipal leadership in the area of coordination and integration can be offered on the following grounds:  
(a) *there exists at present a frame-work for urban planning, through the Municipal Planning Act.*

Increasingly land-use issues are seen as having social planning dimensions. People experience inter-related physical and social needs. A parent with a school-age child is at one and the same time concerned about the presence of a traffic light at a busy intersection on the way to the local school, as well as with the availability of after school activities until the parent comes home from work. Integrated physical and social concerns by citizens should be capable of expression in a common planning context.

One advantage to the urban planning

1. S. Miles, S. Cohen, G. de Konig, *Developing a Canadian Urban Policy*, INTERMET, Toronto, 1973, p. 37.

framework is that it can formulate social objectives directed to the total urban environment, without being perceived as a sphere of competing service provision. This was the case in Halifax where a Social Planning Department, separate and distinct from the existing municipal planning structure, was established along with a direct service responsibility.<sup>1</sup>

At present there also exists the danger that in the desire to coordinate human services delivery we will end up creating a proliferation of planning structures, which will itself become problematic. There is evidence of this possibility now. Community action councils (recommended by the provincial select committee on community schools), district health councils (Mustard Report), constituency advisory groups (LIP), regional office social planning (Hansen Task Force — Community and Social Services), numerous Mayor's task forces (child abuse, the handicapped), Metroplan social development studies, Part II social development studies, neighbourhood raps (United Way), fields of service coalition (community sector) are illustrations of this direction.

We submit that optimum human services or social planning should:

- (i) *be publicly coherent if the average citizen/consumer is to understand and participate in the process (this is one advantage in using a planning mechanism which exists and is known.*
- (ii) *formulate gross human service objectives for environments which possess a natural social cohesion (a ward is too small, a COLAC region too large).*
- (iii) *be capable of individualizing gross objectives to the more particular needs of local settings, with a special sensitivity for responsiveness*

*to neighbourhood and community variation.*

- (b) *the area municipal sector is at present the major provider of basic human services to the general population — through schools, local parks, community centers, and libraries.*

Because it is seen as being on the public front-line of service delivery, the service problems created by senior government levels usually knock first on the municipal door.

This was most evident recently with respect to group homes in city and borough neighbourhoods. The province has the responsibility for licensing, and in most instances (except for homes falling under the social service category) for providing their direct funding. As long as these homes conformed to standards governing their internal operations, there was little concern on how they chose to locate themselves, or to what extent (as part of their milieu approach to treatment) they inter-related with the immediate environment. The result was the over-concentration of homes and related facilities in selective neighbourhoods — Parkdale, Don Vale, Annex, Armour Heights. This has:

- *impinged on the normal character of the neighbourhood on which the milieu approach depends (Parkdale, Armour Heights)*
- *threatened the physical stability of the neighbourhood (Don Vale, Annex) by infusing extensive land assembly practices with legitimate treatment objectives*
- *created financial demand on the area municipal sector because provincial subsidy rates lack rationality and are excessive at the top of the scale, but insufficient at the bottom*
- *generated citizen fear and apprehension, because communities were*

*completely by-passed in the planning, for what are essentially humane approaches to treatment and rehabilitation.*

This erosion of community confidence translates itself into the loss of political support for these services. It also removes one of the benefits of the natural milieu approach — namely, a positive and receptive interacting environment.

In attempting to deal with these concerns communities turned to their municipal governments. Other than employing land-use instruments to regulate the use of housing stock by adapting distribution by-laws (400'/800' separation), neither of the municipal tiers possessed the instruments to promote constructive relationships between the group homes, neighbourhood residents and local service resources.

A second major area where the municipality has faced pressures from problems created by others is with respect to the continued financing of emerging services. This has been most prominent in federal job creation programs in the community employment field.

Over 100 new human services, conceded to be legitimate and worthy of continuity, have emerged in the last three years. The federal government, in what must be viewed as the height of insensitivity acknowledged no responsibility for support of these services after six months of funding. They were left to hang there by themselves, for others to look after. The municipalities were placed under immense political and financial pressure to help these services survive. They neither possessed an expanded revenue base, nor the capacity to re-allocate resources from established services.

The federal level remains free to enter city neighbourhoods, create its own planning mechanisms, assign resources at will, make demands on existing municipal services, then leave abruptly. This federal dabbling with human need in our cities is destructive — to people who receive “now you have it / now you don't” services, to the social fabric of the urban environment, and to the cost effectiveness of the public service dollar.

- (c) *the mobilization of self-help resources in human services, at little cost to the taxpayers requires a close relationship between citizens and their governing environment.*<sup>1</sup>

Historically local government has been assigned the role of enabling citizens to engage in self-government.<sup>2</sup> If citizens begin to perceive decision-making centers as cumulatively incoherent, or remote, then their tendency will be to respond to their governing environment passively. Government and human services, are then perceived as just another set of specialized inputs that one uses rather than relates to.

The creative aspect of participation reflected in self management of urban services is lost. Participation comes to mean complaining when large structures do not perform adequately. There evolves the implicit assumption that service provision is the exclusive domain of experts. The worst features of urbanization are encouraged — anonymity, impersonal and formally prescribed relationships, division of responsibility (usually someone else's). And then we are shocked when injury to persons occurs and by-standers watch, vandalism of public property increases, and parts of our city quietly rot with the majority naively believing that they

1. B. Wharf, N. Carter, *Planning for the Social Services: Canadian Experiences*, Canadian Council on Social Development, July 1972, p. 83.

1. Roland Warren, *op. cit.*, p. 76-89.

2. *Metro Toronto Under Review; What Are The Issues.*, Bureau of Municipal Research, March 1975, p. 8.

are unaffected – as if the lessons from the American urban experience are not yet abundantly clear.

Human services represent a meaningful point of entry for large numbers of citizens, into an active caring relationship with the urban environment. The public sector providing leadership in the human services must possess the receptivity and ability to encourage these instincts. Municipal government has been seen as performing this role – the tradition and public understanding are there.

In recent years citizens across Metro have re-affirmed this expectation, and municipal structures have been compelled to refine their internal processes and operations accordingly. We now have municipal structures more primed than ten years ago, to exercise their traditional role of encouraging self government. Nor have the participators come from the traditional home ownership sector of the municipality – tenants, the elderly, low-income groups, the handicapped, women are increasingly pressing local government to reflect their interests.

It is in the midst of this renewed municipal vitality that we would propose placing the primary responsibility for the coordinated planning and integrated delivery of human services.

#### IV – LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND HUMAN SERVICES

Previous reviews of local government in Metro, along with developments in the last ten years, have not created forms that were primarily directed toward human services effectiveness.<sup>1</sup>

Human services have come to rest at certain municipal levels because of tradi-

tion, notions of efficiency, or for short-term expediency considerations.

The development of the metropolitan structure, and its undeniable achievements, have rested in successfully extending large scale growth beyond the city's borders to the suburban areas. This was made possible by the effective delivery of essential physical services that precede and accompany large scale growth – water supply, sewage, roads, public transportation, uniform standards of protective services. Certain basic human services have accompanied this growth – new schools, parks, libraries, health protection services.

We would suggest that a larger municipal structure – such as Metro – was appropriate in a period of large scale physical growth for two reasons:

- (a) physical growth is capital and resource intensive, requiring specialized forms of management expertise, and technology if effective results are to be achieved, especially where volume is sought.<sup>2</sup>
- (b) that a broadly-based democratic tradition comes slowly in new or rapidly expanding communities, with the influence of the traditionally articulate, middle class home-owners, tending to determine the priorities of local government.

There has been a tendency by area municipalities to ask Metro to assume political responsibilities which are unpopular in the local area – that is on issues for which there has been no influence base creating credible demand. As a result there was the decision to assign Metro the responsibility for income maintenance, social services, and in recent times the pressure for Metro to produce public housing.

Albert Rose contends that many of the boroughs were reticent to accept mixed populations, with their corresponding demand on social services.<sup>1</sup> Prior to the Lawrence Heights project, which was seriously resisted, North York hardly possessed a social welfare administration and few social service programs. There was understandable resistance in boroughs, given the life-style of its articulate residents, to the public provision of many human services. There was a tradition for such groups to privately purchase services such as recreation, through home amenities, clubs, and summer cottages.

Social services were transferred to the metropolitan level in 1967 – due to suburban resistance to these programs and because Toronto was short-changed on a previous allocation by Metro of provincial social service dollars.<sup>2</sup>

Nothing suggests that this move was based on notions of service effectiveness – other than ensuring basic accessibility on the one hand, and adequate financing on the other. In fact it is highly questionable if the service needs of low-income groups are best met by isolating the administration of their services from those of the general population. This has been a theme underlying unitary administrative strategies around the guaranteed income approach. It has also become evident to us in the ghetto-like provision of public housing. All the previous arguments about service inter-relatedness can be cited here.

We shall refer briefly to the recent policy initiatives in Metro around subsidized housing, for they offer some insights to the larger issue of human services leadership, and the two tiered

structure. Individual area municipalities have resisted subsidized housing offered through OHC. Once more the temptation was to push an unpopular political program upstairs – except by the City of Toronto which had already adopted a housing policy. It is assumed that Metro will again be successful where area municipalities have been reticent, by exercising the necessary authority to override local resistance.

