PARTIES TO CHANGE

The Introduction of Political Parties
in the 1969 Toronto Municipal Election

PARTIES TO CHANGE

The Introduction of Political Parties

in the

1969 Toronto Municipal Election

PREFACE

In *Parties To Change* the Bureau of Municipal Research is presenting a collection of readings that deal with the need for and viability of political parties operating at the municipal level. Political parties were first introduced in Metropolitan Toronto in the municipal elections of 1969. Originally prepared for a meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association in June, 1970, the papers included in this volume represent an attempt to analyze the 1969 election experience and suggest the possible future role of party politics in municipal government. It is hoped that *Parties To Change* will provide an additional perspective on the debate surrounding municipal party politics.

The ideas and opinions presented in the papers are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the position of the Bureau of Municipal Research.

SUSAN A. FISH
Executive Director

TABLE OF CONTENTS

THE BEGINNINGS OF CHANGE

by P. Silcox

The entrance of political parties into the Toronto municipal election in 1969 hardly made a great splash even in the comparatively tranquil waters of Ontario municipal politics. The election of a number of reform candidates to councils and school boards has had an immediate effect on the substance of debates within these bodies, but there has been no radical transformation in their operations. The revolution predicted by some, following the entry of political parties into local politics, is at least temporarily postponed. The year 1969 may have marked, however, at least the beginning of a period when municipal politics will be less concerned with pot holes and garbage collection, and more concerned with the social issues raised by rapid urbanization.

The three articles printed here deal with some of the questions raised by the involvement of political parties in the election. This introduction places the articles in perspective, both in terms of the wider historical context of political changes in Metropolitan Toronto in the last two decades, and the immediate circumstances which led to party participation in the election.

Toronto was an 'exploding metropolis' in the postwar period, facing the familiar urban problems of transportation, water supply, sewage disposal, housing, etc., which have been labelled collectively "the Metropolitan Problem". Thirteen municipalities and one county government had jurisdiction in the area undergoing rapid urbanization, and by 1950 it was clear that this fragmentation of responsibility was seriously impeding solutions to the problems created. The Ontario Municipal Board, a provincial agency designed to oversee various municipal functions,[1] carried out a major structural review in 1951 that resulted in a recommendation for a new two tier local government structure. In 1953 the Province acted on the recommendations of the Board and established the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, a two tier regional structure that allowed for the continued existence of the thirteen local municipalities but created a new upper level of government to deal with problems common to the whole area.

---

[1] For a recent analysis of the role of the Ontario Municipal Board see: Bureau of Municipal Research, *Urban Development and the Ontario Municipal Board,* Winter, 1970-71.

Working with a cabinet of senior officials, the appointed Chairman of the new Metropolitan Corporation, F. G. Gardiner, managed the political compromises and gave the leadership necessary to embark on area-wide programmes. Heavy emphasis was placed on the provision of physical facilities, and in the late nineteen fifties Gardiner regularly made reference to Metro's success in getting the 'steam shovels into the ground'. Provincial confidence in the new structure was indicated by the transfer of significant new powers to the upper level in 1958.

Debate on local government structure, however, was not ended by the success of the Metropolitan Corporation. City politicians were unhappy both over the loss of power suffered by City Council following the creation of the Metropolitan Corporation, and the declining importance of the City whose population remained static while that of the suburban municipalities grew rapidly. Total amalgamation of local governments, which might once again increase the influence of the City in the decision-making process, was clearly preferred. Politicians in the three large outer suburbs, on the other hand, well aware of the population shifts away from the City, supported reforms which would preserve some independence for their newly important municipalities and increase their strength at the upper level of government. Their favoured structure was a consolidation of the suburban municipalities and a revised formula for representation on the Metropolitan Council.

The nature of the choice in future structural reform was clear by 1960, and the continued disagreement among the municipal leaders in the area made it obvious that the Province would have to exert its authority again. The Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto was established in 1963, and for two years the formal ritual presentation of the familiar cases went on. Finally, in 1965, the Commission reported in favour of consolidation and adjusted representation on the Metropolitan Council. The Province adapted its proposals and imposed the new structure on the area in 1967.

Political debates on constitutions have a tendency to go on long after they are really creative or relevant, and this was certainly true in the Toronto case. The debate over structure really belongs to the nineteen fifties. The need for structural reform was clear in that decade, and few people believed that the choice of one option rather than the other would drastically affect the quality of life in the metropolis. New forces were at work in Toronto in the nineteen sixties, reshaping the nature of local political issues. F. G. Gardiner, the most important political leader of the nineteen fifties, understood this in 1961 when he predicted a difficult time ahead as the emphasis of political debate shifted from the issues created in building a physically united metropolis to social questions.

Generally in 1961, however, pride and confidence in the success of the Metro structure were at a peak.[2] Even in the City, progress with an imaginative project to build a new City Hall seemed to engender an expansive feeling. As the 1962 elections approached, this general confidence began to give way to a feeling of uncertainty.

It was in this period that ratepayers' and residents' groups began to emerge as significant elements in local politics. Starting as defensive organizations to protect the character of particular neighbourhoods from rapid and poorly planned development, they gradually assumed a more positive role and began to question basic policies and the values that underlay them. A rapid rise in house prices, occupancy rates, and rents, combined with the slow pace of public housing construction, emerged as a major political issue. "The Housing Crisis" was the first of a number of crises that began the period of questioning the quality of life in the new metropolis.

Concern over a shortage of moderately priced housing led to an interest in urban renewal. Local politicians in Toronto had long shown a reluctance to formalize official municipal plans for fear they would impede the councils in encouraging large revenue producing developments. At the same time, a second, quite different source began to question the usefulness of official plans. Those affected by the plans, especially in urban renewal areas, demonstrated concern about the social effects of implementation and demanded a central role in the planning process. This new attitude quickly spread to a greater awareness of the problems created by the development of transportation facilities and general environmental pollution.

The City elections of 1966 reflected the changed climate of opinion. The retiring City Council had shown very limited sensitivity to the new forces developing in the City, and many members had been unable to conceal their impatience with citizens who questioned the underlying values of City policies. Mayor Givens had been unable to lead his Council to a new understanding, and as a result had shown little rapport with many of its members. He had also been sidetracked by his concern for prestigious cultural projects which seemed to many to be of marginal importance to the majority

---

[2] For a more complete analysis of Metro's early success see: Frank Smallwood, *Metro Toronto: A Decade Later* (Bureau of Municipal Research, 1963).

of citizens. If Mayor Givens was a less than perfect representative of the new reform elements in the City, his principal opponent, William Dennison, was a classic representative of the traditionalist position.

A very conservative veteran socialist, Dennison had built a personal following in the working class areas of the City by his painstaking work as a processor of minor grievances. He had a reputation for personal honesty and austerity that added weight to his promise of a hardworking administration which would be very parsimonious with "the taxpayer's dollar". A third candidate, William Archer, was an experienced and hardworking Controller with a reputation as a sound administrator.

Givens and Archer split the middle class vote between them and William Dennison became the new Mayor. His Council was made up of a very mixed group. The majority consisted of traditional ward politicians with little interest in a new approach to City problems but with an inexhaustible interest in potholes and garbage collection. A small group of individualist reformers formed a vocal, if largely uncoordinated, opposition. For three years the Council was a disorganized battlefield for these two groups. Battle lines were rarely clearcut and debates often made up of irrelevancies, but the debates did at least reflect the uncertainty and confusion felt by many citizens in thinking about the future of the metropolis.

The mass media reported the work of Council in some detail. The more perceptive observers pointed out that the debates often involved important matters, but in a Council made up of individuals it was impossible for any form to be given to the discussion. They developed this theme and passed on to explain the role political parties might play in organizing and clarifying the debate. A large scale discussion on the possible role of political parties in municipal politics ensued.

Two important and related structural changes took place in the City prior to the 1969 election that had a great impact on the potential role of political parties. The Council, with much prompting from groups within the City, abolished the Board of Control. This body, made up of four controllers elected on a city-wide basis and the Mayor, had important functions in overseeing the City administration and financial matters. It was also supposed to coordinate City policies and help shape Council deliberations. It performed these functions poorly between 1966 and 1969, being rent with political and personal disputes. Advocates of a party system saw it as a barrier to effective operation since there was no guarantee that its members would be in tune with a majority on the Council. In addition, despite their central role in the Council's work, two controllers did not have seats on Metropolitan Council.

The abolition of Board of Control led to the decision to expand the number of City wards from nine to eleven, with two representatives from each ward. This required the redrawing of the electoral map. Council overwhelmingly approved a redistribution which allowed for the continued existence of strip wards in the central area. The strip wards were just that: long narrow configurations that included a cross section of the City's population within their boundaries, balancing the votes of the predominantly working class population in the south with those of the wealthy northern sections.[3] Most aldermen came from the northern section of these wards. This plan was opposed by many community groups in the City which favoured more compact wards with more homogeneous populations. These groups appealed to the Ontario Municipal Board against the Council-approved redistribution. To the great annoyance of the majority of aldermen, the Board accepted the objectors' viewpoint and created more compact wards.

Many young people interested in local politics, and convinced of the viability of local political parties, felt that the national parties (they insisted on this designation for what are in fact provincial parties) were not the best vehicle for bringing order and form to the urban political arena. For them, a local civic party was the preferred form. It was with this end in mind that Civic Action (CIVAC) was established by a group of young teachers, lawyers and businessmen. This organization was the first to make a real impact on the local Toronto scene.

CIVAC was, from the beginning, a collection of people who were critical of the existing methods of electing members to Council, and who were aware of the need for a more systematic consideration of the problems facing the City. It showed few signs, however, of developing a clearcut series of proposals which would appeal to the ordinary voter, or of finding a prestigious and dynamic leader around whom an organization could be built. At an early stage it fell prey to the temptation of using publicity gimmicks to attract the attention of the mass media. Nevertheless, the very vagueness of its reform appeal drew a number of established local politicians into its ranks. One result was the formation of a very loose combination of reform

---

[3] For a further discussion see: Bureau of Municipal Research, *Ward Boundaries in the City of Toronto*, News Brief Nos. 112, 113.

Council members, who were able to act together, on procedural matters at least. The organization gained even more publicity when, as a counter strategy, a number of traditionalists on City Council formed an even looser organization, the Council Cooperative Committee. The CCC never amounted to much, although its formation did tend to make the differences within Council clearer and its members also cooperated on procedural votes.

In 1966, the New Democratic Party was impatiently awaiting a provincial election. Its volunteer members had exercised their talents in three federal and one provincial election since 1961, and it was generally understood that if a good organization is to be maintained it must be used frequently. At the same time, many members of the party began to see the most pressing social issues as urban issues, and the most reactionary of politicians the local ones. Despite the reluctance of many party leaders, there had been grass roots pressure for involvement in the 1966 election, and in fact a few candidates had been put forward and backed by local associations. There was much discussion of a municipal strategy between 1966 and 1968, encouraged in part by the party's gains in the 1967 provincial election. In 1968, the biennial provincial convention approved party entry into municipal politics by local organizations.

For Toronto supporters of the Liberal party, 1968 was an exciting year, especially since it erased the memory of the party's poor performance in the 1967 provincial election. Many local Liberals were involved in the campaigns of the candidates for the Liberal leadership following Lester Pearson's retirement announcement. The choice of Pierre Elliot Trudeau seemed not merely to involve the selection of a new leader, but to transform the whole party. In the Walter Gordon era, a new emphasis had been placed on the creative role of local associations, and Trudeau's emphasis on participation strengthened this trend. In June the federal election was a triumph for the local party as Trudeaumania swept the urban areas of the country. The party had many active new recruits from the urban middle class, and the Trudeau victory proved to be heady wine for them. Very much attuned to U.S. events, their attention turned to city politics with no federal or provincial contest in view.