My own personal inclination is to doubt this – subsidized housing is a more visible presence in the physical environment and cannot be snuck in as easily as were social services. Individual resistance by area municipalities can manifest itself as federated resistance at the metropolitan level. The use of Metro in this way to promote unpopular social measures is not healthy in the long run. Functions of urban government are assigned to the Metro structure, less on notions of effectiveness and more in response to basic political problems.

If certain area municipalities remain undemocratically based and are thereby insensitive to the interests of the less articulate and needy, then the province possesses sufficient direct and subtle instruments, such as fiscal incentives, with which to impact in these areas. The province uses these instruments at present, but in pursuit of efficiency objectives such as in the public health boards issue. These same instruments can be employed to encourage responsible social output by local government.

If the source of resistance is an inadequate revenue base with which to fund social measures, then it makes reform of municipal financing all the more urgent; to yield more revenue, and

1. Albert Rose, *op. cit.*, This theme is discussed throughout the book.  
2. Alan Gartner, Frank Riessman, *op. cit.*, p. 35-36.

1. Albert Rose, *op. cit.*, p. 71, 77.  
2. Albert Rose, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

to partially deconditionalize social development transfers so that funds can be used for local social priorities — whether it is less library expansion, and more services to the elderly.<sup>1</sup>

In the present context of assigning responsibilities, a certain logic takes over. This is evident in the Draft Interim Metro Housing Policy, which emanated from the Chairman's Office in May 1974, and proposed that metro assume responsibility for targetting and delivering subsidized housing. Recommendation 5.11 recommends that Metro be responsible for the:<sup>2</sup>

“... provision of any on-going program of services aimed at developing truly integrated neighbourhoods, as well as meeting the social, personal needs of all the residents of that total neighbourhood, including the housing project.”

If this recommendation comes to be eventually adopted, Metro could legitimately begin to provide recreation and health protection services, currently area municipal responsibilities. There is no quarrelling with the logic of recommendation 5.11 — it is in pursuit of a sound objective; to ensure that subsidized housing provision is accompanied by appropriate soft services. It is the concept of Metro's role which requires careful consideration.

#### *Centralization vs. Horizontal Integration*

The two-tiered structure in Metro is itself a source of fragmentation in the coordinated planning and integrated delivery of human services. Confusion persists as to which level has primary responsibility in this area.

Both metro and some area municipalities (Etobicoke, Toronto) are currently pursuing community-oriented strategies for service integration. In

addition education boards are seeking to integrate school facilities with multi-human service provision (Toronto-Paralld Use Policy). Private efforts (Regent Park, Rexdale, Agincourt) are actively underway. The province is currently funding a pilot multi-service project in the Borough of York. Once more there is a need for rationalization. If there are too many independent integrators, we may lose the benefits of integration itself.

A choice should be made about where primary municipal leadership ought to come from — Metro or the area municipalities (assuming a two-tier structure.)

If we wish to ensure that a uniform standard exists throughout all area municipalities, we will centralize this responsibility to Metro. There is little doubt that Metro would develop a program of integrated delivery that would be efficient, in the narrow sense of the term. Such a choice would implicitly move local government in Metro toward amalgamation in the long run, since area municipalities would eventually lose a major component of their direct service role.

My preference is for horizontal integration at the area municipal level — that is, the development of a closer structural relationship between area municipal human services, special purpose boards (libraries, public health), and boards of education; the devolution of social services (excluding income maintenance), along with a review capability of local police work to area municipalities; and the development of decentralized delivery and service review structures *within* area municipalities which can be granted statutory recognition. This would be accompanied

by the formal entrenchment of human services/social planning into area municipal planning. The coordination of direct federal, provincial and private service provision would have to be examined.

The preference for horizontal integration at the area municipal level is based on the following set of reasons:

(a) *the metropolitan level of government was originally introduced to cope with the rapid physical growth around Toronto.*

In recent years a consensus has emerged across all parts of Metro that growth ought to be somewhat tempered. During the next ten years we will be less concerned with efficiently managing rapid growth and more directed to the effective management of existing growth levels. Many of these concerns are now evident and will be of social significance. These include:

- the rapid increase of one-parent families and their increasing impoverishment
- an increasing population of the elderly, with personal support needs if they are to be able (as is their preference) to remain in the community rather than be forced into more costly institutional settings.
- the presence of youth crime and its threat to community and neighbourhood stability
- public service job creation for those dislocated by a staggering economy, and for groups such as married women, the elderly, and the handicapped whose work needs often require special programs.
- an increased emphasis on preventive health measures, such as physical fitness facilities and nutrition programs

- the dropping of the school leaving age and the need to integrate youngsters into the labour force and community
- the continued growth of neighbourhood residential centers as treatment and rehabilitation settings for the emotionally handicapped, retarded, ex-offenders, ex-mental health patients, etc.

These concerns will be accompanied by the need for vastly increased levels of subsidized and assisted housing.

Two prominent observers of local government — Albert Rose and Frank Smallwood — have noted that metropolitan organization may not be the most appropriate instrument for dealing with social problems.<sup>1</sup> Its size, and consequent reliance on highly specialized forms of management, may be more suited to physical works; here standardization of problems is more evident, results are concrete, and subject to precise measurements.

This is not the case with social problems, where dysfunction, dependence, stress have individualized dimensions for which the prescription tends to vary and results are often hard to measure. Large management structures have their own strengths, and we need not fault the metropolitan structure for an inability to deal with urban concerns for which it was never intended. But in reviewing metro's role we should be very careful to understand the changing needs in our urban environment, and assign responsibilities accordingly.

There is one area, however, where the metropolitan level could play a very crucial role — to be a coordinating mechanism for area municipalities in their social policy negotiations with the provincial and federal government. While

1. Art Eggleton as quoted by Marg Daly, *The Metro Dollar: Taxing Property is Not Enough*, Toronto Star, April 12, 1975, p. B-4.

2. *Draft Interim Metro Housing Policy*, Office of the Metropolitan Chairman, May 1974.

1. Albert Rose, *op. cit.*, p. 12, 100.

the problems of people don't always present themselves in standardized form, the problems created by senior government levels in social policy areas, funding, regulations and administrative procedures tend to be common.

The recent re-structuring of the Metropolitan Chairman's office, with an emphasis on policy review, is a constructive initiative consistent with the direction of this paper.

(b) *there is little evidence to suggest that cost and service effectiveness cannot be achieved within the present scale of most area municipalities.*

Centralization is sometimes seen as attractive because the tip of the iceberg appears to be simpler. Instead of six Commissioners, there is only one, with six decision-making structures reduced to one.

Savings to the taxpayer through this line of reasoning can be deceptive. For it is how the unseen part of the iceberg functions that will in the end determine cost effectiveness. If five superfluous Commissioners are replaced by ten new middle management staff necessary to make centralization work, then savings can be eroded. If there is a reduced capability for the unitary decision-making structure to know all the parts of the operation intimately, then the quality of decision-making and cost effectiveness can suffer.

Whether this occurs, or not, will be determined by the nature of the output to be managed and reviewed.

Human services are labour and consumer intensive, in contrast to physical services which tend to be capital and resource intensive.<sup>1</sup> What does this mean? The human services are characterized by the intricate range of inter-

action that occurs between provider and user. Problems do not tend to present themselves in standardized form, therefore appropriate service responses are not always predictable. The dependence on scarce, highly specialized and costly technology as a normal feature of human service provision is not prevalent — with notable exceptions in secondary forms of health care and treatment.

The need to interact with economic and social environments of a scale exceeding that of the area municipality, is not a necessary precondition to most forms of human service provision. This is true in the areas of primary health care and prevention, personal care services, instruction of the young, continuing education for adults, treatment/counselling for many forms of stress and dysfunction, recreation, fitness, cultural enrichment and orientation. Specialization will of course require going beyond the area municipal scale for services such as those offered by Sick Children's Hospital, Ontario Science Center, conservation areas. But effective use of these resources can be administratively separated from the ongoing forms of human service provision cited above.

What we have been examining is the spill-over concept applied to human services.<sup>2</sup> There is little in the nature of a day care center, for example, to suggest that if 50 such services are managed by one structure (i.e. — Metro) higher quality day care will emerge than if 10 such services are managed and supported by an area municipality. It is more likely, given the present distribution of functions, for quality day care to develop in a system that also has responsibility for allied prevention and enrichment resources — public health, schools, parks,

and recreation, libraries.

We would suggest that human services require a scale large enough to sustain a necessary complement of human service resources, but compact enough to enable:

- responsiveness to variation both between and within local communities; if the government scale is too large, the subtleties of local variation are less prominent in relationship to the whole.
- flexible inter-relationship and response when varying delivery responses are required. Larger human service structures breed more management, and diminish frontline access to key administrative centers. If integration as an objective will necessitate larger units of coordinated management and review, we should carefully limit the growth of necessary structures to what is minimally required.
- the value of participation in human services, expressed as self-help and community self-management, requires a government structure with a tradition of responsiveness to citizen involvement. This has not been one of Metro's more prominent strengths in recent times.