The younger Liberals quickly found that their enthusiasms were not shared by many of the older members of the party who were already active in municipal politics. As a result, a considerable period of time was spent in an internal debate on the wisdom of local action. After some difficulties, the younger members of the party, with the support of such prominent Liberals as the Provincial

Leader, won the day. A small committee was established to seek a leader and a larger open committee began work on drafting a local party platform. Local ward organizations had to be created and candidates selected.

There was some debate within the Progressive Conservative party on entry into the municipal field, but it was limited in scope and desultory in tone. A few prominent members were in favour, but the provincial leadership had little to gain from victory and seemed to believe that its provincial position might be weakened by a full scale clash with opposition parties in an urban setting. Also opposed to such a course were substantial numbers of local office holders who were members of the party.

The three political parties that decided to contest Council seats in the 1969 election were all interested in changing the style and direction of local politics, but they did not include within their ranks all of those who sought this end. The involvement of parties was resisted not only by the traditionalists but also by some reformers. This group hoped to mobilise the active community groups behind individual reform candidates, who would share a common outlook and be able to cooperate once elected to Council. They believed that dependence on political parties would result in the division of some community groups with a resulting lack of strength. Other community leaders had attained their standing by their work with nonpartisan groups, and feared they would lose it in a situation dominated by parties. In that sense, many of the reformers were conservative where political strategy was involved. The most prominent of local reform politicians, Controller Margaret Campbell, who contested the mayoralty without benefit of party, was *de facto* leader of this group.

The Liberal party made the most concerted effort to win seats on both the Council and the School Board but the major event in the launching of the campaign, the municipal leadership convention, was badly mismanaged. For a considerable time senior members of the party had talked about the need to choose an experienced and prestigious leader, yet, in the end, the position went to a young university professor with no established reputation but with the necessary ability and enthusiasm to organize a following. The new leader, Stephen Clarkson, had the support of the provincial leader but did not get a great deal of help from locally prominent Liberals. One indication of this was the difficulty in raising sufficient funds to promote a full scale campaign. The new leader stimulated the production of policy statements, but these did not differ greatly from

proposals made by other reform elements and there was limited opportunity to present them. Despite the efforts of the leader and the party candidates, it was clear that a full scale party effort was not involved. One factor which detracted from the Liberal campaign was the position taken by some locally prominent Liberals. For example, Controller Beavis ran as an independent aldermanic candidate critical of party involvement, Alderman O'Donohue was a CIVAC candidate, and Alderman Bruce ran as an official candidate without trying to conceal his lack of enthusiasm for the leader and platform.

The N.D.P. nominated sixteen official aldermanic candidates, but decided not to contest the mayoralty. Many party workers in the working class areas of the City had long been supporters of William Dennison, and despite his conservative orientation, a clash with him would have divided the party. With no mayoralty candidate and a slow and late start in the campaign, the party never demonstrated the organizational efficiency it had shown in federal and provincial elections, and, despite long negotiations with labour organizations, the party did not receive their full united backing.

CIVAC also failed to find a mayoralty candidate, although Mrs. Campbell had been one of its supporters. The CIVAC block on Council dissolved before the election, and, as a result, the party did not offer a full scale concerted campaign. Its membership endorsed and aided a number of candidates, most of whom were already reasonably well known local figures.

A late entrant on the electoral scene was the League for Socialist Action, claiming to represent the left wing of the N.D.P. This group nominated a number of candidates, including John Riddell for mayor, with the expressed intent of "filling in" the New Democrats' incomplete ticket.

The three Toronto newspapers, which are generally thought to have considerable influence in local elections, took differing positions. The Toronto Telegram had always been opposed to party politics and its slate of candidates was chosen on an individual basis. It was made up largely of incumbents and traditionalists. However, the Telegram's most distinguished local reporter took a different position and endorsed a reform oriented slate. The Globe and Mail struggled with the party question for some time before endorsing party involvement. It then took a consistent position of supporting party slates. It even did this in the case of the N.D.P. slate in Scarborough on the grounds that it was the one organized group contesting elections in that borough. The Toronto Star followed a course

of firm radicalism on the party issue before the election and vacillating conservatism during the contest. As a result, it endorsed candidates on an individual basis, although many of those endorsed came from the various party slates. The Star also endorsed one of the most colourful of local politicians, Controller Lamport, who was the outspoken critic of parties and reformers.

Although the parties were most active and influential in the City, there was some party activity in the suburbs. The Liberals nominated a candidate for the mayoralty in North York and also contested some of the Council and School Board seats. In Scarborough, the N.D.P. made the most concerted effort in the School Board campaign, with the Liberals putting forward some candidates in both Council and School Board contests. In Etobicoke the wife of the Federal N.D.P. candidate ran a successful campaign in the southern working class section. In the inner suburbs, however, parish pump politics reigned supreme.

BARRIERS TO INTRODUCING PARTY POLITICS

by S. H. E. Clarkson

Defining the Problem

While the rise and fall of political parties has long been a central concern of comparative politics, the birth of parties has normally been seen as the development of new political organizations within parliamentary institutions where parties already exist. The theoretical questions that scholars have asked have accordingly been concerned with such micro-political factors as the influence of the electoral system (whether a single-member, single-vote system discriminates against the entry of the Parti Québecois in Quebec's national Assembly), the dynamics of evolving parties (the emergence of the socialist parties by factional splits from the Indian National Congress), or the motivations impelling extra-parliamentary movements to transform their activity within the political system (the origins of the British Labour Party).

The entry of parties into non-party political systems has been left to the students either of Western parliamentary development or of the decolonization process in the third world. The treatment of these problems tends to be descriptive and historical. The entry of new political parties into non-party municipal systems that is being attempted in Metropolitan Toronto raises a number of interesting problems both old and new for political scientists. The creation of municipal wings by two of the three Canadian national parties (the Liberals and the N.D.P., with the Conservatives waiting in the wings) provides new information on the internal evolution of the national parties particularly in response to the emerging consciousness of our "urban crisis." The fact that there is also a simultaneous development of a party that is independent of the national parties, the Civac Action Party (CIVAC), provides an interesting case to study the problem of party politics in municipal systems on a comparative basis. As a problem in municipal government, the entry of parties into Toronto's politics raises questions concerning the stage of political development of municipal political systems: is it the size, the complexity, the growing political stakes or the awakening to a city problem that has created the need for party activity to provide greater coherence to the representative system?

While these are all important problems, what is most fascinating about the Toronto phenomenon is not the creation of new parties per se but the difficulties encountered by the parties trying to penetrate a political system that has until now operated without parties.[1] What one would have expected to be the very easy transposition of political activity from the federal and provincial levels to the municipal in the same region within the same nation-state turns out to be a case of systemic conflict in which the parties encountered real opposition even from within their own ranks. In the heat of political battle they found the municipal arena to be a separate political culture in many ways hostile to their own style, attitudes and patterns of behaviour. Although geographically co-terminous, the municipal political system is distinct from the provincial and federal in many important ways. The attempted entry of political parties thus raises the macro-political question about parties from one system trying to enter the political structures of another, non-party system.

The political science literature dealing with this problem is meagre. The static framework of structural functionalism sheds no light on the dynamic problems of this systemic change. Theories of modernization will not put our finger on what are critical factors in a "modern" city's "traditional" politics' responsiveness to political innovation. It is the economists, in developing a theoretical structure for analyzing the penetration of markets by new firms, who have been more concerned with this type of structural change. Their major categories identifying the "barriers to entry" that market structures set up to oppose the entry of new firms put the problems concerning party penetration into a useful analytical perspective.

According to the theory of the firm, we can identify seven key variables.

(a) The potential entrant's inducements to entry will vary depending on the state of the market and the objectives of the new firm.

(b) The type of market structure will determine the tactics of a potential entrant and the market response to his entry attempt.

(c) The specific characteristics of the local market are also of direct importance in affecting the new firm's ability to adapt his product to local needs.

(d) Differentiating his product from those of the existing producers by his mastery of advertising and public relations will be a crucial factor to success.

---

[1] Municipal politicians have long had covert ties with the national parties, but have till now felt it expedient to conceal these relations in order to appeal to as broad a cross section as possible of the few voters who take part in municipal elections.

(e) The concept of "consumer sovereignty" implies that the consumer will pass a rational judgment and decide the fate of the new entrant.

(f) The strength of the potential entrant — financial, technological and organizational — will account for his ability to survive.

(g) The quality of his product is both alpha and omega of new entry and growth.

Without for a moment accepting the crude equation of politics with selling soap, this conceptual model does give us a framework for analyzing the critical problems involved in the penetration of the non-party city political system by political parties.

Inducements to Entry

According to the classical theory of the firm, potential entrants are induced into a market because the stakes are high. Prices may be high allowing super profits and attracting new competitors. A firm may have a new product with which it thinks it can expand its market. A group may even split off from an existing operation in order to set up an independent firm within the existing market. The reasons and objectives for new entry are important, for they will determine the strategy of entry.

In Metro Toronto's election campaign of 1969 four parties were officially engaged in seeking seats on municipal councils and boards of education. The League for Socialist Action was a Trotskyite party of mainly young dissidents from the N.D.P. who ran a brave campaign complete with a mayoralty candidate. Of the three 'serious' parties, CIVAC was a coalition drawn from both the national parties and non-party sources, while the Liberals and N.D.P. had established municipal wings to contest the election as separate parties. In terms of their motivation to enter city politics they were practically speaking identical as three expressions of a reform movement in the city. As their platforms indicate, they shared a common ideology. They opposed the existing system of institutionalized individualism in which the elected representatives were not genuinely accountable to the public for lack of structures controlling their performance after election. The institution of party was presented as a means of imposing discipline and accountability on the elected representatives through a democratically run, city-wide political structure open to participation by any interested citizen or group. Philosophically, they agreed on a broad populist conception of the city: the city is for people; quality of life problems should take precedence over

quantity of concrete solutions; expressways, new apartment construction, and urban renewal need bringing under control as they threaten the quality of the urban environment. The concept of community dominated their approach to policy-making: schools should be responsive to the needs of the local community; planning should be controlled by the neighbourhoods affected. A technocratic note entered the discussion of transportation which should be planned on an integrated, not a fragmented, basis. Finally a touch of city state feeling was present: City Hall must have more constitutional and fiscal power; elected representatives of better quality should have more responsibility to develop their own solutions to Toronto's specific problems.

While the primary inducement to entry was the felt need for city reform in a period of urban crisis and weak, ineffective city government, there were secondary motivations for the national parties. For the N.D.P. and, to a lesser extent, for the Liberals, municipal party activity would be a means to strengthen organization, increase recruitment and identify with local problems for the purpose of subsequent provincial and federal election campaigns. However, both parties were hampered by serious internal opposition to municipal activity. The N.D.P. had the longest roots in city politics, having run candidates in 1966, but the Toronto Labour Council's strong support for the incumbent mayor Wm. Dennison, a stubborn opponent of party politics, prevented the N.D.P. from nominating a party candidate for mayor and so running a full campaign with a clearly identified captain.

The Liberals' decision to enter municipal politics was made less than a year before the campaign began and without general party consensus with the result that organization, finance and candidate selection were improvised under the pressure both of the clock and of internal party tensions. For CIVAC, party organization and ideology was expressly divorced from federal or provincial links, although many individuals had a clear party identification in provincial or federal politics. As the party had been generated at the municipal level it had the initial advantage of more identification with city politicians, but the subsequent disadvantage of suffering numerous withdrawals by incumbents as they assessed the electoral costs of a party label.