Most of the area municipalities possess a scale sufficient to undertake human services planning and delivery. North York for example is the size of amalgamated Winnipeg. If further examination suggests that the scales of York and East York are insufficient, then this is an argument for extending their boundaries.

## SUMMARY

The need to situate the coordinated planning and integrated delivery of human services in local government has been examined in other Canadian settings. Specific approaches are now being

implemented in British Columbia and Quebec. The reorganization of metropolitan government in Winnipeg resulted in new structures, which partially relate to the needs discussed here. A number of American cities — New York in particular — have developed their own responses.

This paper has limited itself to identifying the human services factor and to proposing some preliminary principles for those who will engage in further examination of urban structure. If horizontal integration is a credible option then it has to be spelled out in extremely specific terms. There may turn out to be other more suitable options in the light of inter-related considerations.

Whatever the outcome, we think the Roberts Commission should assign the human services question a reasonable priority in its deliberations, and eventual recommendations.

1. Alan Gartner, Riessman, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

2. Referred to in paper #1 of this series, J. Stefan Dupre, *Intergovernmental Relations & the Metropolitan Area*, Ch. 3.



## PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES IN METRO: A SEARCH FOR THE NEW CONSENSUS

Background Paper #4

by

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This invitation to discuss the appropriate distribution of urban planning responsibilities in Toronto provided an open licence to let fancy range imperiously over the alternatives at my command. Twice, during the preceding weeks, I abolished Metro government, and once the local municipalities. Although that's two-to-one in favour of the smaller units, the margin didn't seem decisive enough to settle the issue, so I have turned instead to draw upon the advantages of known, existing institutions. When all is said and done my proposals consist of rather pragmatic adaptations of the present structure, with an emphasis on the need for flexibility.

Presumably, at this stage in both Mr. Robarts' Royal Inquiry and in our own thinking about matters that should concern him, it is important to let our thoughts range broadly over the problems and possibilities for regional and local governments, and not simply to propose and counterpropose detailed solutions to unanalyzed problems. It is in this spirit that I have resisted the urge to highlight a neatly packaged set of planning assignments and chosen rather to let specific proposals flow less orderly from the conceptual arguments. This structure also serves to reinforce my belief that a major effort must be made to find a new consensus

on which to base the operation of regional government in Metropolitan Toronto.

The urban surroundings upon which Toronto's governments must act have changed dramatically since 1954; the external environment has altered and the predictability of economic and social matters has, for the time being, diminished; moreover, our imperialistic designs on neighbouring territory have been thoroughly squelched, and we must apparently be content to manage as best we can our own small acreage, give or take a concession line or two. In spite of these changes, the problems of post-war Toronto so influenced the style and pace of regional government that the inspiration they provided to the original concept of Metro remains barely diminished. The changes have, however, affected Metropolitan officials in recent years, with the result that a more politically aggressive and policy-minded Metro is rapidly disrupting the equilibrium that had been achieved during the sixties between the local municipalities and a low-key, second-tier government.

Metro originated in 1954 with thirteen local municipalities covering 240 square miles becoming participants in a second level of civic administration, the first of Ontario's regional governments. Devised as a compromise between the amalgamatist aspirations of political

forces in Toronto and the preservationist instincts of many local municipalities, Regional Metro was intended to serve as an administrative unit that would guide efficiently the physical outward expansion of Toronto, with the help of a strong commercial revenue base in the central city. Trunk water-supply and sewage-disposal systems were placed under Metro's jurisdiction. Responsibility for the development of urban expressways along with the management and extension of major arterial roads were assigned to Metro. To a related regional body, the new Toronto Transit Commission, went sole authority for public transportation and the job of integrating several commercial transit operations in the suburbs with the highly successful public-transportation Commission in the City, which was about to open a pioneering Yonge Street subway between Eglinton and Union Station. The problems then posed by rapid post-war expansion into financially weak suburban municipalities were so grave that one member of the provincial legislature later called the formation of Metro "crisis legislation", created when "in North York babies were literally being bathed in ginger ale because the water did not run out of the taps."<sup>1</sup>

The political basis for policy direction in Metro government has from the beginning been obscure, an odd situation that is manifest in the method of selection and the highly ambiguous position of Metropolitan Chairman.<sup>2</sup> Perhaps, in the early years, there appeared to be little doubt about regional service requirements, and the functional tasks of providing for urban growth seemed quite straightforward.<sup>3</sup> Until 1970, when the establishment was announced of a Regional Municipality of York directly north of Metro and when other consequences of the Province's "Design for Development" were mooted, an administrative orientation for Regional Metro served to reduce political tension between levels of government; and no challenge to this administrative bias was raised by either the potentially active - - but in practice rather passive - - planning role assigned to Metro or by the second-tier's ambitiously acquisitive external affairs policy.

The few service accretions that did expand the reach of Toronto's regional government during the fifties and sixties flowed from the unchallenged administrative principle of "equal service to all citizens in the Metropolitan areas."<sup>4</sup> The most important of these changes unified local police forces in 1957 and

1. This was Liberal MLA Vernon Singer, as quoted in *Legislature of Ontario Debates*, No. 210, November 10, 1969, p. 8224. *The Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Act* received Royal Assent on April 2, 1953, only 6 weeks after publication of an Ontario Municipal Board report, written by Board Chairman Lorne Cumming, which proposed a federated municipal government structure for Toronto.
2. The Chairman of Metropolitan Toronto is chosen by majority vote of Metropolitan Council members, who are themselves not directly elected to Council. Without a direct link to the electorate, it is unclear whether the Chairman is Council's senior administrative servant, or its political and policy-making leader.
3. Commenting in 1963, Frank Smallwood wrote: "Metro has often been inclined to operate more as a business than as a governmental organization - - more as a gigantic construction company operating under a metropolitan-wide mandate, than as a political body responsible for a wide range of social, as well as physical obligations;" from *Metro Toronto: A Decade Later* (Toronto: Bureau of Municipal Research, 1963) p. 35.
4. This explanation of service unification is from the Metro Council brochure *Metropolitan Toronto 1973*, p. 8

local welfare programmes<sup>1</sup> in 1967. Also in 1967 Toronto's thirteen local municipalities were consolidated into the present six, a departure in detail but not in substance from the recommendations in Goldenberg's 1965 *Report of the Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto*. Goldenberg throughout his *Report* adhered rather closely to the administrative principle enunciated above and gave an explicit justification for local consolidation the expectation that "by widening the areas of service, it would lead to more uniformity in the range and standards of local service."<sup>2</sup> Equitable payment for these "equal services" had been secured from the outset by distributing Metro's property tax burden among the municipalities in proportion to their assessment base. In order to ensure standardized assessment practices throughout the region, Metro upon its formation took over the business of property assessment, a task that in 1970 was shifted to the province.

The administrative bias in the legi-

slative structure of Regional Metro combined with a general consensus throughout the fifties and sixties about the physical needs of the Toronto area served to reduce if not to eliminate controversies over regional planning alternatives and policy options. Metro's own role in regional planning was, as we shall see below, left quite ambiguous in provincial legislation, perhaps because planning was not expected to establish a basis for policy debate but rather simple to provide a low-relief administrative service to the region.<sup>3</sup> With only minor chafing, planning and policy-making could proceed in the face of this ambiguity because conceptually planners and policy-makers were content to draw their inspiration from the sole source of the Metro idea: that the geographical and functional centrality of the City's commercial core demand the erection throughout the Toronto region of administrative, financial and spatial structures that efficiently supported this dominance.<sup>4</sup> For almost twenty years, both the internal and external policies

1. According to Albert Rose, welfare unification under Metro, whose previous "involvement in the field of welfare . . . might even be described as reprehensible", was the direct result of Metro's having mismanaged the distribution among local municipalities of a provincial unconditional grant in a way that was unfair to the City; see *Governing Metropolitan Toronto* (University of California Press, 1972), p. 101.
2. Report of the *Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto* (June, 1965), p. 186.
3. Rose reports that in 1954 both the City's Chief Planner, M. Lawson and Metro's Planning Commissioner, M. Jones faced "the problem of acceptance of planning as an important area of governmental administration," and that "Metropolitan Council expected no more from its planning board than a cursory review of local plans of subdivision and their approval prior to submission to the Community Planning Branch of the Department of Municipal Affairs;" *Governing Metropolitan Toronto*, op. cit., pp. 48-49.
4. The academic counterpart of the Metro idea is central-place theorizing, a paradigmatic approach to planning that is coming under increasingly heavy attack by the "field theorists." For a good discussion of "place" and "non-place", see the volume by Melvin M. Webber et. al., *Explorations into Urban Structure* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964).

of Metro government were fundamentally influenced by this idea.<sup>1</sup> That this original Metro concept was spatial and not social has been significant for both the style of planning and the concerns of policy.

Planning for transportation in Metro was biased strongly by the compelling notion of a concentrically growing automobile-rich hinterland dominated by and seeking access to the central commerce area. The ill-fated Metropolitan transportation plan that, to serve this notion, was early proposed and tenaciously clung to would have directed five major expressways into the center of Toronto: the Gardiner from the west, the Scarborough and Don Valley from the northeast, and Spadina and the 400 extension (down Christie) from the north-west. Entirely aside from the physical absurdity of this scheme, by the late sixties its logic rested in the past. By then, the relative stability of downtown employment and the decentralization of jobs into the suburbs was apparent, and public transit had shown itself capable of acquiring and holding an urban clientele, thus overcoming the quite legitimate

doubts about its future that had been created by the blossoming automobile culture of the fifties.<sup>2</sup> The findings of one of Metro's major transportation consultants, Kates, Peat Marwick and Co. (as it then was), presented in confidence to the Commissioner of Planning early in 1970 should have shaken Metro's obstinate grip on the radial expressway plan: "Whereas the primary destination of a.m. peak period trips in 1964 was to the central area of Toronto," the consultants reported, "the majority of the growth in travel (through to 1995) will be oriented to suburban destinations;" more-over, the average travel speed with the proposed network in 1995 was expected to be 12 m.p.h. compared with an average of 17 m.p.h. in 1964, and "areas of severe congestion . . . are indicated in central North York, southwest Scarborough, central and southern Etobicoke and areas of Mississauga and Pickering."<sup>3</sup> Our inattentiveness to developing traffic problems in the suburbs has had its cost and will take time to correct. As a recent Planning Department report put it, "there is a distinct lack of comprehensive traffic data for the outer Metropolitan areas. Furthermore,

1. This singularity of outlook that characterized Metro's officials helps explain "the weak articulation between Metro's policy-making system and the issues and groupings that exist in the social community" that Harold Kaplan found in his Parsonian study of Metro Toronto, and the "weak involvement (of private groups) in Metro politics" along with a "smaller range of groups and viewpoints in its policy-making process." See his *Urban Political Systems: A Functional Analysis of Metro Toronto* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 39 and 251.
2. These changing forces at work in Metro were discussed by Nadine Nowlan and me in *The Bad Trip* (Toronto: Anansi and new press, 1970), "Jobs, Homes and Expressways", pp. 50 ff. We also noted there the sauce insouciance with which it was believed not only that transportation and land use were separable aspects of urban planning but that the relative mix of expressway and transit facilities had no influence over the use of private or public transportation. More recent trends in downtown employment and land-use are analyzed in my "Land Use in the Central City: A Toronto Perspective," in Canadian Council on Urban and Regional Research, *The Management of Land for Urban Development*, Conference Proceedings, April, 1974.
3. *1995 Travel Demand Study* (submitted March 30, 1970), pp. 3 and 5 of transmittal letter.

little is known about existing travel patterns between Metro and the neighbouring regions of Peel, York and Durham."<sup>1</sup>

Any consensus on a new Metro concept must surely include a strong commitment to public transit, even to the point of believing that financially supported public transportation has a critical developmental role to play in guiding land into efficient uses. Here again Metro's past performance has been dominated by the original Metro idea which led to an undue emphasis on core-oriented, radial transit lines in whose service most bus routes have been re-designed. The latest facility to spring from this concept is the as-yet-uncompleted Spadina transit line, the argument for which rested on a travesty of Metropolitan travel needs. Our attempt in 1972 to establish new principles for the positioning of this diagonal, radial line<sup>2</sup> is reminiscent of the bitter debate during 1956 and 1957 between the late Norman Wilson, then consultant to the TTC, and Metro planners over the appropriate route for a new east-west transit line.<sup>3</sup> Metro wanted a U-shaped line that would cut diagonally from east and west down to Queen Street. In arguing for an under-Bloor route, Wilson laid stress on the "great diversity of movement in a large city," the "increased population and development in the area tributary to the Bloor line and not least in the

areas tributary to its extremities;" and he charged that "at times Planning Board officials appear to contend that (transit) service as an ancillary to the expressway is the chief purpose and function of rapid transit in Toronto."<sup>4</sup> As we know, the TTC won that argument, but the growing strength and confidence of Metro government and the inability of the Transit Commission to meet its expenses from fare revenues combined to weaken the subsequent TTC role in transportation planning. A comprehensive rapid-transit and commuter-rail plan prepared by the TTC in 1969 has been virtually ignored in planning circles.<sup>5</sup> As former Roads Commissioner George Grant found last year when he reported on the state of public-transit planning in Metro, the relationship between the planning functions of the TTC and those of Metro have become chaotic. His full conclusions, as summarized by the Metro Planning Board staff, are worth repeating:

1. The links between numerous bodies involved in the urban planning process are not clear, resulting in fragmented transportation planning.
2. No formal agreement governs these planning relationships of the many planning agencies.
3. The Metro Planning Board has no official long range transportation plan adopted by all of the related agencies.

1. Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department, *Report No. 4 of the Planning Committee*, Item 3, March 12, 1975.
2. Jane Jacobs, Nadine Nowlan and David Nowlan, "Keeping track of the Downsview Subway," *Globe and Mail*, Feb. 1, 1972.
3. See especially the Toronto Transit Commission *Report to Council of Metropolitan Toronto on East-West Rapid Transit Proposals* (January 1956)
4. *Ibid.*, Appendix C, pp. 13-14; 20; and 28.
5. Toronto Transit Commission, *A Concept for Integrated Rapid Transit and Commuter Rail Systems in Metropolitan Toronto* (February, 1969).

4. A long range mass transit plan was developed by TTC without the input of other agencies.
5. Agencies claim they are unaware of the planning and construction projects initiated by other agencies.
6. Although citizens are attending meetings and contributing to the planning process, citizens participation is not recognized in a formal way.
7. Service standards - - route spacing, headways, travel times, etc. - - have not been documented."<sup>1</sup>

This indictment prodded Metropolitan Council to decide, on November 5, 1974 that henceforth the Transportation Division of what is now the Metro Planning Department "be formally assigned the role of co-ordinating matters dealing with the planning for transportation facilities of Metropolitan concern," and that a "technical coordinating committee" consisting of the Planning Commissioner, the Roads Commissioner and the TTC General Managers, be constituted "to report on matters dealing with transportation planning of a Metropolitan concern."<sup>2</sup> In spite of the sorry history of public-transit planning within the Metropolitan Corporation, this effort at co-ordination can only be the beginning of a gradual shift of full transit-planning responsibilities (except for merely operational matters) into the Planning Department of Metro. Such a move, which flows from the logic of any new conceptual basis for regional government, should be accompanied by the addition of staff members whose expertise is in the field of public-transportation planning, and it will require from the Planning Department a more energetic commitment to public

transit.

It is now quite thoroughly recognized that land-use and transportation planning should be complementary and not independent activities.<sup>3</sup> Whether they are, taken together, sufficiently independent of other planning matters - - such as health, welfare or housing - - to be separately organized is a difficult point I will turn to later. During the period when Metropolitan land-use planning was influenced strongly by the early pattern of unserved, patchwork suburban development, its dominant theme was the control of sprawl, defined in the rather specialized sense of "the premature development of essentially rural lands for urban purposes without services being available or anticipated."<sup>4</sup> Such concentration on one relatively narrow aspect of regional structure is puzzling in view of the expectations that must have been held by the province when they initially assigned to the Metropolitan Planning Board responsibility for planning over a 720-square-mile area (three times the size of Metro's own political jurisdiction) such features as "land uses . . . ways of communication . . . park areas . . . public transportation."<sup>5</sup> Although until 1974 not actually demanded by law - as it was in the local municipalities - such planning was to be given expression in an "official plan." The absence of such a metropolitan plan is by now almost legendary. A bulky draft was prepared in 1959; after revisions, it emerged as a leaner volume in 1965 and was adopted by Council on December 15, 1966 not as an official plan but as "a statement of policy."

Metropolitan arguments against sending the 1966 plan to the province for

1. Metropolitan Toronto Planning Board, "Report to the Transportation Committee Re: Relationship of Planning Functions Between the TTC and Metropolitan Toronto," Agenda, October 23, 1974.
2. Metropolitan Toronto Transportation Committee, *Report No. 16* (1974), Clause 19.
3. In Britain, the recognition of this complementary was especially strengthened by the 1963 publication of Colin Buchanan's *Traffic in Towns*.
4. Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, *Metropolitan Plan: Supplement* (December 1966) p.12.
5. *The Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Act*, R.S.O. 1970, chap. 295.

sanction as an official plan stand in part as compelling reasons for abandoning altogether the official plan concept in Metro.<sup>1</sup> Leaving this aside for the moment, it remains puzzling why even the "statement of policy" did not deal more aggressively with such issues as the outward spread of unstructured (although sewered and watered) residential development, the social consequences of isolated suburban apartment clumps, the almost total dependence of outlying residents on the automobile, or the ultimate effect of relying so heavily on a single dominant employment centre. These concerns seemed lost amidst the excuses that flowed from Metro's ill-defined role in land-use planning. This inattention to important structural matters in the 1966 plan was noticed by the Community Planning Branch of what was then the provincial Department of Municipal Affairs, who got in reply to their questions the argument by Planning Commissioner Wronski:

*"that the Metropolitan Planning Board and Council could not reasonably adopt a plan directing development towards the realization of any preconceived structure while their*