The inducements to entry were thus political reform and the strategy chosen was gaining power through the ballot box, not just with better people, but with politicians working as disciplined groups able to implement a whole programme because they have been elected

as a team with a mandate to implement their platform. The major barriers to entry were necessarily accentuated by the hazards of the municipal electoral process.

Market Structure

The difficulties of new entry vary with the type of market, a monopoly being the most difficult to penetrate, a perfectly competitive market the easiest. The monopolist with total control over pricing and marketing will also be able to influence other factors such as advertising and distribution mechanisms in his counter attack against prospective competition. In a free market the relative power of the individual producer is too insignificant to affect market conditions and so respond to new challenges in a conscious way. In oligopolies where a small number of firms divide up the market, coalitions can be formed to resist unwanted intrusion by price fixing or trade restraints, though a sufficiently powerful new entrant may be able to force himself into the club.

At first glance the city political system appears to be a free market. Since there are no overt parties, each alderman or trustee is elected by virtue of his own local campaign, his personal image and his individual record. Once elected the individuals vote on issues "according to their conscience" in constantly changing groupings. If this picture corresponded to reality, then new entry by individuals should be easy and new entry of organized groups of individuals with other political advantages should be easier still. It is true that some of the system's characteristics substantiate this free market image. Any citizen on the tax rolls, for instance, can run for public office by simply declaring his intention, without even having to pay a deposit.

On closer inspection, however, the system reveals many features of the oligopoly. As the popular expression "old guard" denotes, city politicians as a collectivity are seen to be a block. They act as individuals, of course, but work as a group in a sheltered market with their seats protected by other characteristics of the system that discourage political competition. City Hall officials necessarily develop close working relationships with the incumbents who thus establish an exclusive access to expertise concerning municipal problems — information that is not so readily available to non-elected political activists, quite apart from the general public. Businesses with interests in City Hall activities — primarily construction and high rise development — form working relationships with the elected representatives either directly in piloting their projects through City Hall, or indirectly with their legal, insurance or real estate connections. Incumbents naturally receive the most favourable response from such vested interests when asking for contributions to electoral campaign expenses.

Far from being the hearth of local democracy, open to all interested citizens, City Hall has many analogies to restrictive trade practices. Despite an aura of free competition, City Hall was seen at least by the potential entrants as a closed system that had to be taken either by frontal assault or by subversion. Subversion meant getting allies from within the system to support the party cause. Since incumbents who had not rejected party politics out of hand carefully refrained until the last moment from making a decision for or against their involvement in city parties, this left the parties in the situation of having to launch a frontal attack on City Hall as new entrants. The parties' resultant reliance on outsiders is most clearly illustrated in their policy-making process which was carried on by groups of reformist younger professionals (town planners, architects, professors, party activists) working in discussion groups throughout the preceding spring and summer to put together the municipal equivalent of a national or provincial party platform. These programmes reflected their outsider origins in their generality, their long-range perspective and their reformist assumptions. This may have been an advantage in differentiating the parties' appeal from the old guard, but did little to make the parties' message better attuned to the political wave-length of city politics.

If the parties' problems were considerable given the oligopoly they were tackling, they were noticeably increased by the local characteristics of the city's political system.

The Nature of the Local Market

Quite apart from the degree of competition in a market, local factors can create decisive barriers to new entry. The tax system may make it impossible, e.g., for a foreign-controlled company to operate in the local market. The business laws in effect locally may require the potential entrant substantially to alter his way of operating. Local cultural characteristics may required the product to be sold with very different techniques. Geographical or climatic conditions may require major alterations in the firm's product.

While the municipal activists in the national parties were aware of the difficulties involved in cracking city politics, no one probably

anticipated their extent. While in theory the parties would bring to campaigning the advantages of policy, organization and campaign experience from their provincial and federal experience, they came up against institutional, legal and cultural obstacles which made it extremely difficult for them to bring these advantages to bear.

Franchise restrictions. The electoral system is completely different from the provincial and federal parliamentary system. One man does not necessarily have one vote. He may have several if he has several business operations; he may have none if he has not lived in sufficiently elaborate accommodations for a long enough time. Some citizens were thus excluded from the voters' lists while non-citizens appeared on this list. The extreme complexity of the franchise meant that many eligible voters did not think they had the vote — particularly those brought up in smaller towns where only property owners are enfranchised. A second strike against voter activity was the enormous error in the voters' lists. Due to the method of drawing the voters' lists from the tax rolls, the voters' lists' probable average error was 20 per cent.[2] The means of redress are so inadequate that many of those who do know how to request inclusion on the list still are unsuccessful in being registered. While the state of the franchise is publicly deplored by all candidates it is a particular impediment to the parties whose success depended very largely on persuading the whole citizenry to become involved in city politics. The massive disenfranchisement of eligible voters and institutional obstacles to voter registration hamper efforts to sell the new political product to that two-thirds of the potential consumers who have traditionally kept out of the city political market.

The ballot. Those who do exercise a vote have an extraordinarily complicated act to perform. Rather than mark a single "X" to record a combined preference for both party, policy, leader and local representative as he does in provincial and federal elections, the municipal voter in Toronto makes at least five separate decisions. He votes for two aldermen to represent his ward in City Council, two trustees to represent his ward on the Board of Education and one mayor for the city. The implications of this ballot are serious for any party team work. The fortunes of leader and team are separated

---

[2] The tax rolls are drawn up between January and September; according to the Deputy City Clerk, these rolls change by 40 per cent each year. Thus the electoral list drawn up in October is on the average six months out of date or in error by 20 per cent, 90,000 voters. This error was confirmed by Professor Jerry Hough in his careful investigation of three wards. Cf. Jerry Hough.

electorally: local candidates campaigning for themselves have no built-in institutional interest apart from party loyalty in campaigning for their leader; and vice versa. The differentiation of the mayor as a separately elected officer militates against party leaders running for the office: it is less risky to run as a local aldermanic candidate who is also leader of a party (the N.D.P. and CIVAC tactic in 1969) than to run for the all-or-nothing position of mayor and face being left without any office upon defeat (the Liberal tactic). At the ward level, the strains of running a local team of four candidates in pairs who are mutually competitive for votes are very great. If there is strong opposition then the two party candidates may really be vying for one seat on Council or the Board of Education. Even if both candidates of one party are strong, they will still be competing with each other for the greater political power that comes from topping the ward's poll and getting a seat on Metro Council. It is more rational for a party to run only one candidate per ward, but this precludes the chance of obtaining a majority on Council.

The congressional type of political system leads to a particular stress on the individual council record of the incumbent aldermen and mayor. Voting records compiled by ratepayers associations underlined the electoral advantage of the incumbent. "Where were you?" was the implicit question asked of new party candidates for whom caucus solidarity on a platform, not individual performance in council, is the critical factor.

The large number of offices on which the voter has to make a decision leads to a huge number of names from which he has to choose. The gross inadequacies of communications in giving the voter a good knowledge of the twenty or more candidates in his ward make the difficulty of the electoral choice all the more acute. A further disincentive to vote is another obstacle to change. The view was often expressed and reported that there are so many candidates, "I cannot distinguish between them and so will not vote."

Impotence of City Hall. The multiplicity of candidates and electoral offices is in inverse proportion to the amount of power that is at stake in the municipal election. Even if he understands the highly complex division of powers and responsibilities in the Metro political system, the voter is asked to make a decision on a relatively minor office in the overall picture. He is electing aldermen to a council that controls only twenty per cent of his municipal tax dollar and trustees who are in a subordinate position to the Metro school board. The mayor he is electing has no more political power than the aldermen and is only one of a dozen on the Metro executive.

Of the two aldermen elected from his ward, one is being elected indirectly to sit on Metro council. They have virtually no control over such central municipal bodies as the transportation commission, police commission, harbor commission, parking authority and many others. Although the media and the public meetings demand full policy positions of candidates on all issues, these men and women are seeking office for posts that only give them very partial influence over the policies for which they may be elected. The aura of irrelevance and impotence that infuses the election atmosphere must be counted as a further psychological obstacle to the entry of parties whose message is that City Hall should be powerful and must have its structure totally transformed.

The federal system. As a federal system with six different elections being held simultaneously in Metro's six municipalities, the parties were vulnerable to attack in a way that individual incumbents were not. Policy differences between one incumbent and another are not seen to have any more significance than a disagreement between two candidates for public office. Policy differences, on the other hand, between Toronto Liberals and North York Liberals on the Spadina Expressway were seen as reducing the credibility of both Toronto Liberals' anti-Expressway and North York Liberals' pro-Expressway stand. In trying to run a Metro-wide campaign, a party is liable to be attacked on the platform and in the press for the same disagreements that are common currency between other candidates.

Election day procedures. If the parties thought that they would bring the superior canvassing techniques learned over long years at the provincial and federal levels, they were to be frustrated by the law concerning election day procedures. Since canvassing techniques identifying favourable potential voters depend on checking who has voted, regulations forbidding scrutineers to report back to campaign headquarters the names of those who have not yet voted prevents capitalizing on the whole canvassing effort. The fixing of election day at a time of year likely to have the worst weather is yet another factor that militates against high voter participation in the election.

The lack of direct election to Metro Council, the real centre of power, prevents campaign debate on Metro-wide issues. Debate centres on the local concerns of ratepayers associations to the virtual exclusion of Metro problems.

The many factors of the municipal political institutions which present obstacles to the entry of parties into city politics are primarily barriers to more genuine representative democracy. It is not surprising that, if a city has tolerated a blatantly undemocratic electoral system which puts its municipal politics somewhere back in the nineteenth century in terms of its democratic development, that party activity should be equally retarded.

Product Differentiation

A firm's success in entering a new market will often depend upon not just the quality of its product but its ability to differentiate this product in the eyes of the consumer. The two factors are not necessarily related: a good product may not turn out to be sufficiently useful in the consumer's eyes to merit purchase; a fundamentally similar product such as a detergent may be marketed with sufficient originality in label and publicity that it does win a place on the supermarkets' shelves.

The new party's problem in "product differentiation" is communicating to the voter a policy, an image, a style, a personality that genuinely expresses the party's nature and potential, distinguishing its candidates and its message from rival groups or individuals.

Advertising resources. The big difference between a party campaign and a firm's strategy is that the latter will not engage an attack without having sufficient funds for advertising whereas the former will make strategy decisions regardless of financial problems which are only dealt with once the campaign has been launched. The first barrier to entry in the field of product differentiation which parties face is insufficient financial resources to give them control over sufficient advertising resources to get their message across to the public on television, radio and in the printed press. It is debatable that advertising could have transmitted the elaborate policy message that the parties had to communicate but it is generally agreed that sufficient funds would allow a simple political message to be "sold". Not having these funds — and new parties are unlikely to be wealthy if they are reformist — they had to rely on their newsmaking ability in order to transmit their message through the media to the public.

The parties had a legitimate and distinct product in two senses: they had a more elaborate policy platform that individual candidates for any office; they also offered an instrument to implement those policies, namely party discipline in City Hall. If they did not succeed in transmitting this double message to the public it was largely due to the second barrier to entry in the communications field, the nature of the news media.