*planning responsibilities under the existing two-level planning system were limited to those functions for which the Metropolitan Corporation is responsible under The Metropolitan Toronto Act; and in the absence of a clear Provincial statement of the division of responsibilities between the local and Metropolitan governments, the net major effect of Metropolitan planning is and must be the accommodation of new development and redevelopment in a manner consistent with the functional plans and programs (roads, sewers, water, parks, etc.) which are from time to time adopted by the Metropolitan Council. The language with which the Metropolitan Council adopted the plan in December 1966 very clearly emphasizes this limitation on Metropolitan planning as such."*<sup>2</sup>

The sixties and early seventies must be regarded as years during which the opportunity was lost to design in a period of rapid physical development more efficient relationships among jobs, residences and transportation facilities in Metropolitan Toronto. As we sit down again to devise an official plan, this time under the compulsion of an amendment to the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Act passed in 1974, the land area

of Metro is over 80 per cent covered with at least first-generation development and related uses. During the sixties we tended to spread out at relatively constant densities, with employment opportunities decentralized but scattered. Between 1958 and 1971, for example, when total population increased by over 40 per cent, population density in Metro rose from 15.2 persons per developed acre to only 16.7; and a ratio of 27.7 people per developed residential acre in 1963 had risen to only 28.4 in 1971.<sup>1</sup>

Although opportunities have virtually disappeared for guiding first-generation development, the process of re-development has an equal or perhaps even more dramatic effect on the structure and wellbeing of an urban area.<sup>2</sup> A new Metro consensus must focus on the physical and social problems and possibilities that flow from such re-development. The old Metro idea was formally interred on January 1, 1974, when, with the creation of Regional Durham to the east of Metro and Regional Peel to the west, the boundary of the Metropolitan Planning area was rendered coincident with the municipal boundary. This ended two decades of Metropolitan lobbying for greatly expanded borders, in the apparent belief that a solution to the problems of Megalopolitan Toronto required only more extensive municipal control. Mr. McKeough, when he was

Minister of Municipal Affairs, used to call this "the Fred Gardiner view"<sup>3</sup>; around our household, it was known as the "Metro sea-to-sea" policy. In keeping with its long-stated goal of shifting to regional municipalities some ministerial planning responsibilities, the provincial government amended the Planning Act in 1973 and 1974, and the Metropolitan Toronto Act in 1974, in ways that have strengthened enormously Metro Toronto's hand in dealing with local development. Thus, with its attention firmly diverted from external to internal matters, Metro has before it the sensitive task of devising a new policy of intervention into local affairs.

The Planning Act amendments permit the Minister of Housing to delegate to Metro responsibility for approving changes to local official plans and for commenting to the Ontario Municipal Board on legal and technical aspects of local zoning-by-laws. Such delegation will simply formalize procedures that have been in effect in Metro for some time. But the Metropolitan Toronto Act amendment provides for much more dramatic changes. The Metro Planning Board was abolished -- a rather strange move in view of the strong co-ordinating role it played in bringing local planning views to bear on Metro policy -- and Metro is now required to produce an official plan; but most significantly, when such a plan is approved, every local official plan and every zoning by-law must be

1. J. A. Kennedy, Chairman of the Ontario Municipal Board until his retirement in 1972, persistently badgered Metro over the absence of an "official plan." He finally flung down his gauntlet in April 1972 when, during the Metro Centre OMB hearing, he sent a brittle request to the Chairman of Metro Council asking for substantiation and elaboration of a public statement made by the Metro Chairman to the effect that "Council will adopt an official land-use plan when the Province provides legislation to make it workable." Council responded promptly with a motion that set out four basic points of legislative need which, if achieved, would lead Council to forward an official plan for approval. Briefly, the four points were: (1) the need to reduce procedural delays in amending an official plan; (2) the need to clarify the position of the fringe municipalities (which before the creation of Regional governments on all sides of Metro came under the Metro Plan but which were politically disenfranchised by not holding seats on Metro Council); (3) the need to clarify the relationship between Metro planning responsibilities and those of area municipalities; and (4) the need to clarify the extent to which official plans are binding on all bodies. See Metropolitan Executive Committee, *Report No. 23* (1972), Clause No. 3.
2. W. Wronski, *Report on Administration of the Metropolitan Plan* (Report to the Planning Board, April 9, 1968), p. 4.

1. These densities are taken or derived from various data in *Preliminary Impressions of the Urban Structure to 1971*, published by Metroplan (June, 1974).
2. Consider, for example, the City of Toronto which although fully developed in the sense of having very little vacant land has maintained over the years a constant share of Metro's total development activity (as measured by the value of issued building permits); see my "Land Policy in the Central City," *op. cit.*, Table 2.
3. See his remarks in *Legislature of Ontario Debates*, No. 210, Nov. 10, 1969, p. 8216. In this *Debates* number, large parts of a memorandum written by W. Wronski, then Metro Planning Commissioner, were read into the record. Wronski of course espoused the "Fred Gardiner view" and in this memo, which doesn't seem to be part of any other public record, he delivered a strong attack against the province's "Design for Development" policy.

"amended forthwith to conform therewith." Unless my legal interpretation is seriously awry, this requirement that restricted area by-laws be amended to conform with an official plan is something quite new to Toronto and is likely to have the somewhat paradoxical affect of encouraging an official plan that is even less consequential than usual, since an incentive has been provided to ensure that the multitude of local zoning by-laws are undisturbed by whatever legal document emerges from Metro.

These recent amendments to the Planning and Metro Toronto Acts serve mainly to reinforce my many doubts about the usefulness of the official plan concept, as laid out in legislation and as interpreted in local Planning and Legal Departments. Control over the use of private parcels of land is accomplished primarily through restricted area by-laws, whose legal ancestry can be traced back to the English law of nuisance.<sup>1</sup> As John Dakin has pointed out, from the very first Ontario City and Suburbs Plan Act of 1912 the link between a "plan and the implementation of its intention by means of by-laws which do not derive their legal power from the planning act itself"<sup>2</sup> has been very weak. The problem basically is that a restricted area by-law and an urban plan each is devised for a quite different purpose from the other. The plan is expected to contain a statement of goals, directed perhaps to some distant date, to establish priorities in a number of fields -- social as well as physical -- and to present a programme by which we intend to deal with our present

problems and progress hopefully towards a desired future. Zoning by-laws, on the other hand, have been developed to handle rather immediate, local neighbourhood effects of land use. To require that two such different instruments "conform" is a misuse of words; "conform" simply isn't defined in such a comparison of unlike things. However, because we must take seriously the rights of land owners and quite properly provide for their legal protection against purely arbitrary government acts, this imposed linkage between the plan and zoning by-laws has resulted in the erection of a stultifying legal structure around the official plan, with the result that by the time it has passed through the hands of municipal lawyers the document is virtually inconsequential as a policy guide. In an effort to make the plan as robust and impervious to change as possible, specific commitments to action on the part of a council are usually left out, no capital spending programme is presented and there is seldom any reference to the sequence in which envisaged infrastructural facilities, like sewers, roads or transit lines, will get built. A cursory glance at the main findings of a Metro-plan study of local official plans in Toronto is telling: "much confusion pervades the presence of goal statements in planning and decision-making at the municipal level . . . rare indeed is the goal statement that works through consciously from attainable ends to feasible means or vice versa; ends and means are seldom clearly linked. And origins of goals are obscure. No sense of process is evident -- where the goals come from

and why they were selected from among the available alternatives . . . evaluation, to determine if selected ends and means were appropriate, is nowhere to be found in planning . . . conflicts among goal statements are common -- and not unexpected. But rather than . . . providing means for their resolution, official plans merely state conflicting goals as though all were capable of achievement . . . The range of identified goals is narrow . . . particularly inconspicuous are social and ecological goal statements."<sup>1</sup> In many ways, the official plan is simply another document to amend when for some good and compelling reason a zoning by-law is changed in a manner that might possibly place it in conflict with the plan.<sup>2</sup>

If regional Metro is to become an agency through which we develop desirable environmental and social policies for the Toronto area, we might be wise to seek an end to the official plan as an instrument of these policies. In its place, Metropolitan policy by-laws could be used in the service of a far wider range of concerns than the plan embraces. These by-laws would be grounded in and related to current issues, but they would be informed by and require for their passage adequate background research on the implications of present policy for our future wellbeing. The policy by-laws could be much more definitive than an official plan in setting down standards for and constraints on local services and local restricted area by-laws.

More importantly, by abandoning the official-plan approach to policy making, we would be reminded that planning means more than land-use and transportation planning, a narrow view that has been encouraged both by the legal structure of an official plan and the spatial bias inherent in the initial Metro idea.