Media relations. To be reported in the three media of communication (TV, radio and press) the parties had to make "news". One characteristic of news is that it must be seen by the reporter to be *new*. Since a problem is no longer new once it has been reported it is extremely difficult to sustain media coverage of an issue and so transmit the message to the generally passive public. The New Democratic Party tried to make the island airport project a major issue, but, once the original problem had been raised and some mileage made of it in the press, it faded from view since nothing "new" developed. The Liberals made a major attempt to introduce drug abuse as a policy issue both in the Board of Education and in City Hall. Though this was a burning problem at the time in the city this was not an issue that lasted in the campaign domain for more than a few days. Not only was it hard to sustain an issue; it was difficult to get a policy position adequately transmitted in the media. A fairly elaborate Liberal policy on the thorny issue of amalgamation was briefly reported following a detailed press conference. There was no way that the public could receive a full explanation of Liberal policy on how a Metro parliament would resolve the basic institutional problems of the city. They might get a brochure into every household but even it would only have ten suggestive words on the Metro parliament.

A further obstacle to transmitting the parties' policy message was the entertainment imperative of news reporting. Stories had to be linked to personalities, preferably in some sensational way. A confrontation between two candidates over a policy issue would be reported as a personality clash, not a debate on the policy questions. Though the parties had entered the city campaign to challenge the political system, the image that was transmitted by the media was simply that of many new candidates incidentally with party labels who had come into the fray. Individual candidates might be for or against implementing the city plan but the unprecedented phenomenon of candidates working as a team across the city standing behind an agreed common programme was not conveyed. Whether the message could have been conveyed in a nine-week campaign even had the media decided to give the election higher priority in visual and verbal coverage is open to debate. This speculation only underlines the point that a significant barrier to entry was the parties' lack of power to ensure that the message they were bringing to the public was communicated in the way they wanted.

The City Hall press gallery itself must be considered alongside the structural and technological qualities of the media as a barrier to entry. The two or three dozen reporters for the three media are themselves part of the system they are assigned to report on. Some have their own links with incumbent politicians and therefore tend to have a stake in preserving the status quo in particular instances. They grow to know and even accept the way the system works and tend to observe the potential entrant in the same light as do the incumbents: a threat to the established way of carrying on city business. This is not to impugn any motivations. It is simply to recognize that a further barrier to entry is not being part of the system and so not having the connections and status with the media men that would generate equal space in reporting. Since newsworthiness is defined also in terms of how well-known is the personality who is making the news, incumbents will always get more space than newscomers. If something only becomes newsworthy once it is seen by a reporter, the incumbent again has the advantage by having direct access to the media men whose typewriters, microphones or studios are within moments of his own office. More seriously, apprehensions that the institution of the party caucus would reduce the amount of information that elected representatives would transmit to the press underlay much of the disparagement with which some reporters treated the party campaigns. Partially counteracting these costs were the benefits of newness: some reporters did welcome the prospect of reform and did try to be fair to the new entrants.

The more identified a reporter was with the system, the more difficult it was for him to see the general and long term questions that the parties raised in their campaigns. The difficulty the parties experienced in raising fundamental questions such as the redefinition of the role of the cities in the constitution and the general responsibility of the province for city problems may have been due to this factor. A most dramatic example of the differing treatment accorded incumbents and challengers was a CBC series of twenty-minute interviews during the last week of the four mayoralty candidates. The order in which they were presented was in itself deliberate — from what was considered the least likely to win (the Socialist candidate) to the incumbent mayor, considered most likely to win and so interviewed last in the series — or closest to the election date. The two party candidates were attacked with extraordinary vigour if not venom by the interviewers who then interviewed the incumbent controller and mayor with the standard deference and passivity, apologizing afterwards for this switch in approach. The general policies of the media towards the campaign were formulated by editors and executives in their own back rooms. It was clear from their perform-

ance, however, that the media contributed to the psychology of third-class status which plagues city politics. Despite the heroic efforts of the news personnel who worked within the budgetary and space limits imposed on them, the reporters could do nothing to rectify the low priority given to the election campaign. The CBC refused to give any free time broadcast space on television or on radio; the newspapers gave little photographic space and refused to make page 7 available to policy stateements on the grounds that either the news reporters were covering them enough or that they would then have to open their columns to all candidates.

Where media coverage was best, at the mayoralty level, the message was still obscured. One private radio station held an hour-long debate between the candidates for mayor; the private television station held a half-hour debate; the *Toronto Star* staged a grilling debate which it printed verbatim. While major efforts were made by the media to be rigorously fair in these events, they did convey the policy stands of the mayoralty candidates without being able to transmit the real innovation of party politics being proposed for City Hall. While the mayoralty effort was transmitted still in terms of personality, other aspects of the campaign were hardly reported at all. Ward campaigns and borough campaigns received far less sustained coverage, but again in terms of personality, not party for those who were running as party candidate.

Direct public meetings. Even such means of direct personal communication with voters as public all-candidate meetings were little more successful. The constraints of time and structure which prevented debate between candidates and restricted meetings to brief monologues followed by questions did nothing to help convey the decisive difference of party activity to individual activity in City Hall. There was in fact no way convincingly to convey the message that, for the first time in the city's history candidates were running for all offices — trustee, aldermen and mayor — behind a common programme that they had worked out together in caucus. It was difficult for the voter in Ward 5 to realize that, for the first time, those people who voted N.D.P. in Ward 10 were also voting for the same policy as those voting N.D.P. in Ward 1 through 11. What is a common assumption of parliamentary elections in federal and provincial politics was politically meaningless in the city election.

If full information concerning all products for sale is a defining characteristic of pure competition, the marketplace of city politics is decidedly impure and resistant to political innovation of so basic a kind as new party politics. A further problem raised by our analogy is that product differentiation will be more difficult if a number of new firms simultaneously try to enter a market selling the same product. To some extent it may be argued that the parties, weak as they were, strengthened the cause of party politics by acting together. If, however, the stakes were fixed by the number of seats on Council and the Board of Education, inter-party competition reduced the credibility of a party gaining a majority or even a dominant position. If the supply of voters is inelastic — and the election day returns showed that it had even shrunk — then the inter-party competition produced a further disincentive to vote and so weakened the thrust of party entry.

It is hard to determine how successful product differentiation is in the political marketplace. Was "party" a package of policies, a team of candidates, a leader or a method of activity in City Hall? Was the image of party that of inexperience or youthful vigour? Was it of divided parties or of pioneering parties? The way the parties were perceived was dependent on a host of factors beyond the control of the parties: the federal or provincial party loyalty of the voter, his interest toward city politics, the newspaper he reads, the radio or TV station he tunes in to, even the attitudes of friends or associates.

With all these uncertainties about the parties' differentiation of their own product, it is not surprising that they were not able to differentiate their markets and appeal to specific groups in the public. Not only did they have insufficient resources to advertise; they could only carry out consuumer research within the narrow limits of telephone polls and canvass questionnaires. The parties could fall back on voters lists from provincial and federal campaigns where the files were in good condition and the constituency executives were sympathetic. Nevertheless, the party vote refused to turn out: known N.D.P. supporters in Scarborough, for instance, refused to vote despite canvassers' urgings.

Consumer Sovereignty

> In the final analysis according to micro-economic theory, it is the consumer who is sovereign. It is the purchaser who, by his decision to buy or not to buy a new product, determines the fate of the potential entrant into a new market.

Just as few economists will claim that the concept of the sovereign consumer bears much relationship to the real world of the manipulated, indoctrinated and bribed housewife, there are few political scientists who will defend the simple democratic theory that elections

are decided by rationally deliberating men and women. Without wanting to claim that each of the 450,000 eligible voters in the city of Toronto made a fully rational decision based on complete knowledge of the candidates or their policies, it is still possible to make some general statements about the attitudes of the public which were ultimately decisive in resolving the election struggle. Elements of many voters' decisions have been hinted at already. The uncertainty of the franchise, the complexity of the ballot, the impossibly long list of candidates, the lack of knowledge of how the individual candidates stood: these were factors which, together with the cold weather, help explain why the voters stayed away from the polls in a deafeningly silent majority.

Other factors certainly played their part. The general disinterest in "third rate" City Hall politics because of its apparent irrelevance to their lives was a massive disincentive to vote that could not be counteracted during a brief campaign. So was the very general satisfaction with the degree of services provided by City Hall in the traditional areas of garbage collection, road and sidewalk repair and snow removal. If City Hall is seen by the vast majority as reasonably efficient and uncorrupt and inoffensive, why bother? The scepticism about politics that is latent at the federal and provincial levels came out openly in the municipal campaign as a general hostility to parties. Despite the reform parties' claims to the contrary, many saw them as the instruments of corruption, the means of keeping power from the people and the agents for politicians to feather their own nests after elections. A different concern was expressed that an election of a particular party to power in City Hall might generate conflict with Queen's Park that would lead to more costs than benefits.

Even for our rare "rational" voter, there were genuine causes of doubt. No party had a full scale effort in every borough across Metro; no party was united on its policy issues when they did cross Metro boundaries. Party candidates were often low in experience and quality. Furthermore the parties seemed to get into more trouble than it was worth: the provincial Liberals issued their most unpopular position paper for extending support for separate high schools three weeks before the election in once orange Toronto.

The final blow for party workers was the failure of those identified party voters who had been reminded in the canvass to turn out to vote on election day. N.D.P. organizers complain of known supporters who refused by the hundreds to come out to vote on December 1st.

If the consumer was sovereign in city politics, he was a consumer thoroughly indifferent to the whole system and largely beyond the reach of the press and television set. The sovereign voter was as unimpressed by the N.D.P. campaign literature as by the Liberals' editorial endorsements in the *Globe & Mail* and *Star*. Voter sovereignty meant the mayor of Toronto was elected by fifteen per cent of the eligible voters. This is not to say that the vote was unreasonable. It is simply that the actual vote is itself a barrier to entry of new parties since such a circumscribed and imperfect instrument of measuring public attitudes has an overwhelming impact on the party entrants. The election returns are a once-for-all act that leaves no room for stepping up the advertising campaign or developing a new window display. It is a short, sharp and brutal verdict giving the victors the few spoils of office and leaving the losers out in the cold.

Power of the Firm

Integral to the success of the firm in its new endeavour is the organizational, financial, technological and commercial strength of the firm itself. A large international firm with massive research departments and adequate means for survey research on the markets will normally be far better able to assault the positions of a tightly defended oligopoly. Economies of scale, financial power, will affect the new firm's prospects. A small firm with weak financial reserves and too ambitious a programme may fall flat on its face.

It is in the comparison with the monolithic firm making a well-researched decision to launch a concerted attack on a new market that our analogy with party entry is most revealing. For the parties' operations are far removed from the single-minded corporation operating with an efficient command structure in response to policy decisions made carefully in advance.

In theory the national parties should bring many advantages to city politics. For economies of scale, read advantages of concentrating federal and provincial workers on city wards for campaigning. For special skills, patents and technical expertise, read the policy advantages that come from close personal ties with the federal and provincial levels for making policies on important city issues. For brand image read the favorable or unfavorable impact of the labels Liberal and N.D.P. in the city election. On almost all these points, however, the barriers to entry came not from the outside system but from the parties themselves. Rather than the centralized firm well prepared to launch a properly financed, carefully orches-

trated campaign, the parties were split, ill-prepared, improvising and uncertain in their first official venture into the city forum.

Finances — Even on so basic a problem as finance, the Liberals entered the election campaign with no finance committee and $2,000 in debt. The funds promised the N.D.P. from the Toronto Labour Council did not materialize in the expected dimensions.

Party solidarity — Party solidarity was not the expected asset because of the large degree of opposition to party involvement in municipal politics that were still actively expressed in both the N.D.P. and Liberal parties. Coming primarily from those closely related to incumbents in municipal politics, internal opposition at riding executive and central executives reduced the availability of talent and the confidence that would have been transmitted to the press of a fully operating party campaign.