To ensure that a more aggressive regional government is responsive and not repressive in the face of local needs, two-tier government must be based on a careful understanding of the arguments for and against centralized control. This issue is best approached through an understanding that the real world is complex and any government structure is but an imperfect device for dealing with this complexity. Jane Jacobs would want it emphasized that this is "organized" complexity<sup>3</sup>, an elaboration that stresses the inter-relationships among activities and events in an urban area. Instruments of government policy, like road building, transit-fare subsidization or zoning restrictions, all affect the mix and magnitude of activities in the city, and determine therefore the level and distribution of wellbeing among its citizens. However, activity linkages within the urban system increase enormously the problem of organizing government, which we tend to do by devising separate functional departments -- Departments of Roads, of Works, of Social Services, of Planning and of Budgeting -- and by establishing separate territorial jurisdictions -- a

1. The first chapter of J. B. Milner's brilliant *Community Planning: A Casebook on Law and Administration* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963) provides a fascinating insight into this history.
2. John Dakin, "Toronto Planning: A Planning Review of the Legal and Jurisdictional Contexts from 1912 to 1970", Papers on Planning and Design No. 3, Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of Toronto (February, 1974), p. 11.

1. R. S. Lang and J. E. Page, *Goals in Official Plans* (Metroplan, December 1973), pp. 18-19.
2. James F. McCallum in presenting a lecture to the Law Society of Upper Canada a few years ago noted that "the profession would get greater assistance from a discussion of . . . amendments to both an official plan and a zoning by-law. . . . in the present state of planning law in Ontario, there are in existence many zoning by-laws and official plans. The problem most often encountered is how to amend them." "Practice Before Planning Board, Council, Municipal Board and Minister," in *Three Lectures on the Planning Act* (Law Society of Upper Canada, 1970) p. 9.
3. *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (New York: Random House, 1961), Chap. 22.

a corporation called the City of Toronto to manage the central 24,000 acres of Metro, another called the Borough of Scarborough to manage the eastern 45,000 acres, and so on. If indeed urban activities throughout Metropolitan Toronto are strongly interdependent, then it is extremely unlikely that we can reach some given set of goals by having the separate departments and territories each aim at achieving a satisfactory level for one of the goals. For example, if the Roads and Traffic Department of Metro is set the task of increasing the average speed of travel on main roads to some agreed upon level, the instruments they would use to achieve this goal — road widening and expressway building — might make it impossible for the Planning Department to reach its goal of reducing the need to travel by encouraging some desirable degree of decentralized commercial development; or a Neighbourhood Planning Group's desire to enhance the financial wellbeing of local tenants by imposing rent controls might completely frustrate a Housing Department's aim to encouraging more private-sector accommodation.

There seems to be an obvious way to avoid such a counterproductive use of government instruments: centralize the planning and policy-making activities

of government. Functional departments and territorial units of some kind would have to be retained, but with an extreme form of centralization they would have no independent planning role and no goals other than the efficient administration of the level of service they were told to provide; with less extreme centralization, the separate organizational units might have some planning responsibility, as they do now in Toronto, but co-ordination at the centre would be strengthened. Such conclusions necessarily follow from any argument that begins with a focus on system interdependencies and emphasises the technical impossibility<sup>1</sup> of achieving a given set of urban goals through decentralized functional departments or territorial governments.

Although an appropriate passage from either John Stuart Mill or Alexis de Tocqueville could quite usefully be inserted at this point — and any reader should feel free to do so — it is really not necessary to draw upon hoary declamations in favour of local government to illustrate the logical difficulty with the above argument for centralization. The problem fundamentally is that it assumes the existence of a set of goals to be achieved and it is precisely the absence of such a set (or at least the absence of a sufficiently specific set) that

1. Strictly speaking, there are circumstances in which a given set of goals can be reached even in a complex, interdependent system through the decentralized use of separable government instruments. But rarely do we have sufficient knowledge about a social system to devise the appropriate separation. If we did have such knowledge, rather unusual assignments might emerge from our analysis. For example, if functional separation were technically possible in Toronto it might turn out that a Roads Department should be assigned the task of achieving a specific mill rate through its spending programme, the Planning Department might aim at low levels of traffic congestion through land-use controls, and the Housing Department might be directed to keep the unemployment rate of construction workers below some maximum level. At a very abstract, theoretical level in policy sciences the study of this particular organizational problem is called the "assignment problem."

unfortunately characterizes human society.<sup>1</sup>

Analogies with complex biological organisms, which are often used to illustrate urban complexity, break down at that point, for the "goal" of the organism is completely specified as survival in a given external environment. Human society directs some of its effort towards satisfying the constraints of an uncontrollable environment, from sun-spot disturbances to imported inflation, but in a rich, urban society we put more emphasis on the need to satisfy our internally produced goals, which are based on the likes and dislikes of individuals and communities of individuals. In order to understand these individual values, we generally have to understand the impact of a whole host of government and private activities on people taken either individually or in fairly small groups; and the government that addresses itself to the question of needs, wants and values must be flexible enough to experiment with new ways of meeting these demands. This type of operation is based on quite different principles from the centralized administration that integrates functions so as to deliver efficiently a given output mix. It is not impossible that both operations could take place within the same government, but the flexible, value-probing, needs-seeking branch of any government must relate to small-scale communities of interest. Obviously, it is a style of government well suited to a local municipality. Equally obviously, the efficient integration of well defined functions requires a government that exhausts within its jurisdiction

major functionally interdependencies. If these two activities are indeed to be carried on by two different levels of government, the major problem is not in assigning responsibilities to one or the other, it is in linking the two politically so that the lower or demand-oriented level has some control over the upper or supply-oriented government. In passing, it is worth noting that direct election to Metro may serve only to weaken this linkage.

Rather than delve further into this problem, let me take the easy way out by assuming that the political linkage between our two specially designed tiers — the one to emphasize demand problems, the other supply — is satisfactorily achieved; in any case it is the subject of other addresses to this conference and not of mine. How should we go about organizing the planning responsibilities of each level? It seems to me that, flowing from the argument so far and taking account of the present situation in Metro, we would be wise to follow two principles:

(1) retain as much flexibility in the style and type of services available for delivery at the local level as possible; and (2) concentrate at Metro on the internal organization of government, on the creation of organizational forms adequate to deliver the intelligence needed for an understanding of the relationships among urban activities. With possible exceptions of the Boroughs of York and East York, there is no local municipality in Toronto that is too small not to be able to organize reasonably efficiently any of the normal municipal responsibilities, so there would

1. Unfortunate as it may be for the rest of society, it's good luck for politicians and social scientists for whom a new issue or a good political dispute constitutes the intellectual equivalent of a winter-works project.

seem to be no ground for extending these two principles to include a recognition of small-scale inefficiencies in the delivery of some services.

Applying the first principle, I am led to argue for an extension of the responsibilities shared between Metro and the local municipalities to include such things as the provision of public transit and the exercise of control over police activities. Especially at the cutting or experimental edge of these services, the perspective of a local municipality may be important and the opportunity otherwise missed of providing a specialized service that might ultimately grow into a more standardized, municipal service. It is not so much, however, the distribution of specific service responsibilities that concerns me here as it is the ability to bring these services to bear on planning processes. Planning, it must be realized, involves not only the discovery of the possible but also the selection of the best.<sup>1</sup> At a local level this requires municipal government to have flexibility in devising participatory structures, as an aid to understanding needs and values, and in delivering government services. Such services include the possible provision of local jitney or public-taxi facilities (which is why I suggest that local jurisdictions not be prohibited from providing, either directly or through contract, public transportation); and they include the creative use of community police (which is why the local municipalities should have some responsibility for this branch of the Metro Police Department.)<sup>2</sup>

The role of local municipalities in

providing for more structured citizen participation should, I believe be more forcefully recognized in legislation. Aside from the remnants of old-fashioned, government-by-referendum which remain in the Municipal Act, and the Planning Act's requirement that Planning Boards "hold public meetings and publish information for the purpose of obtaining the participation and co-operation of the inhabitants of the planning area," nothing is set down that might help guide local governments in the performance of their duty to encourage an aware and responsive citizenry. As a beginning, I propose that local planning departments be required to draft a skeleton constitution for community and neighbourhood groups which would provide for satisfactory levels of openness, accessibility, and accountability by the groups. The planning department, through the local municipal budget, should be required to help sponsor financially groups meeting these minimum criteria. Let me stress, however, that the nurture of such participatory structures requires in municipal government professionals with particular skills; it cannot simply be left in the hands of politicians or land-use planners who find themselves suddenly committed to radical causes. The roots of participation go much deeper than recent rhetoric, and to draw upon accumulated knowledge we should turn to people such as group and community workers from the social-work profession, or to others who have shown themselves capable of understanding the elements of group processes.

Health and welfare services, the for-

mer now a local responsibility, both have components that could be responsive to special community needs; and so indeed does such an apparently objectively judged service as firefighting, where, for example, an interest in the esoterica of fighting blazes in excessively high buildings may be the specialized concern of the City's fire department, and not one that would be shared by a Metro Department.

In many ways the "Interim Housing Policy" passed recently by Metropolitan Council<sup>1</sup> is an example of the creative use of shared responsibilities that I believe should be encouraged. This particular policy is the beginning of a belated response, prompted by the current agitation over housing costs, to housing responsibilities that Metro and the local governments have shared since the federation's inception. In 1973, the City initiated its own policy through the publication in December of *Living Room: An Approach to Home Banking and Land Banking for the City of Toronto*. As well as suggesting annual production targets for a variety of housing types, this document established for the City a policy of developing unsubsidized housing for families of moderate income in the expectation that such City-controlled housing will be insulated from future land-price increases and so provide, after another generation of general inflation, housing for low-income families. That the City has not wanted to lose the initiative provided by this policy, and the subsequent establishment of a local Housing Department, is clearly reflected in the Metro document which assigns to the second-tier a concentration on providing current housing for those of low income.

Over time, the Metropolitan administration should, I believe, acquire a much larger role in housing than this interim document proposes, for it is only by expanding its reach into moderate-income assisted housing for ownership, which is now left to local Councils, that the integrating role of Metro, as expounded in the very first paragraph of the "Interim Housing Policy", can be met: "An interim housing policy," the document reads, "should reflect the long term housing, transportation, population, employment and environmental goals of the Metropolitan Council." However until Metropolitan government has the power, based on a new regional consensus, to control more aspects of local development, through the imposition of such things as density minimums and less restrictive zoning, regional housing goals will not be achieved. The gravest weakness in the Metro housing document is the only slight attention paid to problems of implementation. Almost 70 per cent of the proposed total 1975 housing starts are, according to the adopted policy, to be initiated by the private market. How does Metro intend to achieve this? What instruments are to be used to bring area municipalities into line with the goals they, through their participation on Metro Council, have now adopted? All of this is left very unclear in the policy document; any resolution clearly depends on Metro's gaining greater regulatory powers than it now has.

In accepting new responsibilities in a re-created federation, Metro is bound to be moved still by the administrative principle that calls for equal treatment of constituent municipalities, a principle that has in the past played such a

1. I use the word "best" to imply only that, given our general values and existing institutions, some possible mixtures of government activities are better than others. To a person who doesn't believe this, planning simply has no meaning.

2. For a review of recent attempts in New York to integrate various municipal services at the community level, see R. K. Yin, R. W. Hearn and P. M. Shapiro, "Administrative Decentralization of Municipal Services: Assessing the New York City Experience," *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (March 1974).

1. Minutes of Council of the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, Feb. 25, 1975. The policy itself is available as Item 10, Report No. 4 of The Metropolitan Executive Committee.

prominent role in Metropolitan re-organization. As the basis of administrative change, this principle seems on the surface simply to refine one of the most important functions of any upper-tier government, to carry out an equalizing redistribution of income among members of the federation. But when this redistribution is attempted through the administration of "equal services," the laudatory principle can in practice become insidious. Strong pressures are built up for the standardization of services, even in the face of disparate demands. Services come to be measured in terms of inputs (such as the number of doctors employed) rather than accomplishments or outputs (such as a reduction in the number of infant deaths per thousand live births);<sup>1</sup> and centralization is encouraged simply because of the difficulty of establishing the equitability of decentralized services.<sup>2</sup> In applying an "equal service" principle, Metro will have to be sensitive to variations in local need and to the very measure of service; and its attempt at income redistribution should be based on a sophisticated analysis of the property tax burden that is borne by different income classes throughout the Metro region.

Fortunately, Metro is in the process of creating an analytical group that will be able to undertake the tax-burden study

proposed above, and to deal as well with a variety of other matters of policy integration and co-ordination. Let me conclude my discussion with a comment on this Metro re-organization, in the light of my second assignment principle given above. In looking at the administration of planning and policy in Metro, we should recognize that, along with its specific functional responsibilities, the second tier must assume a major research and intelligence role in order adequately to fulfil its responsibility for monitoring local social and physical development, and to assume a stronger co-ordinating role among the local municipalities. As well, the creation of regional governments around Metro and the possibility of adopting more aggressive and independent approaches towards both the provincial and the federal governments than has so far occurred, requires Metro to have the research and staff capacity to meet these other governments with well prepared external-affairs policies. The basic organizational issue, I believe, is the extent to which these co-ordinating and research functions should take place within a new policy unit rather than in an expanded Planning Department, which has so far borne the main load of policy co-ordination for both internal and external matters.

In its recent re-organization, Metro did not face squarely this issue. A new

Directorate of Economic and Policy Research has been established,<sup>1</sup> but how far its duties will extend into the traditional – even if unclaimed – territory of the professional planners is not resolved. The argument could go either way<sup>2</sup>, but in view of the overwhelming emphasis in the Planning Department on land-use and transportation planning, and the virtual absence of staff capacity in other fields, it seems to me that this department should be re-named the Land Use and Transportation Department and the new Research Directorate be expanded into a Policy and Planning Unit reporting to the Executive Committee. This new unit would have no operating role; the Land Use and Transportation Department would retain responsibility for processing local land-use decisions, such as zoning by-law changes.

A strong Policy and Planning Unit within Metro will provide our regional government with the ability to respond quickly and with flexibility in the face of changing internal and external circumstances. As the re-organization report of the Metropolitan Chairman points out: "The problems facing Metro today are quantitatively and qualitatively different from those of any previous administration." A new Metro consensus must recognize these changed circumstances and allow co-ordination and policy-making to take place at the regional level. However, the exercise of these responsibilities should flow from

the needs and values of area municipalities. Viewed this way, Metro would be an instrument of the local governments and not an authority imposed upon them.

1. I mention this output measure partly because of the striking difference between a 1973 infant death rate of 18.7 in the City's "University" public health district and 11.1 in the "North Toronto" district. For this and additional information see the City of Toronto Department of Public Health, *Annual Statement 1973*, a document that by its analytic excellence and help in establishing policy goals stands in marked contrast to the health reports of the other municipalities. For a strong indictment of centralized control of social programmes through the imposition of input standards see Alice Rivlin, *Systematic Thinking for Social Action* (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1971), especially ch. 6.

2. Such centralization doesn't necessarily achieve its apparent objective to equalize service; it often merely masks the problem of measurement. For an argument against federal centralization in the name of distributional equity see my "Centrifugally speaking: Some Economics of Canadian Federalism," in Trevor Lloyd and Jack McLeod (eds.) *Agenda 1970* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press for the University League for Social Reform, 1968).

1. For a description of the new administrative changes, see Item 12, Report No. 3 of the Metropolitan Executive Committee, which went to Council on February 11, 1975.

2. A similar administrative problem has bothered the Greater London Council which, since its formation in 1965, has juggled around research, transportation and land-use planning in an attempt to find the appropriate structure. For a good description of planning in London between 1965 and 1970, see Peter Self, "Planning," chap. 9 of Gerald Rhodes (ed.), *The New Government of London: The First Five Years* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972).



## SUMMARY

The conference was essentially a program directed to a representative spectrum of community leadership both in and out of government. We hoped that this leadership group would in turn disseminate the ideas of the Conference to colleagues and participants in their respective organizations.

The speakers, background papers, and discussion groups revealed an interesting set of interrelated themes and sentiments. These included:

(a) *the increasingly political nature of contemporary urban planning.* Traditional planning theories, reflected in the official plan procedure, have assumed an ability to define a public good based on rational approaches to the public interest. Recently planning has come to mean the regulation of a variety of competing perspectives of what constitutes the public good. For example market-related interests compete with residential interests and hold differing viewpoints on the desirability and location of public and community amenities. In this context the phenomenon of citizen participation emerges along with the need to design urban government structures which create access to the planning process throughout all its stages.

(b) *the need for viable scale in urban government.*

Consideration included the degree to which size contributes to efficiencies or diseconomies of scale; the capability of municipal government to be sensitive and responsive to local variations within its domain; the corresponding need for urban structures which are flexible and adaptive to changing conditions; the ability of urban government to confer and make possible a sense of identity among its citizens in

the midst of the anonymity of urban life.

(c) *the emergence of human services (i.e. the soft area) as a major consumer of municipal expenditures,* and the virtual absence of coordinated planning and integrated delivery for the benefit of urban residents. This phenomenon, in contrast to the traditional land-use servicing emphasis of municipal government, creates an important set of new considerations in examining issues related to urban government structure.

(d) *the recognition that within Metropolitan Toronto the challenge for the late seventies and early eighties is less one of coping with rapid physical growth and more that of effectively managing existing growth levels.*

These new circumstances have profound implications for both hard and soft services and for the purpose and functions of the present two-tier system. However, no consensus emerged as to the specific structural reforms that were needed - whether we should modify the existing set-up or consider entirely new approaches to urban government.

(e) *an attachment to local area municipalities; and at the same time, a concern for accountability from Metro government* if it continues to perform in its present capacity; significantly, throughout the conference amalgamation did not emerge as a preferred option.

One issue was of serious concern to a large number of participants and tended to underlie all of the themes: municipal government's lack of power in relation to the senior levels of government and its inability to carry out its functions.

This is significant in two areas: the financing of local government, and the

need to clarify intergovernmental relations with the province in areas where mutual responsibilities overlap. Inadequate and inappropriate financing make local decision-making limited and often unaccountable, such as in cost-sharing or conditional funding schemes. The inter-relationship of provincial planning objectives in the areas of growth, transportation and assisted housing remain unclear. The present ad hoc method of exchange between the province and metro municipalities was seen as disruptive to understandable and accountable local government. No serious structural resolution of this dilemma was proposed by participants.

We hope that the submissions to the Roberts Commission will see some of these themes treated in greater detail, with their consequence to urban government structure spelled out in clearer terms.