Campaign expertise — The expertise with which the party people were meant to approach the election campaign because of their previous federal and provincial campaign experience was offset by their ignorance of local political lore. Paying for bingos in the name of your candidate at community and ethnic group meetings, for instance, or insisting on appointments with editorial boards of the three newspapers for endorsement of each aldermanic candidate were common knowledge to local political figures but out of the realm of experience of the federal or provincial politicians.

Selection of candidates — Even for candidates who, in theory, would be easier to recruit as part of a team that had a central organizational base and financial support, arrangements were too embryonic to have established even tolerably acceptable standards for party discipline, qualities for candidates and methods of campaigning. The open ward association established by as democratic a constitution as possible was ripe for takeover by any ambitious extrovert interested in a fast way into politics. With no power to select a team himself, the challenge for the party leader, whether mayoralty or aldermanic candidate, was to form a coherent whole from this group of very haphazardly selected team mates.

The Quality of the Product

The corollary of consumer sovereignty is the notion that no amount of advertising or packaging will save a low quality product. Even if a new product secures a place in a market, it may need to be developed and improved if it is to establish its place in the changing market. The product must be good; it must also answer the needs of the consumers.

The assumption under which the parties set up shop and contested the municipal election of 1969 in Toronto was that the city's political system needed rationalization and democratization and that political parties could answer this need. Other assumptions are possible. One could assume that there is a need for democratization without positing that parties can provide the answer. Those who ran as independents took this line. A more drastic assumption is that the problems of the system cannot be resolved by a representative system unless basic structural changes are made in the whole socio-economic system. The conclusions to be drawn from the campaign and the election are ambiguous. Does the sixty-five per cent abstention rate justify the latter assumption? Or are the needs for reform simply not yet perceived by the public?

The actual results of the December 1st election in Toronto may appear at first sight to justify the parties' assumption: of the "old guard" seven were unseated; of the twenty-two aldermen elected to city of Toronto where the greatest party activity took place these City Council ten of the twenty-two were party candidates. In the results exaggerate the success of the parties' effort. Of the five aldermen who claimed membership in CIVAC, only three had put any emphasis on their party membership during the campaign. Of the new members elected, most were elected more on the basis on their status as notables in their community, than their party label. The underlying reason for the large turnover was the radical change in ward boundary lines which left many in the old guard without a ward in which they were genuine incumbents. The most crushing statistic was the voter turnout: 35 per cent or 3 per cent lower than the previous election. The parties had clearly failed to draw into the city political marketplace that silent two-thirds of the electorate who had traditionally voted with their feet — unwilling to walk to the polls. Were these judgments on the parties *qua* parties or on new parties that were fielding very raw candidates? Would the results have been different if they had been non-reform parties in the contest?

The newness of the parties at the municipal level made the election a first response to the new product. There had been no chance for improvements and adaptations of the national party to local conditions — a process that will now take place in the inter-electoral period.

Crystal-Gazing at the Model

The analysis of the various barriers that confronted parties in their attempt to enter city politics makes it quite clear that it was

too much to expect a successful transformation of City Hall in one campaign. Whether the parties will continue to act as agents of change in the system or be co-opted by the system while they are still in their growing stage will depend both on the kind of party activity that is maintained between elections and on the changing needs of the political system. If our model is a useful one, it should allow us to make certain predictions about the probable course of developments.

(a) We should expect parties to continue to concentrate their efforts on municipal politics if the underlying inducement remains, the growing crisis of life in the cities and the continuing clash of the proponents of concrete and the defendants of an improved quality of life. The emergence of the "professional citizen" as a challenge to the old guard style of City Hall and the growing political importance of such symbolic issues as the Spadina Expressway and the waterfront development promise well to keep the sense of crisis close to the surface.

(b) As the structure of City Hall is opened up to more citizen participation by those reformers who have been elected, it should become progressively easier for the non-elected activists to crack the monopoly of expertise and obtain the information allowing them to become more relevant and effective in city politics.

(c) With the transformation of attitudes about urban problems, the greatly increased involvement of community groups and political activists in city politics, growing public awareness of city issues should raise public acceptance of reform politics. If the political parties can identify themselves with these issues in the person of citizens who will make good candidates (acceptable to the wards in their own right as prominent local figures), then the party effort will no longer be tarred with the brush of inexperience. Nevertheless the imperfections of the local market are primarily structural: the rules of the game will have to be democratized if parties are to be able to bring to city politics the advantages they have to offer.

(d) In the vicious circles barring the entry of parties to city politics, the differentiation of the party product may be the most difficult to achieve. As long as parties are split ideologically or geographically, it will be difficult for them to convey to the public that strength and respectability which is their key to public acceptance.

(e) To the extent that the voter-consumer is sovereign and that he is being educated by the increasing gravity of city problems to comprehend them in the three-dimensional perspective of the national and provincial relationships, one can expect the rate of abstention to decline and general public involvement by apartment dwellers and young people to rise. Other things being equal, parties seem more likely than independents to gain from increasing voter turnouts.

(f) (g) The decisive factor will, of course, be the strength of the parties and so the quality of their product in the future election campaigns. The future of party politics in Toronto's municipal government will be determined by the observed success or failure of the parties to respond to the changing needs of the urban political scene.

A priori one would expect any political system to offer some obstacles to fundamental transformations. The legal, psychological and technological barriers to entry of the parties to city politics point out that, within the same geographical region, different political cultures can exist at different constitutional levels. They show on the one hand that the public discriminates in its political behaviour between the different levels of politics. On the other hand they indicate that political cross-breeding from one level of a political system to another is much less easy than one would have assumed.

PATTERNS OF PARTISAN AND NON-PARTISAN BALLOTING

by E. P. Fowler and M. D. Goldrick

The Entrance of Parties

National political parties invaded Toronto's municipal elections in 1969. Not only was it the first intervention of parties on anything like this scale in Canadian cities, but it also ran counter to a North American trend away from partisan urban politics that has prevailed since the beginning of the century.

The purpose of this paper is to consider the effect of the shift from nonpartisan to partisan electoral politics on voting behaviour in the City of Toronto and to offer some explanation for differences in its modest impact on different sectors of the political community. We begin by considering why and how national parties came to commit themselves or abstain from participation in the election, since this helps to explain the limited impact that they had. Anticipating the argument somewhat, it is clear that the Liberal and New Democratic party elites decided in favour of involvement in response not to public clamour for party politics but primarily in response to partisan and personal considerations. In so doing, they committed the common error of vastly overestimating the mass public's political knowledge, perception, and concern for ends which the elites thought partisan municipal politics would achieve.

Unquestionably, a series of what might be termed environmental factors created a hospitable climate for partisanship. One of these is a critical size that cities such as Toronto appear to reach when devices like parties become desirable. A large population, heterogeneity, specialization, complexity of issues require institutionalized means to aggregate interests and to provide voters and politicians with a kind of political shorthand with which to sort out issues and appropriate responses[1]. A second factor was the growing dismay with the council system in Toronto, which seemed to conspire against any coherent form of political leadership. Each member of the City Council operated in a sense as one of twenty-three parties, one for each elected position. One is reminded of the Grand Inquisitor's song in The Gondoliers:

> "And party leaders you might meet
> In twos and threes in every street
> Maintaining with no little heat

Their various opinions.
. . . In short whoever you'll agree
When everyone is somebody
Then no one's anybody."

Ad hoc coalitions formed, usually on an issue to issue basis. And nowhere was the fragmented nature of the council more evident than in elections, when citizens were asked to vote for individual candidates who were effectively free from accountability.

This situation had an impact on concerned elites, at least, for whom the introduction of political parties was one of several needed structural changes. A leading voice in this chorus was the Toronto press, which campaigned vigorously for parties in editorial columns from about 1966 on. The attention paid to this issue by the press was extremely important in creating an atmosphere conducive to partisan politics. It is interesting to note, however, that Stephen Clarkson, a mayoralty candidate, has since charged that newspapers were indifferent to the existence of parties during the actual campaign[2]. But as the communication medium of the political elite, newspapers defined and articulated the issue, making it common currency among those few who stopped at the editorial page en route to marriages, births and deaths.

The formation of CIVAC, a so-called 'nonpartisan party', in 1966, gave form and substance to the question of civic parties and through its birth pangs provided material for newspaper discussion of the entire issue. CIVAC also served as an important test-bed, providing an opportunity for national party activists, especially those of the Liberals, to try on party politics for size. Involvement with CIVAC broadened the experience of many and widened the circle of those who were interested in a new form of municipal politics.

A final environmental factor that sharpened the relevance of partisanship was the popularization and growing discussion of the 'cities crisis'. The impact of race, violence, and poverty on cities in the United States focused attention on the condition of urban life, and in a local context, a series of issues — expressway construction, airport location, redevelopment, governmental reform, pollution — and new styles of political activity by citizen groups, appeared to stimulate in many for the first time a consciousness of the city.

These environmental factors helped to create a climate amenable to change, but they did not stir up a groundswell of popular support for party involvement, though they did provide reasons and some justification for party politics at local level to a handful of political

---

[1] See the section on *Voter Receptivity* below.

[2] S. Clarkson, See Above.

sophisticates within parties and outside them. Decisive influence, however, was exerted by party activists. The responses of these influentials to the issues of partisanship were governed on the one hand by the effect of entry on their personal aspirations in party and political life and on the other by their assessments of the benefits or electoral costs of entry in terms of their particular parties.

The importance of both factors can be explained by the unique character of parties. Parties share with other systems of social organization a number of structural characteristics. Two are important for present purposes. First, as opposed to conventional bureaucratic forms of organization, they are voluntary. There are no overt economic incentives and few sanctions to induce participation. Maintenance of membership depends on a continual flow of benefits from party to members which are traded for party support. Such benefits may be ideological or personally instrumental, the latter including the achievement of political ambitions[3]. Through party affiliation, members attempt to maximize the ideological and personal gratifications they receive. The realization of their personal ambitions is functional for the party in the sense that the higher the level of satisfaction achieved within it, the greater the level of support for the pursuit of party goals. If incentives are inadequate, members may look elsewhere for the gratifications they anticipated from party work.

It is as true of party work as of the military that every soldier carries a field marshal's baton in his knapsack. In the Toronto case, there are unrealized ambitions among party activists, especially those of the Liberal and New Democratic parties, workers on the make, faithful supporters who had 'done their mile' for other aspirants, and newcomers who wanted to get out on the hustings. For the Liberals the overwhelming electoral success of 1968 left in its wake confidence, vigour and a cadre of workers whose ambitions were whetted rather than slaked by federal election victories. Similarly, the N.D.P., which had unabashedly flirted with municipal politics since 1964, recorded some electoral success in 1968 and felt that its provincial position was improving in the Metropolitan Toronto area. It too was optimistic and well endowed with party hopefuls. Significantly, and in sharp contrast, the Progressive Conservatives were in veritable disarray. Wiped out federally, the party in Toronto was tightly controlled by an entrenched organization which was itself dominated by a rurally oriented and less than secure provincial government. The spark that seemed to inhabit the other parties was not evident in the Conservative

camp. Thus the Liberal and New Democratic parties seemed in a mood to dare to innovate and had members who were itching to move from constituency backrooms to council front office. It was these who made the running for party intervention, testing the status quo and pushing for new opportunities to absorb their ambition. The entry of these parties into municipal politics provided an appropriate outlet while the relative paucity of similarly motivated adherents in the Progressive Conservative party contributed to its decision to abstain from overt participation in the election.

A second relevant characteristic of parties is referred to by Michels as their omnibus tendency[4]. Parties generally are 'greedy for members'. They are continually engaged in recruitment, for to the extent that they are able to broaden the base of their committed support, their chances of achieving the primary party goal of electoral success are enhanced. However, linked to this is a further imperative of party organization which has already been alluded to; this is the informal and indistinct nature of the role of members. In contrast to bureaucratic organizations, positions are poorly defined, tasks indefinite, and movement between positions largely unsystematic. Thus, if the base of the party is expanded, opportunities for members to derive gratifications from their association must be found if their support is to be retained.

The Liberal and New Democratic parties were motivated by these kinds of considerations. Both could see solid advantages in full-blown participation though in neither case, of course, was this the unanimous judgment of their members. Municipal activity for both parties offered a means to animate and involve party adherents and at the same time to broaden the base of their popular support. For the Liberal party, the latter point was something of a departure. While involvement in local politics had been an accustomed part of party rhetoric since the early nineteen sixties, it received its first real stimulus from Trudeau and subsequently was sanctified by the writings of the National President, Senator Richard Stanbury.

If municipal politics could enhance the mass party or populist image of the Liberals, it could do this and more for the N.D.P., particularly in the Toronto area. After some coolness toward municipal involvement by the party, the Toronto Labour Council came down solidly in favour of it during 1968. This was the result of dwindling influence by organized labour during the nineteen sixties in the government of Toronto. In addition, it was felt by some in the labour movement that municipal politics and its attendant opportunities for

---

[3]See S. J. Eldersveld, *Political Parties*, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), chapter 1.

[4]S. J. Eldersveld, *Ibid.*, p. 5.

community work and social animation offered an appropriate means to involve the more than 120,000 trade unionists in Metropolitan Toronto in their unions and party.

For both parties, municipal involvement promised to employ under-utilized human resources and mobilize new support. The Progressive Conservatives, on the other hand, were not in such an expansionist mood. Some members who advocated partisan involvement certainly regarded it as a means to rejuvenate the party's flagging fortunes but they were not persuasive.

A third party incentive to involvement was the conventional wisdom holding that the Toronto City Council and, in fact, most municipal governments in Metropolitan Toronto were dominated by undeclared Tories[5]. While this provided an added incentive to the Liberals and N.D.P., it was obviously a factor which militated against any adventure by the Progressive Conservatives.

Looking at the other side of the ledger, there were real obstacles to party intervention which, on the part of the Tories, prevailed. Foremost of these was the financial one. From the Progressive Conservative side, it was argued that since the conservative minded candidates already were achieving considerable electoral success, their only demand on the party could be for campaign funds which it could ill afford. As the momentum for involvement by the Liberal party picked up, tacit support from its highest reaches gave some assurance but no promise of financial assistance for a campaign. But concern in this respect was important in both the Liberal and New Democratic parties.

Primary opposition in all three parties came from incumbent politicians. The greatest influence of this kind was present in the Progressive Conservative party, but all incumbents were reluctant to tamper with what for them was a successful arrangement.

Two other factors militating against party involvement were particularly important. Again for the Tories, the party organization dominated by the provincial government could see few advantages and many potential problems in dealing with a Conservative City Council, let alone an antagonistic one. This was less a concern for the other parties, the provincial and federal levels of which were more indifferent at least initially, than anything else. However, the eventual endorsement of municipal participation by the provincial leaders of the Liberals and New Democrats prior to the election probably indicated a belief that the local parties could help build a provincial challenge.

---

[5]See: Bureau of Municipal Research, *The Metro Politician — A Profile,* Toronto, June 1963.

Finally, the question of adequate leadership was important in the parties' decisions. The national Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties traditionally have placed great emphasis on the image projected by their leadership. The fact that the Progressive Conservatives were unable to produce a mayoralty candidate who could project a strong, purposeful public image was a major reason for their rejection of intervention. The Liberals, on the other hand, courted 'public figures' from every sector of the community finally settling on a relatively unknown candidate who was unable to establish himself adequately in the short time available. Whether consistency with a national convention of this kind is essential in a municipal setting such as Toronto is a matter of conjecture. But the electoral success of the N.D.P., (a party which tends to be stronger in its organization than in the image of its leader, in federal politics), lends some support to the idea that it is not a matter of conjecture. Though the incumbent Mayor of Toronto, William Dennison, was a member of the N.D.P., he refused to campaign as a party candidate. After a good deal of rancorous debate, the Party decided not to contest the mayoralty with an official candidate but, as we make clear below, it still was able to project a distinctive party image to a significant degree.

The outcome of this interplay of forces was that the Tories passed while the Liberals and N.D.P. plunged. The point that should be emphasised here is that while what we have called environmental conditions created an atmosphere more congenial to partisan electoral politics than ever before, the decision to contest the 1969 election was made by political party activists acting on the basis of personal and party considerations. The decision was not made in response to popular demand, though on that score, the political elites may well have mistaken their own voices, amplified by the press, for those of the people.

Voter Receptivity

In the preceding pages, we have indicated some of the considerations affecting politicians and political parties entering the Toronto municipal election of 1969. All that was prior to the campaign and the election. The crushing fact is, of course, that the City's voters could not seem to have cared less about the introduction of parties into the election. There are some who dispute this, arguing that party candidates received half the votes which were cast. On the other hand, they also fielded half of the candidates. The best evidence we have comes from some data we collected ourselves. When the votes were counted on election day, students from York University were present in 33 polls selected at random in each of 11 wards throughout Toronto,

recording the votes of every seventh ballot as they were counted. For a small proportion of the City's polls, therefore, we were able to ascertain the number of people who voted a 'straight' Liberal Council ticket, and (for those wards in which it was possible) the number of people who voted for both N.D.P. candidates for alderman[6]. Of 33 polls, only 13 could be characterized as having a glimmer of partisan spirit; these partisan polls are compared with the others below.

But the important point is that out of the 544 people who voted in our sample, only 35 voted for two or more Liberals and 22 voted for two New Democrats (in some wards it was, of course, impossible to vote for two New Democrats). Out of the 35 Liberals only 7 voted the full Liberal Council ticket (this was possible in only five wards)[7]. The following table presents the evidence most starkly:

Table I

Ticket voting in the Toronto Municipal Elections

	Number of Persons Voting for Party in Wards Where it was possible to Vote a Full Ticket*	Number of Persons Voting a Full Ticket	Percent Voting Full Ticket
Liberal	201	7	3.5
N.D.P.	69	22	21.9

*'Voting for Party' means the vote of the most popular party candidate in each polling district.

Granted, it is easier to vote for two than three persons, so some of the N.D.P. voting may have happened by chance. But it also takes considerably more knowledge to vote for two aldermen of the same party than for the mayor and an alderman: there was only one case where a voter chose both Liberal aldermen and voted against the Liberal candidate for Mayor, Stephen Clarkson, while there were 27 cases where Clarkson and one alderman were picked out.

Table I indicates two things. First, there was practically no ticket voting in Toronto's elections in 1969, both because no chance was afforded the electorate to practice it and because they chose not to structure their vote in that way. Second, where such voting did occur, it was among the N.D.P. voters, who had no party mayoralty candidate, as such, to head the ticket.

[6]Here we acknowledge with thanks the help of our colleague, Professor F. F. Schindeler who suggested this technique to us.

[7]Each voter could vote for two aldermanic, one mayoral and two school trustee candidates. Because the turnout for trustee elections was so light we had to ignore them; 'ticket' voting was construed as voting for two or more candidates of the same party. See the text for the ramifications of this mehod.

This evidence leads one to ask, did it make any difference that parties were introduced into the Toronto elections? Our thesis is that yes, it did, but we contend that the introduction of parties was more the result of a significant change at the elite level than the cause of a shift of habits of voting. We are suggesting that parties were inevitable in Toronto elections no matter what the projections of success were for individual parties or for their difficulties in cracking the system. This means that politicians craved organized competition in urban politics, *whether or not they felt the electorate was ready or interested in it*. But in addition, Toronto presents an illuminating case of variations in the relationships between elites and non-elites, as represented by the difference between N.D.P. and Liberal ticket voting.

There are two links in our chain of reasoning. The first link was the personal ambitions and perceptions of party activists, which we discussed above. The second link concerns voting behaviour.

The fundamental point to be remembered (and it often is not) is that while the party label usually serves as a cue to the unsophisticated voter, in general, the distance between the ideological world of political elites and that of the average voter should be measured in light years[8]. In an extremely perceptive article, Converse has challenged the notion that the election of a particular party, or a change in government, indicates that in even the vaguest sense some voters shifted, for rational reasons, from one side of the partisan fence to the other[9]. The voter most likely to switch his vote has practically no knowledge of the political system, let alone the particular issues of an election. Generally, the more partisan the voter, the more likely he is to be informed on the issues of an election. That is, his unwillingness to be swayed grows as his information grows. This is something of a paradox, of course, given the extent to which the ostensible purpose of many campaign debates is to persuade the doubters. The people who are 'doubters' seldom expose themselves to the debate, while the people who are informed tend to be irreconcilably committed.

Once all this has been said, it may still be argued that when two or three parties are consistently contesting one election after another, many voters (often well over 50%) form stable and well defined images of those parties and their positions vis-à-vis the voter himself[10]. In fact, the party is the single most significant cue for the average

[8]This hyperbole is borrowed from V. O. Key's, *Southern Politics.*

[9]P. E. Converse, 'The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics', in D. E. Apter, *Ideology and Discontent*, (New York: Free Press, 1964).

[10]*ibid.*

politically sophisticated, they responded quite respectably to the N.D.P. label. In short, the Liberals did not attract their usual following, while the N.D.P. did. Why?

Our discussion of the internal structure and the electoral tactics of the two parties helps explain this difference. The Liberal Party is oriented toward its leaders and does not have as distinctive a personality as the N.D.P. In fact, it was Trudeau as much as the Liberals who won in Toronto in 1968. The N.D.P., on the other hand, no matter what level of government, has a separate labour image which attracts a faithful core of voters. It is also more of a mass party, so that an adherent is more likely to feel strongly about his party than a Liberal is. The New Democratic party supporter relies less on strong reinforcement of party loyalty by leaders, issues and other reference groups than the Liberal supporter. A potential Liberal supporter who has voted regularly in previous municipal elections needed to reorient his image of city leaders, issues and groups to reinforce his loyalty to Toronto Liberals: after all, this kind of reinforcement is necessary for regular Liberal voting at the national level. The unsophisticated Liberal voter just did not have the information or the political energy to perform this feat in one election. The N.D.P. voter had no such task.

Regardless of the motives of individual politicians, the nature of Toronto politics is changing, and partisan elections reflect that change. For instance, many issues are becoming political that once were not: pollution, expressways and rapid transit, housing, tenant-landlord relations, ward boundaries, school location, waterfront development. The Spadina expressway controversy has demonstrated that building an urban superhighway is no longer an administrative decision; contrary to the credo of American 'good government' reformers, there *is* a liberal and conservative way to pave a street. This does not mean that in a nonpartisan system people do not fight about such issues. But Toronto has reached a size at which larger numbers of people are interested in more issues, and multiple issues tend to be grouped.

This grouping process — as well as the multiplication of issues in a developing political system — has not been adequately studied. One clue to its operation comes from the political psychologists who argue that man needs to structure his political perceptions because if he has too many disconnected opinions of anything, he becomes confused and unable to act[17]. It's obviously the political elite who are more likely to have too many political perceptions, for the masses operate on so few. Thus, the need to structure a city's multiple problems and organize

them into a platform of action will come from the politically involved first, those who group themselves one way or another, though parties are the most usual form. These groupings then serve a second purpose for the political elite: when they compete for political office the mass of voters are not asked to 'categorize' each candidate separately, but to use his organized affiliation to cue their votes. As we have seen in Toronto, the process of organizing and reaching the voter varies from party to party. The important point is that few studies exist which treat practice as anything but a *fait accompli*, initiating action, rather than the struggling product of a maturing political system.