This is one aspect of the conference's impact which can only be assessed as the deliberations of the Commission unfold.

## APPENDIX A – CONFERENCE PROGRAMME

- 1:00 p.m. Registration (The Plaza Room)
- 1:30 p.m. Keynote Address: Senator H. Carl Goldenberg
- 2:00 p.m. *What Are The Appropriate Responsibilities of Local Government?*  
(Plenary Session)  
Chairman: *Stephen Clarkson*, Department of Political Economy  
University of Toronto  
Speakers: *Thomas Plunkett*, Director of the Institute of Local  
Government, Queen's University  
*Dr. Albert Rose*, author of many papers and two mono-  
graphs on government in Metropolitan Toronto  
*Karl Jaffary*, former Executive Alderman of the City  
of Toronto and Metropolitan Toronto  
*Topics include: the traditional purpose of local government, the impact  
of urbanization, Metro's record, and the contemporary context.*
- 3:15 p.m. *Is the Present Form of Metro still Relevant? The Form of Local  
Government* (Plenary Session)  
Chairman: *Ron Atkey*, Former Member of Parliament  
Speakers: *Dr. Anne Golden*, Bureau of Municipal Research  
*Peter F. E. Lyman*, Senior Consultant, Peat Marwick  
*Maryvyn Novick*, Social Planning Council  
*David M. Nowlan*, Professor of Economics, University of  
Toronto  
*Topics include: possible structural solutions, economies and diseconomies  
of scale, human service delivery, and urban planning.*
- 4:15 p.m. Coffee/Tea
- 4:30 p.m. Discussion Groups
- 6:00 p.m. Hospitality, Dinner (The Empress Room)
- 7:30 p.m. *Municipal Autonomy: How Much Financial Independence and Planning  
Authority Is Desirable?* (Plenary Session)  
Chairman: *Charles K. Bens*, Executive Director, Bureau of  
Municipal Research  
Speakers: *Don Richmond*, Research Assistant for the Metro Chairman  
*Arthur Eggleton*, Executive Alderman, City of Toronto  
*M. Darcy Goldrick*, Alderman, City of Toronto

*Eric Hardy*, President, Eric Hardy Consulting Ltd.  
*Michael Cassidy*, M.P.P., N.D.P., Ottawa Centre, Housing  
Critic  
*Mrs. Margaret Campbell*, M.P.P., Lib. St. George,  
Housing Critic

- 9:30 p.m. Concluding Remarks: Mr. Kenneth Cameron, Executive Secretary,  
Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto

## APPENDIX B

### TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION

All recommendations advanced by the Commissioner in the Study Prospectus, the Study Report, or any other related documents will be made in accordance with the terms of reference described below.

The Commissioner is empowered and instructed to:

- (I) Examine, evaluate and make appropriate recommendations on the structure, organization and operations of local government within the Metropolitan Toronto area, including all municipal governments, boards and commissions and without precluding the consideration of a single or two tier form of government, to make specific reference to the following:
  - (a) the present anticipated future social and economic conditions including population and economic growth patterns, and the resource and service requirements of the municipalities;
  - (b) the appropriateness of the boundaries of the Metropolitan area municipalities, with particular reference to population pressures (e.g. growth, density, mobility and stability), community of interests, administrative effectiveness, socio-economic interdependencies and the geographic, demographic and institutional constraints existing within the study area;
  - (c) the appropriate division of responsibilities and functions and the arrangements among:
    - (i) the Province and the system of local government operating within the study area;
    - (ii) Metro and the area municipalities, including the possibility of the delegation of greater authority to other area municipalities;
    - (iii) Metro and the area municipalities and all local Boards and Commissions;
  - (d) the selection of the Chairman of the Council of Metropolitan Toronto, and the selection and roles of committee chairmen and their relationships to the members of municipal councils;
  - (e) the roles and functions of the heads of councils in the discharge of their responsibilities within the system of Metropolitan and local government;
  - (f) the organization of municipal councils and their committees, including Executive Committees, other committees and Boards of Control, with particular reference to roles and systems of policy-making and implementation;
  - (g) the system of administration and the relationship of the administrative organization to the municipal councils and committees of council in the development and implementation of policies in the Metropolitan area;
  - (h) the appropriate system of representation as it applies to local government in the Metropolitan area;
  - (i) the relationship between the members of municipal councils and the electorate and residents of the Metro area, with specific regard for the requirements of responsive local government decision-making and the accountability of members of councils and their boards and commissions;
- (II) Undertake to encourage public awareness, participation and understanding of the issues, by among other things, holding public meetings throughout the Metro area and publishing the findings and recommendations of the study in sufficient quantity.
  - (j) the relationship between revenue and expenditures in Metro, the area municipalities in Metro, the area municipalities and special purpose bodies, including the adequacy of the revenues and the priority setting mechanism for expenditures;
  - (k) any other matter which the study commissioner considers relevant to local government in the Metropolitan area.

## APPENDIX C

### BACKGROUND STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON METROPOLITAN TORONTO

- The Organization of local Government in Metropolitan Toronto
- A Financial Profile of Metropolitan Toronto and its Constituent Municipalities, 1967-1973
- The Planning Process in Metropolitan Toronto
- The Electoral System for Metropolitan Toronto
- Demographic Trends in Metropolitan Toronto
- The Provision and Conservation of Housing in Metropolitan Toronto
- Transportation Organization in Metropolitan Toronto
- Physical Services, Environmental Protection and Energy Supply in Metropolitan Toronto
- Public Safety in Metropolitan Toronto
- Social Policy in Metropolitan Toronto

These reports are available in all Public Libraries in Metro. Individual copies may be obtained free of charge by writing:

The Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto  
Suite #309  
145 Queen Street West  
Toronto, Ontario M5H 2N9

## APPENDIX D

### PUBLIC HEARINGS


Beginning May 22, 1975, the Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto will be holding public hearings in the theatre of the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education at 252 Bloor Street West. The Commission will hear submissions until mid-July, recess for the remainder of the summer and resume sitting in early October. The specific dates and times of hearings will be announced in local newspapers as schedules are finalized. All sessions will be open to the public.

The purpose of these hearings is to provide an opportunity for the public to comment on any aspect of the existing structure, organization and financing of local government in Metropolitan Toronto in all of its forms and make any suggestions they might have as to how it might be improved in the future.

The Commission is instructed to examine, evaluate and make appropriate recommendations on the structure, organization and operations of local government within the Metropolitan Toronto area, including all municipal governments, boards and commissions. Given this context, submissions should be not so much concerned with individual policies and decisions made at the local level as with who makes these decisions, how they are made, and whether or not they could be better handled by a different system of local government in Metro.

To date, more than 300 individuals and groups have indicated a desire to appear before the Commission. The majority are individuals appearing on their own behalf or that of a group. The Commission hopes to hear most of these presentations before the summer recess and to receive those from municipalities and related government bodies in the fall.

Any person or group interested in making a presentation to the Commission who has not already indicated a desire to do so is asked to notify the Commission in writing as soon as possible so that a hearing can be scheduled.



# BUREAU OF MUNICIPAL RESEARCH

BUREAU OF MUNICIPAL RESEARCH  
Suite 306, 2 Toronto Street, Toronto, Ontario, M5C 2B6  
Telephone: 363-9265

Founded in 1914 as a non-profit research agency staffed by well qualified personnel, the Bureau of Municipal Research maintains continuous study of the problems facing municipalities and their residents.

Long an advocate of responsive and responsible government, the Bureau has gained wide recognition for the high calibre of its quarterly *Civic Affairs*, its monthly *BMR Comment*, its information and advisory services, and the participation of its staff in the public discussion of issues.

The Bureau is an independent agency supported by a broad cross-section of business and professional firms, organizations, governments, and individuals.

*your inquiries are invited:*

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## SOCIAL PLANNING COUNCIL OF METROPOLITAN TORONTO

185 Bloor Street East, 3rd Floor 961-9831  
(as of July 1st, 1975)

The Social Planning Council is governed by a voluntary Board of Directors, 45 men and women representing a cross-section of the community. Each is selected for a two year term, on a rotating basis.

Membership in the Council is open to any Metro resident or group. It costs \$2.00 per individual and \$10.00 per organizational membership, which entitles you to a voice in Council Affairs, attendance at special interest meetings, a vote at the annual meeting and receipt of our monthly newsletter.

The Council's staff numbers around 30, of which 14 are program and executive staff, six program assistants and the rest support staff.

The Council receives about 80 per cent of its financial support from the United Way, the rest from government and other sources.

It is hard to put into a few words what social planning is all about. That's partly because society itself has become so complicated, so bureaucratic, and in

large urban areas, so impersonal that the idea of planning for today's services is awesome, and unpopular.

Social planning is many things, and that's where the Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto comes in:

Trying to help people adjust to the changes and powerful influences bombarding them on all sides.

Bringing some order into the chaos arising from growing needs and inadequate or ill-planned resources for growing needs.

Researching changes in needs and helping to work out priorities.

Bringing people together from all walks of life - to help them find answers to community problems and improve the quality of their lives.

Providing resources and facilities to community groups.

Working closely with voluntary agencies, citizen groups and all levels of government to better plan and provide social services of all kinds.