Politicians and political scientists both tend to think of parties as dynamic forces which influence the course of political systems. There is nothing wrong with this, of course, except that parties' behaviour itself is susceptible to a wide range of influences such as the ones described above — all their energy is not self-generated. To a greater extent than many other social groupings, parties are sensitive to extra-organizational influences and the vagaries of their members' motivations. Furthermore, parties soon acquire a keen instinct for survival and this constitutes a potent influence on their behaviour. Our major point in this paper is that parties are intermediate organizations between the masses and institutions of government, are both cause and effect of changes in the political system[18]. We have seen how the Liberal party paid the price of not recognizing this clearly enough.

Research, in addition, has usually compared nonpartisan with partisan cities: it has not considered why one city might move from one system to another. With Toronto, we have seen several things about the dynamics of this change process. First, the elites decide to alter the rules of the game; since they are the ones who play the game, the rules are most important to them[19]. Once having structured themselves according to parties, the elites then try to filter this restructuring down to the electorate. It reaches them not in any explicit sense, but merely as semi-conscious cues for the average citizen's casual half-interest in politics.

Secondly, elites differ in their relations with the electorate, and their success in introducing changes in the system may vary according to their different relations. The Liberals were much less successful in reaching the electorate than the N.D.P.

Finally, parties seem to be reflectors of changes in the issues faced by a political system as much as they are innovators. Perhaps we shall be able to observe this phenomenon again as more nonpartisan cities approach Toronto's size and complexity.

---

[17]L. Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance,* (Evanston: Rowe Peterson, 1957).

[18]Eldersveld, *Op. Cit.*

[19]Robert Dahl, *Who Governs?* (Yale Univ. Press, 1961).

THE LIBERAL PARTY AND THE MAYORALTY ELECTION*

by J. F. Hough

In the June 1968 federal elections the Liberal candidates received 134,000 votes in the City of Toronto, an absolute majority of those cast, and they emerged victorious in nine of the eleven ridings located wholly or in large part within the City. Indeed, less than 500 additional Liberal votes in each of the two losing ridings would have produced victory there as well. Perhaps encouraged by this success, the Liberal party decided to enter the races for mayor and 16 aldermanic positions in the 1969 Toronto municipal election. It nominated as its mayoralty candidate Stephen Clarkson, a young 'stylish professor on a crusade'[1] — a candidate who emphasized 'quality of life' issues and presented an image in his campaign not unlike that which proved so successful for the national candidate of the party in 1968. The result was 33,000 votes for the Liberal candidate for mayor (21% of the total cast) as against 53,000 votes for Margaret Campbell (a senior controller) and 66,000 for the incumbent mayor, William Dennison. Only two Liberal aldermen were elected, one of them an incumbent 'Old Guard' alderman whose votes in City Council frequently had not corresponded to the new party programme.

It is the purpose of this paper to explore some of the reasons for the difference in the Liberal vote totals in the federal and city elections. This paper does not by any means provide a comprehensive analysis of this question, for it is based largely on a survey that was designed for a different purpose: an examination of the determinants of voters' turnout[2]. A sample of 1,840 persons was drawn from the voters' lists in three Toronto wards (Wards 5, 6 and 11). Students administered a questionnaire to half of the sample and a questionnaire was mailed to those who failed to return the first. Since part of the study focused in detail on Ward 5, my wife visited those in that ward who failed to return the second mailed questionnaire.

Of the 920 persons assigned to students for interviews, 359

---

[1]The phrase is from the heading of an article on Clarkson in the *Toronto Globe and Mail*, November 27, 1969, p. 7.
[2]The results of the original study appear in an article 'Voters' Turnout and the Responsiveness of Local Government: The Case of Toronto, 1969', published in Paul Fox, ed., *Politics: Canada*, 3rd edition (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1970).

proved to have moved prior to the election or to be ineligible or non-resident electors. 83 percent of the remaining 651 persons completed the questionnaire. We could not ascertain the percentage who had moved among the half of the sample who were mailed a questionnaire, but, if the percentage is not unlike that for the student questionnaires, the response-rate for the mailed questionnaires was approximately 70 percent.

Because of the primary focus of the study, the questionnaire probed more deeply into the factors associated with voters' turnout than with those associated with the choice made by those who did vote. Nevertheless, one question did ask for candidate preference for mayor, aldermen, and school trustees, while another question asked, 'Which party do you vote for most often in national elections? a. Conservative ....; b. Liberal ....; c. New Democratic (NDP) ....; d. No preference ....'. However, since the information on candidate preference was of marginal importance for the primary study and since the question was thought to be a sensitive one, an effort was made to reduce any adverse impact it might have on the response rate of the questionnaire as a whole. To the question itself, there was added the following underlined statement: 'Leave this question out if it is too personal', and interviewers were instructed not to press hard on the question. This decision no doubt contributed to the fact that more than 30 percent of the 537 respondents who voted did not indicate a mayoralty choice or stated that they were undecided.

The fact that the study dealt with voters' turnout did, however, have one important side-benefit for this paper. Because the question of who voted and who did not was all important, the study (unlike most voting behaviour studies) did not rely on the respondents for information on this fact. Instead, the poll books were examined to determine who among those sampled had, in fact, voted. Consequently, when it is stated that the analysis of the mayorality vote will rest on the questionnaires of 315 voters who were willing to state their preference for mayor, we can say with complete certainty that we are analyzing respondents who really did vote.

When a party received 133,000 votes in one election and 33,000 in another held 18 months later, when its proportion of the vote cast drops from 52% to 21%, a number of factors are almost surely involved. The important question from both a practical and theoretical point of view is whether these were factors largely peculiar to this one election or whether they are more permanent ones, likely to be important in any future municipal election as well.

Certainly at least part of the explanation for the Liberal defeat is

---

to be found in the specific nature of the 1969 election and the Liberal campaign.

First, as Stephen Clarkson discusses in his paper, there are many endemic difficulties associated with the entry of parties into municipal politics for the first time. It is certainly not necessary to review these difficulties here, but it should be noted that the difficulties of 'entering the market' are likely to be particularly great when there have been no major scandals in the old administration and when the population seems basically contented with the status quo. In the sample as a whole (that is, the sample used for the original turnout study), 24 percent of the respondents ranked city services as excellent (garbage collection, police protection, snow-plowing, and street repairs were cited as examples in the question), 47 percent characterized them as good, 20 percent as fair, 6 percent as poor, and 3 percent expressed no opinion. (The percentage of good-excellent responses ranged from 78 percent in the high-income census tracts to 59 percent in the low-income tracts.)

Second, the age and experience of the Liberal candidate cannot be ignored. At 32, Clarkson had had little opportunity to gain experience in municipal politics and to gain voter recognition. Indeed, to the extent that he had become known, it was through pronouncements on foreign policy questions rather than on urban problems. There must have been many who would have agreed with a written comment on the questionnaire of a woman lawyer: 'Re: Stephen Clarkson — am interested but feel that some municipal experience is necessary before aiming for the mayor's seat'. Older voters seem to have been particularly concerned about this question, for only 1 of the 42 persons in the sample who were 65 years or older voted for Clarkson for mayor.

Third, the race for mayor was not a two-way one between the Liberal candidate and an 'Old Guard' mayor. Instead, there was a third strong candidate, Margaret Campbell, who emphasized the same issues as the Liberal Party and who had fought for many of these causes for some time as an alderman and then controller. The similarity between the Campbell position and that of the Liberals was dramatically illustrated late in the campaign when Clarkson proposed that he be elected mayor and that Mrs. Campbell be appointed chairman of the Metro Toronto Council.

The presence of Mrs. Campbell in the race did more than split the 'reform' vote. She proved particularly successful in undercutting Liberal support among two important groups. One was composed of the single women — a key element in the apartment house vote that was vital to the Liberal plans and hopes. In line with Liberal expecta-

tions, only a small number voted for the incumbent mayor — 18 percent among the 50 single women in the sample. Yet, the Liberal candidate did little better — 22 percent of the vote. It was Mrs. Campbell who received the support of 60 percent of this group.

A second group among whom Margaret Campbell seemed to do well were the persons concerned with the 'quality of life' issues. This is perhaps too sweeping a statement, but we do have information on the one issue that this group generally viewed as the symbol of all that was wrong with current city politics — the extension of the Spadina Expressway into the City. Both Clarkson and Campbell strongly opposed this decision, but the issue seemed to have little impact upon the former's vote. Indeed, Clarkson received 25 percent of the vote of both the supporters and opponents of the Spadina Expressway, and did best (30 per cent of the vote) among those undecided on the question. However, the issue of the Spadina Expressway seemed quite salient in the case of the other two candidates. Mrs. Campbell was supported by 54 percent of those who opposed the Expressway, but by only 33 percent of those who approved it. Mayor Dennison, on the other hand, was preferred by 43 percent of the supporters of the Expressway, compared with 22 percent of its opponents.

A fourth factor contributing to the low vote of the Liberal Party was disunity within the party itself. The decision to enter municipal politics had not been an unanimous one, and the problem was not lessened by acrimony arising during the nomination of a mayoralty candidate. One serious consequence of party disunity was a severe shortage of campaign funds. There was no money whatsoever to purchase the television time that would be necessary to promote an unknown, but potentially charismatic candidate.

The degree of party unity was low even among the candidates themselves. Party spokesmen and candidates emphasized the value of party discipline on City Council, but the pledge may not have seemed totally credible to some voters. The party standard bearer denounced Old Guard politicians, but the only incumbent alderman running on the Liberal ticket was prominent among this group. The party platform and mayoralty candidate expressed concern about City deference to real estate developers, but its candidate in Ward II was closely associated with the pro-developer position. On the issue of the Spadina Expressway, the city Liberals and the suburban Liberals took different positions — a fact that did not suggest forthcoming party unity on the Metro Council. Sometimes the disunity assumed more personal forms. At one large neighbourhood meeting, the two Liberal candidates for alderman spoke much more warmly about Margaret Campbell than

about the candidate of their own party, and they strongly implied that she was their real first choice.

The factors cited in the last section could be interpreted as being of only historical importance. It could be argued that the result would (or will) be quite different in 1972 when the problems of first entry into municipal politics will be in the past. Or at least it could be argued that this would be the case if the party is more united, if it selects a more experienced candidate, and if its vote is not eroded by the presence of another candidate appealing to its natural supporters. However, is there any evidence from the survey indicating whether this argument is a sound one?

Certainly the data does make clear that even in this first, rather disorganized entry of the Liberal Party into municipal politics, the party label was a factor of considerable importance. Indeed, the factor associated most closely with Liberal voting in the municipal election was a preference for the Liberal Party at the federal level. Thus, Clarkson was the front-running candidate among those who stated that they usually voted for the federal Liberal Party, receiving 39 percent of their vote. In contrast, he received the support of 21 percent of the N.D.P. voters and only 8 percent of the Conservatives. Those who stated that their federal voting preference varied gave Clarkson 20 percent of their vote.

Yet, even among those identifying themselves with the federal Liberal Party, less than one half voted for the municipal Liberal candidate for mayor. Is this fact simply to be explained by the factors discussed in the last section? Or does it suggest that the Liberal Party will face the same diffculty in transferring its federal vote to the municipal level that it has had at the provincial level?

Obviously this question can be answered only by history, but there is one indication that the Liberals do face at least one long-term problem in their quest for municipal victory. One of the striking facts about the 1968 federal election was the ability of the Liberal candidates to win strong support in all sections of the three wards being studied. Ward 6 often is the first residence of new immigrants without knowledge of the English language, and it contains some of the poorest areas of the city. Ward 11 contains some of the wealthiest areas of the City, nevertheless, the lowest-income census tracts of Ward 6 and the highest-income census tracts of Ward 11 both gave Liberal candidates the same 57 percent of their vote in the 1968 federal election. (Polling subdivisions based entirely on high-rise apartment houses are excluded from these calculations. The Liberal candidates received 64 percent of the vote in such subdivisions within the three wards.)

In the provincial elections, as John Wilson and David Hoffman

have shown, the lower-status supporters of the federal Liberal Party in southern Ontario tend to remain loyal to the provincial Liberal Party (although their turnout rate is low), while a significant number of the higher-status Liberals defect to the Conservative Party[3]. In the 1969 municipal election the federal Liberal coalition also failed to maintain itself, but in this election it was lower-status Liberal voters who did not support their party's candidate for mayor.

Among the real upper class of Canada (and of all industrialized countries) — the managerial officials of large organizations and the professionals — Clarkson received the support of 49 percent of those who voted Liberal on the federal level. (He received the votes of 44 percent of the Liberal college students, who should also be included in this upper class group, at least in the University of Toronto areas being studied in this paper.) Among the middle class — the small businessmen, salesmen, and clerical personnel — Clarkson was supported by 33 percent of the Liberals, and among the skilled and unskilled workers by 24 percent of his party. If — as they sometimes perceive themselves — the retired persons are really the lower class of society, Clarkson's 15 percent support among this group of Liberals completes the picture.

This pattern of class differential in the support for the Liberal mayoralty candidate was not limited to those voters who identified themselves as Liberals. It appears in the analysis of any voter characteristic that is class-related:

Occupation: Professionals and managers — 32 percent; small businessmen — 11 percent; clerical-sales — 25 percent; workers — 23 percent.

Assessed value of house: Under $4500 — 13 percent; $4500-$7000 — 19 percent; over $7000 — 32 percent.

Education: Elementary or incomplete high school — 16 percent; high school graduate or incomplete college — 25 percent; college degree or higher — 32 percent.

Symptomatic of Clarkson's relative strength among upper class voters is the vote in the downtown polling subdivisions in which at least 90 percent of the voters were non-residents. Such subdivisions almost always centre on one or more large office buildings, and their voters are primarily lawyers, accountants, and so forth, rather than small businessmen. An examination of the aggregate data in the official returns reveals that Clarkson received a percentage of the vote (30 percent) that was almost as high as that (33 percent) received in the subdivisions based exclusively on high rent apartments.

[3]John Wilson and David Hoffman, 'The Liberal Party in Contemporary Ontario Politics', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. III, No. 2, June 1970.

The significance of these statistics on the class composition of the Liberal vote is difficult to judge on the basis of one election alone. Yet, it is conceivable that they point to a fundamental problem the Liberals face as they enter Toronto municipal politics — a fundamental difficulty in maintaining the political alliance of the affluent upper class and the New Canadian working class. The reliance upon the real estate tax for municipal finance does push the low-income citizens into a conservatism on municipal governmental expenditures on social welfare issues in a way that bodes well for the alliance, but on many issues the two divergent elements of the Liberal coalition are on opposing sides. In the realm of education, for example, it is not easy for a politician to reconcile the New Canadian's desire for an extension of the separate school system with 'Orange' Toronto's suspicion of such a policy. It may not be easy to mobilize a high turnout in lower-income areas without emphasizing the existing differentials in municipal services and thereby alienating those areas that benefit from the status quo.

The 'quality of life' issues emphasized in the 1969 campaign may seem to transcend class boundaries and to avoid aggravating tensions within the Liberal coalition. In reality, however, this is not the case. First, of course, the financial conservatism engendered by the real estate tax creates even greater suspicion among the poor about the 'frill' expenditures involved in a better 'quality of life' than it does about social welfare measures. (The 'Old Guard's' much-denounced resistance to cultural expenditures is, for example, quite understandable and rational in terms of the class basis of their voting support.) Second — and even more fundamental — real estate developments and expressways often convey quite different connotations to the affluent and to the poor. To the affluent, they represent a challenge to a status quo that is very pleasant (to the affluent). To the poor, real estate developments mean an increase in the city's real estate tax base. More important, to the poor — particularly to the New Canadian poor who are heavily involved in construction work — real estate developments and expressways mean additional jobs. In a time of relatively high unemployment it is not surprising that a campaign based on 'quality of life' issues did relatively poorly among low-income groups. What is surprising is that it did as well as it did.

Certainly it would be wrong even to suggest that the problems discussed in this paper preclude the successful entry of parties into Toronto municipal politics. Even the federal Liberal coalition might be maintained through a different candidate-and-issue balance (e.g., a mayoralty candidate of New Canadian background emphasizing

'quality of life' issues). Even more feasible would be a three party race with rather different coalitions than found in federal elections. Particularly on the Metro Toronto level, the Liberals might be quite successful with a coalition between the suburbs and the affluent areas of the city (assuming that it would not be the Conservatives who establish this alliance as they do on the provincial level).

Yet, it would be equally wrong to ignore the differences in the municipal and federal environments — particularly those associated with the differences between a graduated income tax and a property tax that must still be paid when a person is unemployed, underemployed, or retired. A tax structure that changes the low-income voter from a man who favours expanded governmental services into one who favours low governmental expenditures is one that will require many adjustments in approach as parties move from the federal to the municipal level.

POSTSCRIPT . . . CITY COUNCIL RESULTS

by P. Silcox

Voter Turnout

After all statutory procedures for adding and deleting names had been followed, the electoral register contained 426,434 names. Civic electoral registers are notoriously inaccurate, so that the turnout of people who were in practice able to vote was probably considerably higher than the official figure of 38.5%.

A large number of those who voted failed to mark a complete ballot paper. In the mayoralty contest, only 93.3% of those who took a ballot paper actually cast a valid vote for one of the four candidates. This phenomenon was even more marked in the aldermanic contests. For example, in Ward One 16,005 voters recorded 24,445 votes for aldermanic candidates, so that 18.6% of the votes were not used.

The pre-election redistribution of seats used total population as the basis for drawing ward boundaries, and as a partial result, there were significant differences in the size of ward electorates. The largest electorate, 49,986, was in Ward Eleven; the smallest, 23,991 in Ward Three. There were also marked differences in percentage turnout between wards. The highest turnout was in Ward Eleven, where 47.3% of those listed on the electoral register voted, while the lowest, 29.2%, was in Ward Six. It might be assumed that percentage turnout would be related to the number of candidates contesting aldermanic and school board seats. In fact, this was not the case. In Ward One, where the only acclamation occurred, the percentage turnout for school board seats was three percentage points above the average for the City as a whole.

Ward	Electors	% Voting	Candidates Council	Candidates School Board
1	38,633	41.4	7	2
2	38,938	33	8	7
3	23,991	40	6	6
4	25,296	34.5	8	4
5	39,252	38.4	9	9
6	41,438	29.2	10	6
7	40,991	33.3	9	7
8	35,439	37.5	7	7
9	42,065	42.6	6	6
10	49,365	42.5	7	6
11	49,986	47.3	6	3
Total	426,439	38.5	83	62

William Dennison retained the mayoralty with a sizeable majority but failed to win half of the votes cast for mayoral candidates. He carried eight of the eleven wards. Wards Five, Six and Ten were carried by Mrs. Campbell.

The Mayoral Vote

W. D. Dennison	66,083	(43.15%)
M. Campbell	52,813	(34.48%)
S. H. E. Clarkson	31,927	(20.85%)
J. Ridell	2,337	(1.52%)

When voters elect their aldermen, they also decide who is to serve on the Council of the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto. The senior alderman, the candidate with the largest total vote in each ward, serves on this latter body in addition to City Council. In nine wards, incumbent Council members were elected as senior aldermen, including all three retiring Controllers who contested the aldermanic elections. In Wards One, Four, Six, Eight and Ten, the senior alderman elected demonstrated an overwhelming electoral appeal. In the wards listed, the junior alderman failed to win 60% of the votes given to his senior colleague.

Parties

The Liberals and New Democrats each nominated 16 aldermanic candidates, although one Liberal decided at the last minute to change wards on his own initiative. Three New Democrats and two Liberals were elected. Four of the five were newcomers to City Council. One Liberal victor had previously been elected as an Independent.

Election to office is of course the one real indication of success for a political party, but it is also of interest to ask how close the losing candidates came to winning office. Any standard one uses here is, of course, an arbitrary one. It can be argued that a political party sometimes runs candidates to give expression to a particular viewpoint, or to prepare the ground for future victories. When all this is said, however, winning electoral contests is the central aim of political parties in a democratic system, and any standard used to measure the success of a political party must be related to this.

Here two standards are used; any candidate who won half the vote secured by the Junior alderman in a given ward is labelled a 'serious challenger for office'; any candidate who failed to secure one quarter of the vote won by the Junior alderman in a given ward is labelled a 'token candidate'.

Using these standards, five N.D.P. candidates and two Liberal candidates, in addition to those elected, rank as 'serious challengers for office'. One should note in passing that the Liberal candidate for mayor just fails to achieve this status. Four New Democrats and three Liberals rank as 'token candidates'.

The table below shows the relative success of party candidates in terms of the percentage won by alderman.

| Ward	Junior alderman	% of Vote of Senior Alderman Won			
		N.D.P.		Liberal	
		1st Cand.	2nd	1st Cand.	2nd
1	50	32	23	14	—
2	76	76	—	29	19
3	85	31	20	100	—
4	54	22	12	7	—
5	89	51	—	44	38
6	59	43	—	59	21
7	93	100	—	25	—
8	58	43	38	14	—
9	98	98	38	12	—
10	60	13	—	60	25
11	91	11	—	48	—

One additional point that is clear from this table is that the two candidates of a party often fared very differently, indicating the limited extent of straight ticket voting.

Occupations of Candidates

Precise details of the occupations of candidates are extremely difficult to obtain, but the candidates do supply a general designation when nominated. Unspecific as these are, they do provide some indication of the type of occupation and allow some generalizations to be made.

As might be expected, the candidates who win elections provide an even less accurate reflection of the voting population than do the larger category of all candidates. It would be surprising in the Canadian context if many manual workers were found among the candidates. The City of Toronto election of 1969 provides no surprise on that score.

Occupation	Candidates	Members of City Council
Businessman	12	5
Lawyer	11	6
Clerical & Sales	10	—
Teacher	8	3
Real Estate	6	1
Engineer	5	3
Skilled Worker	5	—
Journalist	4	1
Public Relations	3	—
Insurance agent	3	2
Accountant	3	1
Labour, Pol. organizer	3	—
Student	2	—
Contractor	2	1
Minister	1	—
Social Worker	1	—
Architect	1	—
Housewife	2	—
Retired	2	—

BUREAU OF MUNICIPAL RESEARCH

Founded in 1914 as a non-profit research agency staffed by well qualified personnel, the Bureau of Municipal Research maintains continuous study of the problems facing municipalities and their residents.

Long an advocate of responsive and responsible government, the Bureau has gained wide recognition for the high calibre of its quarterly *Civic Affairs*, its monthly *BMR Comment*, its information and advisory services, and the participation of its staff in the public discussion of issues.

The Bureau is an independent agency supported by a broad cross-section of business and professional firms, organizations, governments, and individuals.

your inquiries are invited:

BUREAU OF MUNICIPAL RESEARCH
Suite 406, 4 RICHMOND ST. E., Toronto 1, 363-9265